Madison, Benjamin v. Agawam, Town of - Police Department (SPR 20150821)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Shawn A. Williams Supervisor ofR ecords December 23, 2015 SPRlS/821 Lieutenant Edward McGovern Agawam Police Department 681 Springfield Street Feeding Hills, MA Dear Lieutenant McGovern: I have received the petition of Benjamin Maddison appealing the response of the Agawam Police Department (Department) to his request for public records. G. L. c. 66 § 1O (b ); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(2). Specifically, Mr. Madison requested copies of records pertaining to him. The Department initially responded to Mr. Maddison in a letter dated September 24, 2015. In this letter, you denied Mr. Maddison's request, stating "it is overly broad and burdensome." You also suggested that Mr. Maddison continue to work with his attorney to acquire records from the Department. Mr. Maddison appealed this response in a letter to this office dated September 26, 2015. Subsequent to the intervention of an attorney on my staff, you provided a supplemental response to Mr. Maddison in a letter dated November 17,2015. You explained that the records Mr. Maddison sought in his initial request are different than those described in his appeal to this office. Specifically, Mr. Maddison's initial request was for "all police reports, call logs, and warrant information as of 20 14" (Request 1) . In his September 26 appeal petition to this office, Mr. Maddison indicates he is seeking all police reports, call logs, and warrant information about him within a specified time period (Request 2). Purpose of request; identity of requester Mr. Maddison's request pertains to records regarding him. Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requesters. Access to a record requested pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requester. See Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, OneAshburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 · (617) 727-2832 ·Fax (617) 727-5914 www.sec.state.ma.us/pre

Lieutenant Edward McGovern SPR15/821 Page Two December 23, 2015 Mr. Maddison's purpose in making the request has no bearing on the public status of any existing responsive records. It should be noted that the discovery process and the Public Records Law are two distinct and independent avenues for gaining access to records. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that while a party's access to records may be limited by the Public Records Law, this may not preclude obtaining the records through discovery. Commonwealth v. Wanis, 426 Mass. 639 (1998). Mr. Maddison may wish to consider another means of seeking to obtain any existing responsive records. November 17 letter The Department's November 17 response provides fee estimates for both requests. Request 2 is the only subject of this appeal because Mr. Maddison refers to this request in his appeal to this office. The Department states the cost for providing records responsive to Request 2 is $26.26 and you explain certain records may be redacted or withheld pursuant to G.L. c. 41, §97(d). Request for fee waiver Mr. Maddison requested the Department waive the fees associated with this request. This office has been made aware that the Department intends to waive the $26.26 fee and provide records responsive to Request 2 that it deems non-exempt from disclosure. See 950 C.M.R. 32.06. Conclusion Accordingly, I will consider this appeal closed with the proviso that, within ten (1 0) days, the Department provides records responsive to Request 2 in a manner consistent with the Public records Law and this Determination. Mr. Maddison is advised that he may appeal the Department's redactions or withholding of records, if any, within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(2). cc: Mr. Benjamin Maddison