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William McDonagh v. Suffolk County Sheriff's Department (SPR 20190468)

Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records · Filed 02-26-2019

ClosedAppealPetitioner Won

SPR 20190468 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by William McDonagh concerning records held by Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, opened 02-26-2019. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records.

Case Details

Case Number
20190468
Case Type
Appeal
Case Subtype
Initial
Status
Closed
Requester
William McDonagh
Custodian
Suffolk County Sheriff's Department
Date Opened
02-26-2019
Date Closed
03-12-2019
Date Request Submitted
11-30-2018
Processing Fees Charged
0.00
Petitions Regarding Fees
No
Time to Comply
17 Business Days (4-4-19)
Went to Court
No

PDF Document

Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records March 12, 2019 SPR19/0468 Maria F. Romero, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Suffolk County Sheriffs Department 132 Portland Street Boston, MA 02114 Dear Attorney Romero: I have received the petition of William McDonagh appealing the response of the Suffolk County Sheriffs Department (Department) to a request for public records. G. L. c. 66, § 1O A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Specifically, Mr. McDonagh originally requested "the names of the correctional officers that were working and the dates requested with regards to the following incidents listed below." The Department provided a response to Mr. McDonagh on January 9, 2019. Mr. McDonagh appealed the Department's response to this office on February 26, 2019. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § lOA(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). "Public records" is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any town of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § lO(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. G. L. c. 66, § lO(b)(iv). If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § lO(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre• pre@sec.state.ma.us

Maria F. Romero, Esq. SPR19/0468 Page 2 March 12, 2019 Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7 (26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public's right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). The Department cites the Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) Act for the reasoning behind withholding requested records. See G. L. c. 4, § 7 (26)(a). Please note that an updated definition of CORI is currently in effect. CORI is defined as: [R]ecords and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to the nature or disposition of a criminal charge, an arrest, a pre-trial proceeding, other judicial proceedings, previous hearings conducted pursuant to section 58A of chapter 276 where the defendant was detained prior to trial or released with conditions under subsection (2) of section 58A of chapter 276, sentencing, incarceration, rehabilitation, or release. Such information shall be restricted to information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment. Criminal offender record information shall not include evaluative information, statistical and analytical reports and files in which individuals are not directly or indirectly identifiable, or intelligence information ... Criminal offender record information shall not include information concerning any offenses which are not punishable by incarceration G. L. C. 6, § 167. It is unclear how the withheld records are exempt under the CORI Act; specifically, it is uncertain how all of these records contain information compiled by a criminal justice agency and is restricted to "information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment" as described above. Exemption (c) The Department redacted portions of responsive records under Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law.

Maria F. Romero, Esq. SPR19/0468 Page 3 March 12, 2019 Exemption ( c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information; also any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First clause Exemption ( c) contains two distinct and independent clauses, each requiring its own analysis. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432-33 (1983). The first clause, relevant to this determination, creates a categorical exemption for personnel and medical information that relates to an identifiable individual and is of a "personal nature." Id. at 434. Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual is exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. School Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 438. Generally, medical information will be of a sufficiently personal nature to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person's body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Examiner, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). While it is generally held that one's right to privacy is extinguished at death, an Individual's privacy interest in his or her medical information survives death. See id. at 134. Second clause Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c ) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public's right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm'r of Real Property Dep't, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case by case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep't of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280,292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n. 13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415,427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number).

Maria F. Romero, Esq. SPR19/0468 Page 4 March 12, 2019 This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. The Department's response does not address how the redacted information constitutes medical or personnel information, nor does it address the factors articulated in PETA . As a result, the Department has not established how the withheld information is exempt under Exemption (c). Exemption (d) The Department is withholding records under Exemption ( d). Exemption ( d) allows the withholding of: inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based G. L. C. 4, §7(26)(d). Exemption ( d) is intended to avoid premature release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if disclosed. Its application is limited to recommendations on legal and policy matters found within an ongoing deliberative process. See Babets v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230,237 n.8 (1988). Factual reports which are reasonably complete and inferences which can be drawn from factual investigations, even if labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt as deliberative or policy making materials. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d); see also Envtl. Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (purely factual matters used in the development of government policy are always subject to disclosure). The Department does not make clear that the records it withheld are "inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency" as required by Exemption (d). See G. L. c. 66, § lO(b)(iv); Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) ( custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). The Department does not explain how the records would involve legal or policy concerns that would be developed by the Department. As a result, the Department has not met its burden to explain how the records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption ( d). See G. L. C. 4, §7 (26)(d).

Maria F. Romero, Esq. SPR19/0468 Page 5 March 12, 2019 Conclusion Accordingly, the Department is ordered to review the request and provide a written response to Mr. McDonagh, made in accordance with the Public Records Law, its Access Regulations and this order within 10 business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of this response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma. us. Sincerely, ~~ Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records cc: William McDonagh