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Joe Difazio v. Cohasset, Town of - Town Clerk (SPR 20191020)
Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records · Filed 06-20-2019
ClosedAppealPetitioner Won
SPR 20191020 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by Joe Difazio concerning records held by Cohasset, Town of - Town Clerk, opened 06-20-2019. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records.
Case Details
- Case Number
- 20191020
- Case Type
- Appeal
- Case Subtype
- In Cam
- Status
- Closed
- Requester
- Joe Difazio
- Custodian
- Cohasset, Town of - Town Clerk
- Date Opened
- 06-20-2019
- Date Closed
- 07-12-2019
- Processing Fees Charged
- 0.00
- Petitions Regarding Fees
- No
- Time to Comply
- 10 Business Days (7-26-19)
- Went to Court
- No
- In Camera Opened
- 06-20-2019
- In Camera Closed
- 07-12-2019
PDF Document
Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor ofR ecords May 31, 2019 SPR19/1020 Louise L. Demas Superintendent Cohasset Public Schools 143 Pond Street Cohasset, MA 02025 Dear Superintendent Demas: I have received the petition of Joseph Difazio appealing the response of the Cohasset Public Schools (School) to a request for public records. G. L. c. 66, § lOA; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Specifically, on February 5, 2019, Mr. Difazio requested the following records: 1. "Any records, including electronic communication, receipts, invoices, communication to pause, etc. relating to a Ryan Strategies investigations undertaken by Cohasset's public school system related to [an identified] former school employee ... and/or the school's response to allegations against him." 2. "The final report of any such Ryan Strategies investigation." The School provided an initial response on March 11, 2019, including a fee estimate. After receipt of payment, the School provided another response dated May 21, 2019, which included portions of the responsive records in redacted form. The School also withheld certain responsive records from disclosure. The School claims that the records were redacted and/or withheld pursuant to Exemptions (a), (c), and (f) of the Public Records Law, as well as the attorney-client privilege. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (c), (f). Unsatisfied with the School's May 21st response, Mr. Difazio petitioned this office and this appeal, SPRl 9/1020, was opened as a result. While this appeal was pending, the School provided supplemental responses on May 29, 2019 and May 31, 2019. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 1 OA( d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4 ). "Public records" is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727- 5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre• pre@sec.state.ma.us Superintendent Louise Demas SPR19/1020 Page2 May 31, 2019 form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any town of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § lO(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507,511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 1 O(b )(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The School's May 21st, May 29th, and May 3pt responses In its May 21, 2019 response, the School indicated that it was providing a set of emails and responsive documents. The School provided an index of the records with the exemptions being claimed to withhold and redact portions of the records. The School also informed Mr. Difazio that "complying with [his] request exceeded the good faith cost estimate by four (4) hours" and included a cost estimate of $100. In its supplemental responses on May 29, 2019 and May 31, 2019, the School clarified the exemptions being claimed and provided an updated index of the email records and documents that have either been provided or withheld. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public's right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either "shall not be a public record," "shall be kept confidential" or "shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law." Superintendent Louise Demas SPR19/1020 Page 3 May 31, 2019 The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. Exemption (c) Exemption ( c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information; also any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First clause ofE xemption (c) - personnel Exemption ( c) contains two distinct and independent clauses, each requiring its own analysis. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432-33 (1983). The first clause creates a categorical exemption for personnel information that relates to an identifiable individual and is of a "personal nature." Id. at 434. Massachusetts courts have found that "core categories of personnel information that are 'useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee"' may be withheld from disclosure. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). For example, "employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee," may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of Exemption (c). Wakefield Teachers Ass'n v. School Comm., 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). The courts have also discussed specific categories of records that may be redacted under the first clause. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Exec. Office of Admin. and Finance, Suffolk Sup. No. 11-01184-A (June 14, 2013). Nevertheless, there is a strong public interest in monitoring public expenditures and public employees have a diminished expectation of privacy with respect to public employment matters. See George W. Prescott Publishing Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 274,278 (1985); Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 436 n.15. Further, the public has an interest in knowing whether public employees are "carrying out their duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner." Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 158 (1979). As a result, certain information that is considered personal in the ordinary sense of the word may be considered part of a public record ifrelating to an individual's official responsibilities. See Brogan v. School Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 309 (1987). Superintendent Louise Demas SPR19/1020 Page4 May 31, 2019 Second clause ofE xemption (c) - privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public's right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm'r of Real Property Dep't, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case by case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep't of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280,292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415,427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. Exemption (I) Exemption (f) permits the withholding of: investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest G. L. C. 4, § 7(26)(f). A custodian of records generally must demonstrate a prejudice to investigative efforts in order to withhold requested records. Information relating to an ongoing investigation may be withheld if disclosure could alert suspects to the activities of investigative officials. Confidential investigative techniques may also be withheld indefinitely if disclosure is deemed to be prejudicial to future law enforcement activities. Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass 59, 62 (1976). Redactions may be appropriate where they serve to preserve the anonymity Superintendent Louise Demas SPR19/1020 Page 5 May 31, 2019 of voluntary witnesses. Antell v. Attorney Gen., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 244,248 (2001); Reinstein v. Police Comm\ of Boston, 378 Mass. 281,290 n.18 (1979). Exemption (f) invites a "case-by case consideration" of whether disclosure "would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest." See Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289-90. In camera inspection In order to facilitate a determination as to the applicability of the Exemptions (a), (c), and (f) claims made by the School to withhold portions of the responsive records, the School must provide this office with un-redacted copies of the responsive records for an in camera review without delay. 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4). After I complete my review of the documents, I will return the records to your custody and issue an opinion on the public or exempt nature of the record. The authority to require the submission of records for an in camera inspection emanates from the Code of Massachusetts Regulations. 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4); see also G. L. c. 66, § 1. This office interprets the in camera inspection process to be analogous to that utilized by the judicial system. See Rock v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 206 (1981) ( administrative agency entitled deference in the interpretation of its own regulations). Records are not voluntarily submitted, but rather are submitted pursuant to an order by this office that an in camera inspection is necessary to make a proper finding. Records are submitted for the limited purpose of review. This office is not the custodian of records examined in camera, therefore, any request made to this office for records being reviewed in camera will be denied. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4)(c). This office has a long history of cooperation with governmental agencies with respect to in camera inspection. Custodians submit copies of the relevant records to this office upon a promise of confidentiality. This office does not release records reviewed in camera to anyone under any circumstances. Upon a determination of the public record status, records reviewed in camera are promptly returned to the custodian. To operate in any other fashion would seriously impede our ability to function and would certainly affect our credibility within the legal community. Order Accordingly, the School is ordered to provide this office with un-redacted copies of the responsive records for in camera inspection without delay. Attorney-client privilege A records custodian claiming the attorney-client privilege under the Public Records Law has the burden of not only proving the existence of an attorney-client relationship, but also (1) that the communications were received from a client during the course of the client's search for Superintendent Louise Demas SPR19/1020 Page 6 May 31, 2019 legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) that the communications were made in confidence; and (3) that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 449 Mass. 450 n.9 (2007); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 449 Mass. 609, 619 (2007) (stating that the party seeking the attorney-client privilege has the burden to show the privilege applies). Disclosing attorney client communications to a third party generally undermines the privilege. Comm'r of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 306 (2009). Records custodians seeking to invoke the common law attorney-client privilege "are required to produce detailed indices to support their claims of privilege." Suffolk Constr. Co., 449 Mass, at 460. Pursuant to the Public Records Law, in assessing whether a records custodian has properly withheld records based on the claim of attorney-client privilege the Supervisor of Records "shall require, as part of the decision making process, that the agency or municipality provide a detailed description of the record, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed." G. L. c. 66, § IOA(a). In the index provided, the School indicated that certain email records were withheld under the attorney-client privilege. Upon review of the School's index, the names of the author, recipients and dates of the records are evident. However, the School did not provide information regarding the substance of the record or the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege claim is being claimed. Consequently, the School must provide further information relating to the substance of the record and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed as contemplated in G. L. c. 66, § IOA(a). In particular, the School must establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship and clarify whether the communications were received from a client during the course of the client's search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such, whether the communications were made in confidence, and whether the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. Suffolk Constr. Co., 449 Mass. at 450 n.9. Clarification In his petition for appeal, Mr. Difazio states "[w]e paid the Town $200 ... for the request and they have asked us for an additional $100." Based on his appeal petition, it is unclear if Mr. Difazio is objecting to the fee estimate provided by the School in its May 21st response. Mr. Difazio is advised to inform this office if he objects to the fee. Conclusion Accordingly, the School is ordered to provide Mr. Difazio with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law, and its Regulations within ten business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of this response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Superintendent Louise Demas SPR19/1020 Page 7 May 31, 2019 Sincerely, ~~ Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records cc: Joseph Difazio Rosann DiPietro, Esq.