Norbert Tschakert v. Salem State University (SPR 20200954)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records June 29, 2020 SPR20/0954 Rita P. Colucci, Esq. General Counsel Salem State University 352 Lafayette Street Salem, MA 01970-5353 Dear Attorney Colucci: I have received the petition of Norbert Tschakert appealing the response of the Salem State University (University) to a request for public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Specifically, Mr. Tschakert requested: “…any and all communication and documents Dean Barnes initiated or received that include me, my name, or my position as the endowed chair (and which I was not already a party to).” On June 5, 2020, the University provided Mr. Tschakert with responsive records; however, certain of the correspondence (communications) were withheld under the common law attorney-client privilege and Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law. As a result, Mr. Tschakert petitioned the Supervisor of Records (Supervisor), and this appeal was opened. Status of the requestor Mr. Tschakert should be advised the reason for which a requestor seeks access to, or a copy of, a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record requested pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). In addition, the discovery process and the Public Records Law are two distinct and independent avenues for gaining access to records. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that while a party's access to records may be limited by the Public Records Law, this may not preclude obtaining the records through discovery. Commonwealth v. Wanis, 426 Mass. 639 (1998); 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1)(a) (the administrative appeal process “shall not apply to records in which an individual, or a representative of the individual, has a unique right of access One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Rita P. Colucci, Esq. SPR20/0954 Page 2 June 29, 2020 to the record through statutory, regulatory, judicial or other applicable means.”). Accordingly, Mr. Tschakert’s status as an employee of the University will play no role in a determination as to whether the records should be disclosed to the public in their entirety. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any town of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based…”); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). Common law attorney-client privilege In its June 5th response, the University has claimed that certain of the communications sent and received by the University’s General Counsel’s Office have been withheld under the common law attorney-client privilege, as recognized by Suffolk Constr. Co., Inc. v. DCAM, 449 Mass. 444 (2008). There is an implicit assumption that a governmental entity “may assert attorney-client privilege to protect documents against disclosure where they contain communications between lawyer and client for purpose of obtaining legal advice.” Brossard v. University of Massachusetts, 9 Mass. L. Rep. 471 (1998), referencing Judge Rotenberg Educ. Center, Inc., v. Comm’r of the Dept. of Mental Retardation (No. 1), 424 Mass. 430 (1997). The issue of whether this privilege extends to governmental entities was discussed in the affirmative by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court). Suffolk Constr. Co., Inc., 449 Mass. 444. The Court found that the privilege applies in the public realm. The Supervisor of Records has the authority to determine whether records may be withheld as privileged. See Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 414 Mass. 609, 614-615 (1993). The Court affirmed the “general rule” that when matters are “communicated by a client to his attorney, in professional confidence, the attorney shall not be at any time afterwards called upon or permitted to disclose in testimony.” Suffolk Constr. Co., Inc., 449 Mass. at 448, quoting

Rita P. Colucci, Esq. SPR20/0954 Page 3 June 29, 2020 Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89, 93 (1831). The Court, however, admonished that a governmental entity has the burden of proving the existence of the attorney-client privilege. Id. The Court requires governmental custodians to satisfy a three-step test to claim not only that an attorney- client relationship exists, but that, with respect to the privileged materials: (1) the communications were received from a client during the course of the client's search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) the communications were made in confidence; and (3) the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. Suffolk Constr. Co., 449 Mass. 450, fn 9, citing Matter of the Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. Ltd. (Bermuda), 425 Mass. 419, 421 (1997); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen --------------------------- Ins. Servs., 449 Mass. 609, 619 (2007) (stating that the party seeking the attorney-client privilege has the burden to show the privilege applies). Pursuant to the Public Records Law, in assessing whether a records custodian has properly withheld records based on the claim of attorney-client privilege that the Supervisor, “shall require, as part of the decision making process, that the agency or municipality provide a detailed description of the record, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed.” G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). While you asserted in your June 5th response that all communications received or sent by the General Counsel’s Office can be withheld under the attorney-client privilege; however, the University did not meet the burden of specificity in claiming the attorney-client privilege to withhold such communications. In claiming the attorney-client privilege to withhold communications, the University must specify that: the communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; the communications were made in confidence; and the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. See Suffolk Constr. Co., 449 Mass. 450, fn 9. In addition to the requirements under Suffolk, the University must provide a detailed description of each communication, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). Exemption (c) The University’s June 5th response indicates, “[c]orrespondence that contained

Rita P. Colucci, Esq. SPR20/0954 Page 4 June 29, 2020 information falling into [E]xemption (c) of MGL c. 4, section 7(26), which exempts personnel information, or information relating to a specific individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. This exemption has been applied to emails containing CV’s of employees and emails containing information regarding a complaint.” Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information; also any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy G. L. c. 4, § 7 (26)(c). Exemption (c) contains two distinct and independent clauses, each requiring its own analysis. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432-33 (1983). The first clause creates a categorical exemption for personnel information that relates to an identifiable individual and is of a “personal nature.” Id. at 434. Massachusetts courts have found that “core categories of personnel information that are ‘useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee’” may be withheld from disclosure. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). For example, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee,” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of Exemption (c). Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. School Comm., 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). The courts have also discussed specific categories of records that may be redacted under the first clause. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Exec. Office of Admin. and Finance, Suffolk Sup. No. 11-01184-A (June 14, 2013). Nevertheless, there is a strong public interest in monitoring public expenditures and public employees have a diminished expectation of privacy with respect to public employment matters. See George W. Prescott Publ’g Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk Cnty., 395 Mass. 274, 278 (1985); Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 436 n.15. Further, the public has an interest in knowing whether public employees are “carrying out their duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner.” Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 158 (1979). As a result, certain information that is considered personal in the ordinary sense of the word may be considered part of a public record if relating to an individual’s official responsibilities. See Brogan v. School Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 309 (1987). Second clause of (c) - privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Property Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case by case basis.

Rita P. Colucci, Esq. SPR20/0954 Page 5 June 29, 2020 This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. It is unclear whether the University claimed only the first clause of Exemption (c), the personnel and medical clause or, whether the University seeks to also withhold requested records under the second clause of Exemption (c). Burden of specificity; duty to segregate Under the Public Records Law, the burden shall be upon the custodian to prove with specificity the exemption which applies. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); see also Globe Newspaper Co. -------------------- v. Police Comm’r, 419 Mass. 852, 857 (1995); Flatley, 419 Mass. at 511. The University did not meet its burden of demonstrating how the responsive records, in their entirety, are exempt from disclosure. See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). The University must produce any non-exempt, segregable portions of the public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). Conclusion Accordingly, the University is ordered to provide a response to the request, in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations as soon as practicable. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of this response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us.

Rita P. Colucci, Esq. SPR20/0954 Page 6 June 29, 2020 Sincerely, Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records cc: Norbert Tschakert