← Back to Search
Andrew Quemere v. Northwestern District Attorney's Office (SPR 20201480)
Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records · Filed 08-26-2020
ClosedAppealPetitioner Won
SPR 20201480 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by Andrew Quemere concerning records held by Northwestern District Attorney's Office, opened 08-26-2020. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records.
Case Details
- Case Number
- 20201480
- Case Type
- Appeal
- Case Subtype
- Initial
- Status
- Closed
- Requester
- Andrew Quemere
- Date Opened
- 08-26-2020
- Date Closed
- 09-10-2020
- Date Request Submitted
- 08-14-2020
- Response Provided Date
- 08-26-2020
- Time to Comply
- 2 Business Days
PDF Document
Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records September 10, 2020 SPR20/1480 Cynthia Von Flatern, Esq. Assistant District Attorney/Records Access Officer Northwestern District Attorney’s Office One Gleason Plaza Northampton, MA 01060 Dear Attorney Flatern: I have received the petition of Andrew Quemere appealing the response of the Northwestern District Attorney’s Office (Office) to a request for public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Specifically, on August 14, 2020, Mr. Quemere requested the following categories of records: [1] Your office’s “Brady lists,” which refers to lists of police officers who have credibility problems and other concerns that must be disclosed to the defense if the officer is involved in a criminal prosecution[.] [2] All letters, emails, and other communications notifying police departments and/or individual police officers that an officer has been added to a Brady list for the years 2015 to the present[.] [3] All policies, procedures, and training records related to Brady lists[.] The Office responded on August 24, 2020, indicating it did not possess certain records and denying access to other portions pursuant to Exemptions (a) and (c) of the Public Records Law. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (c). Unsatisfied with the Office’s response, Mr. Quemere petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR20/1480, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any town of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us Cynthia Von Flatern SPR20/1480 Page 2 September 10, 2020 It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Office’s August 26th response In its August 26, 2020 response, the Office enclosed its “. . . Brady Disclosure Protocol.” The Office states that it “. . . do[es] not have training materials responsive to this request.” The Office further explains that “[d]ecisions about what officers if any would be placed on a Brady list are not complete. In the event that a decision is made that information about an officer must be disclosed to a defendant in a criminal case because it is potentially exculpatory for the defendant, favorable to a defendant, or useful for impeachment, the documents will not be public records as they will fall under the statutory or privacy exceptions to the definition of public records, G.L. c. 4, sec. 7, cl. 26th(a), (c), or some other exception.” Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists Cynthia Von Flatern SPR20/1480 Page 3 September 10, 2020 individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information; also any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First clause of Exemption (c) – personnel & medical Exemption (c) contains two distinct and independent clauses, each requiring its own analysis. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432-33 (1983). The first clause creates a categorical exemption for personnel information that relates to an identifiable individual and is of a “personal nature.” Id. at 434. Massachusetts courts have found that “core categories of personnel information that are ‘useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee’” may be withheld from disclosure. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). For example, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee,” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of Exemption (c). Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. School Comm., 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). The courts have also discussed specific categories of records that may be redacted under the first clause. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Exec. Office of Admin. and Finance, Suffolk Sup. No. 11-01184-A (June 14, 2013). Nevertheless, there is a strong public interest in monitoring public expenditures and public employees have a diminished expectation of privacy with respect to public employment matters. See George W. Prescott Publishing Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 274, 278 (1985); Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 436 n.15. Further, the public has an interest in knowing whether public employees are “carrying out their duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner.” Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 158 (1979). As a result, certain information that is considered personal in the ordinary sense of the word may be considered part of a public record if relating to an individual’s official responsibilities. See Brogan v. School Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 309 (1987). The first clause also creates a categorical exemption for medical information that relates to an identifiable individual and is of a “personal nature.” Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 434. Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual is exempt from disclosure. Brogan, 401 Mass. at 308; Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 438. Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Id. Cynthia Von Flatern SPR20/1480 Page 4 September 10, 2020 There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Medical Examiner, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). Second clause of Exemption (c) – privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Property Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case by case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. The Office’s response did not contain the specificity required in a denial of access to public records. Pursuant to the Public Records Law, the burden shall be upon the records custodian to establish the applicability of an exemption. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based . . .”); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm’r, 419 Mass. 852, 857 (1995); Flatley, 419 Mass. at 511. In the Office’s response, it appears it is claiming a statutory exemption to withhold decisions or records that are incomplete. However, the Office does not cite any statute that permits it to withhold the records from disclosure. The Office is advised that when claiming Exemption (a), a records custodian must cite a statute that either specifically or by necessary Cynthia Von Flatern SPR20/1480 Page 5 September 10, 2020 implication exempts the requested records from disclosure as required by the Public Records Law. See G. L. c. 4, §7(26)(a). Consequently, I find the Office must cite a statute that specifically or by necessary implication permits it to withhold the requested records from disclosure. Further, with respect to Exemption (c), it is unclear how the withheld records fall within the first and/or the second clause of Exemption (c). With respect to the second clause of Exemption (c), the Office has neither demonstrated how the requested records constitute intimate details of a highly personal nature nor how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. It is additionally uncertain whether the records are available from other sources. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. Also, the Office has not identified a privacy interest that outweighs the public interest in disclosure. See id. at 291. Conclusion Accordingly, the Office is ordered to provide Mr. Quemere with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of this response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Sincerely, Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records cc: Andrew Quemere