Matthew Rocheleau v. Plymouth District Attorney's Office (SPR 20201661)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records September 24, 2020 SPR20/1661 Keith Garland, Esq. Assistant District Attorney/Records Access Officer Plymouth County District Attorney’s Office 166 Main Street Brockton, MA 02301 Dear Attorney Garland: I have received the petition of Matthew Rocheleau of the Boston Globe appealing the response of the Plymouth County District Attorney’s Office (Office) to a request for public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Specifically, on June 24, 2020, Mr. Rocheleau requested: Any/all records concerning law enforcement officers whose actions or involvement in a criminal proceeding must be disclosed, including, but not limited to, records about law enforcement officers that the Plymouth County District Attorney's office has determined may be challenged based upon credibility. This request includes, but is not limited to, disclosures the office has made in particular cases about particular officers as well as any such documents/records/correspondence/lists that your agency maintains or has access to, as well as any corresponding documents concerning the basis for why an officer's actions or involvement in a criminal proceeding must be disclosed. Previous appeals This request was the subject of a previous appeals. See SPR20/1192 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (July 30, 2020); SPR20/1299 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (August 13, 2020). Unsatisfied with the Office's subsequent response, Mr. Rocheleau appealed and SPR20/1661 was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Keith Garland, Esq. SPR20/1661 Page 2 September 24, 2020 form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any town of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(d)(iv) (written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based…”); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). The Office’s September 8th response The Office responded on September 8th briefly identifying the records responsive to the request and stating that “… any information, documents, and records involving police officers that [is] … challenged based upon credibility would be excluded … because it is privileged work-product. G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a) & (c).” The Office further asserted, “…[a]dditionally, such information is exempt from production under the public records laws under the investigatory exemption, the privacy exemption, and the deliberative process exemption of G.L. c. 4, § 7, clause 26 (c), (d), and (f).” The Office also claimed the Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) Act, G. L. c. 6 §§ 167, 172, 178 to withhold dangerousness hearing transcripts. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, §7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public's right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-546 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either "shall not be a public record," "shall be kept confidential" or "shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law." The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities.

Keith Garland, Esq. SPR20/1661 Page 3 September 24, 2020 Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information; also any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Second clause of Exemption (c) - Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public's right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm'r of Real Property Dep't, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case by case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. Inc. (PETA) v. Department of Agricultural Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. ---------------------------- App. Ct. 415, 428 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. Exemption (d) Exemption (d) allows the withholding of: inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based.

Keith Garland, Esq. SPR20/1661 Page 4 September 24, 2020 G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d). Exemption (d) is intended to avoid premature release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if disclosed. Its application is limited to recommendations on legal and policy matters found within an ongoing deliberative process. See Babets v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230,237 n.8 (1988). Factual reports which are reasonably complete and inferences which can be drawn from factual investigations, even if labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt as deliberative or policy making materials. G. L. c. 4, §7(26)(d); see also Envtl. Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 --------------------------- U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (purely factual matters used in the development of government policy are subject to disclosure). Attorney Work Product The Supreme Judicial Court opined on the issue of attorney work product in DaRosa v. New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446 (2015). In DaRosa, the SJC concluded that "opinion" work product that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or its representative falls within the scope of Exemption (d). DaRosa, 471 Mass. at 448. It also concluded that "fact" work product under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial falls within the scope of Exemption ( d) where it is not a reasonably completed study or report or, if it is reasonably completed, where it is interwoven with opinions or analysis leading to opinions. Id. The Court left open "the question whether opinion work product might no longer be protected once the litigation is concluded," noting that the answer "may depend on the particular circumstances, such as the risk of similar litigation." Id. at 459 n.16. Exemption (f) Exemption (f) permits the withholding of: investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(f). A custodian of records generally must demonstrate a prejudice to investigative efforts in order to withhold requested records. Information relating to an ongoing investigation may be withheld if disclosure could alert suspects to the activities of investigative officials. Confidential investigative techniques may also be withheld indefinitely if disclosure is deemed to be prejudicial to future law enforcement activities. Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 62 (1976). Redactions may be appropriate where they serve to preserve the anonymity of voluntary witnesses. Antell v. Attorney Gen., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 248 (2001); Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 290 n.18 (1979). Exemption (f) invites a “case-by-case consideration” of

Keith Garland, Esq. SPR20/1661 Page 5 September 24, 2020 whether disclosure “would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest.” See Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289-90. As a matter of course, witness provided information is essential to efficient and effective law enforcement. This exemption is intended to allow investigative officials to provide an assurance of confidentiality to private citizens so that they will speak openly and voluntarily about matters. Bougas 371 Mass at 62. Any information contained in a witness statement, which if disclosed would create a grave risk of directly or indirectly identifying the voluntary witness is subject to withholding Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 438. The disclosure of the names and other identifying information of victims, complainants and voluntary witnesses may deter other potential witnesses and citizens from providing information to law enforcement agencies in future investigations. Therefore, Exemption (f) will allow the withholding of the name and identifying details of any victims, complainants and voluntary witnesses, and where the individuals can be indirectly identified even with redaction. Burden of specificity in responding and claiming exemptions Pursuant to the Public Records Law, the burden shall be on the records custodian to prove with specificity the exemption which applies. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); see also Globe Newspaper ----------------- Co. v. Police Comm’r, 419 Mass. 852, 857 (1995); Flatley, 419 Mass. at 511. The Office did not meet its burden of demonstrating how the responsive records, in their entirety, are exempt from disclosure. See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Where possible, the Office must produce any non-exempt segregable portions of the records. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). Despite the Office’s response, it remains unclear what responsive records the Office possesses. The Office must clearly identify what records it has in its possession, custody or control that are responsive to Mr. Rochelau’s request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3)(c)(4) (a records access officer must provide a written response that identifies the record, categories of records, or portions of the record it intends to withhold). In its September 8th response, the Office claimed certain exemptions; however, it is unclear which exemptions apply to the requested records. Further, the Office did not state whether the records can be redacted in a way to prevent the disclosure of the identities of those individuals with a privacy interest, work product or other protected information. The Office must clarify these issues. As a result, I find that the Office did not satisfy its burden in responding to this records request in order to comply with the Public Records Law and its Access Regulations. Conclusion Accordingly, the Office is ordered to provide Mr. Rocheleau with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its

Keith Garland, Esq. SPR20/1661 Page 6 September 24, 2020 Regulations within 10 business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of this response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Sincerely, Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records cc: Matthew Rocheleau