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Beth David v. Fairhaven, Town of - Police Department (SPR 20201811)

Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records · Filed 10-27-2020

ClosedAppealPetitioner Won

SPR 20201811 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by Beth David concerning records held by Fairhaven, Town of - Police Department, opened 10-27-2020. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records.

Case Details

Case Number
20201811
Case Type
Appeal
Case Subtype
Recon
Status
Closed
Requester
Beth David
Custodian
Fairhaven, Town of - Police Department
Date Opened
10-27-2020
Date Closed
11-24-2020
Date Request Submitted
07-30-2020
Response Provided Date
08-04-2020
Processing Fees Charged
0.00
Petitions Regarding Fees
No
Time to Comply
NA
Recon Opened
10-27-2020
Recon Closed
11-24-2020

PDF Document

Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records October 8, 2020 SPR20/1811 Jaunna Adesso Fairhaven Police Department 1 Bryant Lane Fairhaven, MA 02719 Dear Ms. Adesso: I have received the petition of Beth David of Fairhaven Neighborhood News, LLC appealing the response of the Fairhaven Police Department (Department) to a request for public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Specifically, on September 30, 2020, Ms. David requested “[t]he incident report(s) and any supporting documents, including, but not limited to, videos, surveillance videos, transcripts of interviews, etc., pertaining to the incident involving sitting Selectboard member . . . that took place on July 1, 2020.” The Department provided a response on August 7, 2020, denying access to responsive records pursuant to Exemptions (a) and (c) of the Public Records Law. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (c). Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Ms. David petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR20/1811, was opened as a result. While this appeal was pending, the Department provided a supplemental response dated October 6, 2020. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any town of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Juanna Adesso SPR20/1811 Page 2 October 8, 2020 If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Department’s August 7th response In its August 7, 2020 response, the Department states that it is denying access to the responsive records under “exemption a because there are charges pending and the case has not been heard yet[;] exemption c due to privacy as you requested the report specific named individual[.]” Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. Under Exemption (a), citing the Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) Act, the Department explains that “[t]he records requested contain Criminal Offender Information. This information consists of information which is protected under Exemption A. As a result, such information must be withheld/redacted under the law.” The updated definition of CORI states in relevant part: [R]ecords and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts

Juanna Adesso SPR20/1811 Page 3 October 8, 2020 criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to the nature or disposition of a criminal charge, an arrest, a pre-trial proceeding, other judicial proceedings, previous hearings conducted pursuant to section 58A of chapter 276 where the defendant was detained prior to trial or released with conditions under subsection (2) of section 58A of chapter 276, sentencing, incarceration, rehabilitation, or release. Such information shall be restricted to information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment. Criminal offender record information shall not include evaluative information, statistical and analytical reports and files in which individuals are not directly or indirectly identifiable, or intelligence information . . . Criminal offender record information shall not include information concerning any offenses which are not punishable by incarceration. G. L. c. 6, § 167 (emphasis added). Based on the foregoing, I find the Department has not met its burden to demonstrate how the requested records are exempt under the CORI Act. Specifically, it is unclear how these records contain “information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment,” as defined in G. L. c. 6, § 167 (emphasis added). Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information; also any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Second clause of Exemption (c) – privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Property Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case by case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017).

Juanna Adesso SPR20/1811 Page 4 October 8, 2020 The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. ---------------------------- App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. With respect to Exemption (c), the Department states that “[t]he records requested contain information which, if disclosed, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Such information contains intimate details and the privacy interests involved outweigh the public interests in the disclosure of that information. As a result, such information must be withheld/redacted under the law.” The Department has not demonstrated how the responsive records constitute intimate details of a highly personal nature nor how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. It is additionally uncertain whether any of the information is available from other sources. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. Also, I find the Department has not identified a privacy interest about an identified individual that substantially outweighs the public interest in obtaining this information. Consequently, I find the Department has not met its burden to withhold the responsive records from disclosure pursuant to the second clause of Exemption (c). As a result, I find the Department did not meet its burden of explaining with specificity how the records, in their entirety, are exempt from disclosure. See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Any non-exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). Additionally, the Department did not identify the records, categories of records or portions of records in its possession that it intends to withhold from disclosure. To deny access to a record under the Public Records Law, a records access officer must identify the record, categories of records, or portions of the record it intends to withhold. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3)(c)(4). Therefore, the Department must identify the records in its possession that were withheld under Exemptions (a) and (c). Conclusion Accordingly, the Department is ordered to provide Ms. David with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its

Juanna Adesso SPR20/1811 Page 5 October 8, 2020 Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of this response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Sincerely, Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records cc: Beth David