Dusty Christensen v. Easthampton, City of - Police Department (SPR 20202482)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records December 29, 2020 SPR20/2482 Robert J. Aliberti Chief of Police Easthampton Police Department 32 Payson Avenue Easthampton, MA 01027 Dear Chief Aliberti: I have received the petition of Dusty Christensen appealing the response of the Easthampton Police Department (Department) to a request for public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Specifically, on October 30, 2020, Mr. Christensen requested the following records: “[1.] Any internal investigation log, or other similar manner of tracking internal investigation cases, maintained by the Department. [2.] Any citizen’s complaint log, or other similar manner of tracking civilian complaints, maintained by the Department.” Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Mr. Christensen appealed and SPR20/2482 was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any town of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based…”); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Robert J. Aliberti SPR20/2482 Page 2 December 29, 2020 burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). The Department’s November 9th response In its November 9th response, the Department redacted access to certain responsive records and cited Exemptions (a), (c) and (f) of the Public Records Law. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, §7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public's right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-546 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either "shall not be a public record," "shall be kept confidential" or "shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law." The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. In its response, the Department cited G.L. c. 214, §1B which states as follows: “A person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce such right and in connection therewith to award damages.” G.L. c. 214, §1B. The cited statute does not specifically exempt the record from disclosure as required by Exemption (a).

Robert J. Aliberti SPR20/2482 Page 3 December 29, 2020 Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information; also any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First clause - Personnel Exemption (c) contains two distinct and independent clauses, each requiring its own analysis. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432-33 (1983). The first clause creates a categorical exemption for personnel information that relates to an identifiable individual and is of a “personal nature.” Id. at 434. Massachusetts courts have found that “core categories of personnel information that are ‘useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee’” may be withheld from disclosure. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). For example, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee,” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of Exemption (c). Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. School Comm., 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). The courts have also discussed specific categories of records that may be redacted under the first clause. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Exec. Office of Admin. and Finance, Suffolk Sup. No. 11-01184-A (June 14, 2013). Nevertheless, there is a strong public interest in monitoring public expenditures and public employees have a diminished expectation of privacy with respect to public employment matters. See George W. Prescott Publishing Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 274, 278 (1985); Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 436 n.15. Further, the public has an interest in knowing whether public employees are “carrying out their duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner.” Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 158 (1979). As a result, certain information that is considered personal in the ordinary sense of the word may be considered part of a public record if relating to an individual’s official responsibilities. See Brogan v. School Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 309 (1987). Internal affairs records Please note that the courts have contrasted the public status of disciplinary investigation materials of law enforcement personnel from the “ordinary evaluations, performance assessments, and disciplinary determinations” included in the public records exemption for “personnel [file] or information” for other public employees due to the significance of maintaining the transparency of the police department’s internal affairs process. Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 2. The Appeals Court reasoned that openness in a police internal affairs

Robert J. Aliberti SPR20/2482 Page 4 December 29, 2020 investigatory process, facilitated by the release of the relevant documents, was necessary to foster the public trust in law enforcement. Id. at 7-8. The Appeals Court in Worcester defined the internal affairs process as follows: An internal affairs investigation is a formalized citizen complaint procedure, separate and independent from ordinary employment evaluation and assessment. Unlike other evaluations and assessments, the internal affairs process exists specifically to address complaints of police corruption (theft, bribery, acceptance of gratuities), misconduct (verbal and physical abuse, unlawful arrest, harassment), and other criminal acts that would undermine the relationship of trust and confidence between the police and the citizenry that is essential to law enforcement. The internal affairs procedure fosters the public's trust and confidence in the integrity of the police department, its employees, and its processes for investigating complaints because the department has the integrity to discipline itself. A citizenry's full and fair assessment of a police department's internal investigation of its officer's actions promotes the core value of trust between citizens and police essential to law enforcement and the protection of constitutional rights. Id. at 7-8, citing Globe Newspaper Co., 419 Mass. at 866 (emphasis added). Under Exemption (c), the Department asserts that the “… release of these records without redacting names of those involved may constitute complaints and disciplinary documentation concerning certain members of the Easthampton Police Department, including persons that may no longer be employed by the City of Easthampton, and such information is exempt from disclosure under the first clause of Exemption (c).” In light of the Worcester decision described above, as well as the public interest in disclosure of internal affairs records, I find the Department has not met its burden to redact the responsive records, pursuant to the personnel clause of Exemption (c); specifically, it is unclear why the records are not public as determined by Worcester. Also, it is unclear how the names of individuals constitute one of the core categories of personnel information, such as an employment application, employee work evaluation, disciplinary documentation, or promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee, which may be properly withheld from disclosure under the personnel clause of Exemption (c). Therefore, I find that the Department needs to clarify the issue of redacted personnel information and explain how this would not fall under a Worcester analysis. Second clause of Exemption (c) - Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public's right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm'r of Real Property Dep't, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case by case basis.

Robert J. Aliberti SPR20/2482 Page 5 December 29, 2020 This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. Inc. (PETA) v. Department of Agricultural Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; - se - e -al-so- -D-o-e -v.- R-e-g-is-tr-a-r -of- M--o-to-r -V-e-hi-c-le-s, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 428 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its response, the Department stated, “such records to the extent they exist, have been redacted as disclosure may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and, further may be redacted, in part, to protect the personal privacy rights of any individual involved.” In its response, the Department did not explain the privacy interest at stake. Considering the PETA decision, I find the Department has not demonstrated how the report contains intimate details of a highly personal nature and that disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. Neither has it addressed the availability of such information from other sources. As such, I find the Department has not met its burden of specificity to withhold the records under the privacy clause of Exemption (c). Exemption (f) Exemption (f) permits the withholding of: investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest. G. L. c. 4, § 7 (26)(f). A custodian of records generally must demonstrate a prejudice to investigative efforts in order to withhold requested records. Information relating to an ongoing investigation may be

Robert J. Aliberti SPR20/2482 Page 6 December 29, 2020 withheld if disclosure could alert suspects to the activities of investigative officials. Confidential investigative techniques may also be withheld indefinitely if disclosure is deemed to be prejudicial to future law enforcement activities. Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass 59, 62 (1976). Redactions may be appropriate where they serve to preserve the anonymity of voluntary witnesses. Antell v. Attorney Gen., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 248 (2001); Reinstein v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 290 n.18 (1979). Exemption (f) invites a "case-by case consideration" of whether disclosure "would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest." See Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289-290. In its response, the Department stated, “[r]eleasing specific and identifiable information regarding internal affairs records may include confidential details provided to police investigators by complainants, voluntary witnesses, officers and/or alleged victims, the Department may redact that information in compliance with the law. … The redaction is needed to protect the personal privacy interests of voluntary witnesses and complainants, [Exemption (f)] allows some records to be withheld or at the very least redacted.” The Department’s November 9th response did not provide supporting information on how the investigative process is ongoing. It remains unclear what responsive records the Department possesses. The Department must identify what records it has in its possession, custody or control that are responsive to Mr. Christensen’s request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 2.06(3)(c)(4) (a records access officer must provide a written response that identifies the record, categories of records, or portions of the record it intends to withhold). It is additionally uncertain how disclosure “would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest” as required by Exemption (f). As a matter of course, witness provided information is essential to efficient and effective law enforcement. This exemption is intended to allow investigative officials to provide an assurance of confidentiality to private citizens so that they will speak openly and voluntarily about matters. Bougas 371 Mass at 62. Any information contained in a witness statement, which if disclosed would create a grave risk of directly or indirectly identifying the voluntary witness is subject to withholding Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 438. The disclosure of the names and other identifying information of victims, complainants and voluntary witnesses may deter other potential witnesses and citizens from providing information to law enforcement agencies in future investigations. Therefore, Exemption (f) will allow the withholding of the name and identifying details of any victims, complainants and voluntary witnesses, and where the individuals can be indirectly identified even with redaction. Order Accordingly, the Department is ordered to provide Mr. Christensen with a response to the request in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law, and its Regulations within 10 business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of this response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us.

Robert J. Aliberti SPR20/2482 Page 7 December 29, 2020 Sincerely, Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records cc: Dusty Christensen