Mark Arsenault v. Executive Office of Public Safety and Security (SPR 20211405)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records June 17, 2021 SPR21/1405 Arielle Mullaney, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Executive Office of Public Safety and Security 1 Ashburton Place, Room 2133 Boston, MA 02108 Dear Attorney Mullaney: I have received the petition of Mark Arsenault of the Boston Globe, on behalf of Matthew Rocheleau, appealing the response of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security (Office/EOPSS) to a request for public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On February 2, 2021, Mr. Rocheleau requested: (1) [a]ny/all e-mails sent [by an identified employee] to one or more email address[es] ending in either @state.ma.us; @massmail.state.ma.us; @doc.state.ma.us, or @mcofu.org from and including January 10, 2020, to, and including March 31, 2020; and (2) [a]ny/all emails [an identified employee] received from one or more email address[es] ending in either @state.ma.us; @massmail.state.ma.us; @doc.state.ma.us, or @mcofu.org from and including January 10, 2020, to, and including March 31, 2020. Previous appeal This request was the subject of a previous appeal. See SPR21/1028 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (May 3, 2021). SPR21/1028 was closed after this office was notified that the Office intended on providing a subsequent response. The Office provided a response on May 21, 2021, which included responsive records in redacted form pursuant to Exemptions (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (n), and (o) of the Public Records Law. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (n), (o). The Office also redacted and withheld certain records under the common law attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Unsatisfied with the Office’s response, Mr. Arsenault petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR21/1405, was opened as a result. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Arielle Mullaney, Esq. SPR21/1405 Page 2 June 17, 2021 The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any town of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Office’s May 21st response In its May 21, 2021 response, the Office indicates that it redacted records under Exemptions (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (n), and (o) of the Public Records Law, as well as the attorney- client privilege and work product doctrine. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.”

Arielle Mullaney, Esq. SPR21/1405 Page 3 June 17, 2021 The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. Under Exemption (a), the Office states that “. . . criminal offender record information (CORI), as defined by G.L. c. 6, § 167, of identifiable inmates, has been redacted. CORI is exempt from disclosure under the public records statue pursuant to G.L. c. 4, § 7 (26) (a) as records that are ‘specifically or by necessary implication exempted to disclosure by statute.’” CORI is currently defined as: [R]ecords and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to the nature or disposition of a criminal charge, an arrest, a pre-trial proceeding, other judicial proceedings, previous hearings conducted pursuant to section 58A of chapter 276 where the defendant was detained prior to trial or released with conditions under subsection (2) of section 58A of chapter 276, sentencing, incarceration, rehabilitation, or release. Such information shall be restricted to information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment. Criminal offender record information shall not include evaluative information, statistical and analytical reports and files in which individuals are not directly or indirectly identifiable, or intelligence information . . . Criminal offender record information shall not include information concerning any offenses which are not punishable by incarceration. G. L. c. 6, § 167. Based on the Office’s response, it is unclear what information regarding identifiable inmates were redacted from the responsive records or how the information constitutes CORI. It is additionally uncertain how the redacted information constitutes “information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment.” See G. L. c. 6, § 167. -- Therefore, I find the Office has not met its burden to withhold those portions of the responsive records under the CORI Act. Exemption (b) Exemption (b) permits the withholding of: records that are related solely to internal personnel rules and practices of the government unit, provided however, that such records shall be withheld only to the extent that proper performance of necessary government functions requires such withholding.

Arielle Mullaney, Esq. SPR21/1405 Page 4 June 17, 2021 G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(b). There are no authoritative Massachusetts decisions interpreting Exemption (b). The general purpose of the cognate federal exemption is to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection materials in which the public cannot reasonably be expected to have an interest. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 362-70 (1976) (interpreting the federal Freedom of Information Act, which provides an exemption for records which are “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency”); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432 (1983) ------------------------------------ (Massachusetts Public Records Law modeled on federal Freedom of Information Act). The courts have interpreted the federal exemption to allow withholding of materials that, if released, could cause agency rules or regulations to be circumvented. See Fiumara v. Higgins, 572 F. Supp. 1093, 1102 (1983) (internal codes are exempt where disclosure may enable outsiders to circumvent agency functions). The analysis employed by the federal courts requires a two-pronged test. Material is exempt if it is predominantly used internally and if disclosure would significantly risk circumvention of agency regulations and statutes. See Marrera v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 622 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1985) (Bureau of Prisons access and identity codes were properly withheld as materials in which the public would have no legitimate interest or which would compromise security if disclosed). Under Exemption (b), the Office indicates “[r]edactions have also been made to employee contact information pursuant to G.L. c. 4, §7(26)(b). . . . Given the lack of case law regarding the application of exemption (b) in Massachusetts, the federal courts interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (hereinafter ‘exemption 2’), the federal equivalent to exemption (b), is instructive. Exemption 2 shields from public disclosure information that is ‘related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.’ The courts have interpreted the phrase ‘personnel rules and practices’ to include not only ‘minor employment matters’ but also other rules and practices governing agency personnel.’ See Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1056 (D.C.Cir.1981)(en banc). The information need not actually be ‘rules and practices’ to qualify under exemption 2, as the statute provides, but also exempts matters ‘related’ to agency rules and practices. Concepcion v. F.B.I., 606 F. Supp. 2d 14, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2009)(citation omitted).” Based on the Office’s response, it is unclear how the “employee contact information” relates to agency rules and practices, nor how disclosure of the information would hinder the proper performance of a necessary government function. Therefore, the Office has not met its burden to withhold “employee contact information” under Exemption (b). Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating

Arielle Mullaney, Esq. SPR21/1405 Page 5 June 17, 2021 to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual is exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. School Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Id. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Medical Examiner, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). Massachusetts courts have found that “core categories of personnel information that are ‘useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee’” may be withheld from disclosure. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). For example, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee,” may be withheld pursuant to Exemption (c). Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. School Comm., 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). The courts have also discussed specific categories of records that may be redacted under Exemption (c). See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Exec. Office of Admin. and Finance, Suffolk Sup. No. 11-01184-A (June 14, 2013). Analysis under Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case by case basis. This exemption does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) ---------------------------- (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This exemption requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The

Arielle Mullaney, Esq. SPR21/1405 Page 6 June 17, 2021 public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. Under Exemption (c), the Office states, “[m]edical information such as medical conditions, injury details, medical appointment information, and treatment location information have been redacted pursuant to G.L. c. 4, §7, cl. 26 (c). Personnel information concerning the hiring and promotion of specific employees has also been redacted pursuant to exemption (c). . .” The Office cites Globe Newspaper Co. and Wakefield, to support its position. Based on the Office’s response, to the extent that the records contain medical information regarding an identifiable individual, the Office may permissibly withhold such information from disclosure. However, it is unclear what “personnel records concerning hiring” were withheld from disclosure. It is additionally uncertain how these records, as well as promotion information constitute intimate details of a highly personal nature, nor how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. It is also not clear whether this information is available from other sources. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. Further, the Office did not provide information with respect to examining whether the public interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. Id. Exemption (d) Exemption (d) allows the withholding of: inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d). Exemption (d) is intended to avoid premature release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if disclosed. Its application is limited to recommendations on legal and policy matters found within an ongoing deliberative process. See Babets v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 237 n.8 (1988). Factual reports which are reasonably complete and inferences which can be drawn from factual investigations, even if labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt as deliberative or policy making materials. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d); see also Envtl. Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (purely factual --------------------------- matters used in the development of government policy are subject to disclosure). Under Exemption (d), the Office asserts that “[p]olicy deliberations and draft recommendations have been redacted pursuant to the deliberative policy exemption set forth in G.L. c. 4, §7 cl. 26 (d).” The Office asserts, “EOPSS is entitled to withhold such records in order to avoid the release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if prematurely disclosed.” Citing Babets and Department of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n,

Arielle Mullaney, Esq. SPR21/1405 Page 7 June 17, 2021 532 U.S. 1, 9 (2001), the Office contends that “. . . disclosure of these deliberations would prevent the successful development of policy as the redactions contain candid comments, concerns, questions, and issues from multiple people working on such policy developments. Such comments have been made under the assumption that they would not be disclosed to the public until a final policy was developed so as not to risk confusion by the public or public scrutiny against those working to complete the policy.” The Office did not explain with specificity what policy positions these comments, concerns or questions relate to, nor has it established how the redacted information constitutes “inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency” as required by Exemption (d). Particularly, the Office has not demonstrated that the redacted information or comments, were only sent between governmental entities or consultants. See Klamath, 532 U.S. at 4 (indicating that a requirement for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption 5 to apply is “its source must be a Government agency”); Cty. of Madison v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 641 F.2d 1036, 1040 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding that documents from a private party are not “intra-agency” under FOIA exemption 5); SPR95/336 Determinations of the Supervisor of Records (August 14, 1995; August 31, 1995) (finding that Exemption (d) does not protect materials submitted to an agency by third parties and only applies to governmental agencies or consultants). Exemption (f) Exemption (f) permits the withholding of: investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(f). A custodian of records generally must demonstrate a prejudice to investigative efforts in order to withhold requested records. Information relating to an ongoing investigation may be withheld if disclosure could alert suspects to the activities of investigative officials. Confidential investigative techniques may also be withheld indefinitely if disclosure is deemed to be prejudicial to future law enforcement activities. Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass 59, 62 (1976). Redactions may be appropriate where they serve to preserve the anonymity of voluntary witnesses. Antell v. Att’y Gen., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 248 (2001); Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 290 n.18 (1979). Exemption (f) invites a “case-by- case consideration” of whether disclosure “would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest.” See Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289-90.

Arielle Mullaney, Esq. SPR21/1405 Page 8 June 17, 2021 Under Exemption (f), the Office states that it redacted information related to active and ongoing investigations. The Office asserts, this exemption “. . . contemplates that the success of law enforcement is predicated on the strength and reliability of its own techniques. For such reasons, EOPSS asserts that the redactions made would jeopardize ongoing and future investigations.” Although, the Office states that disclosure of the redacted information would jeopardize ongoing and future investigations, it did not provide supporting information to demonstrate how disclosure would compromise any ongoing or future investigative efforts or “probably so prejudice the effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest” as required under Exemption (f). Exemption (n) Exemption (n) applies to: records, including, but not limited to, blueprints, plans, policies, procedures and schematic drawings, which relate to internal layout and structural elements, security measures, emergency preparedness, threat or vulnerability assessments, or any other records relating to the security or safety of persons or buildings, structures, facilities, utilities, transportation, cyber security or other infrastructure located within the commonwealth, the disclosure of which, in the reasonable judgment of the record custodian, subject to review by the supervisor of public records under subsection (c) of section 10 of chapter 66, is likely to jeopardize public safety or cyber security. Exemption (n) allows for the withholding of certain records which if released would jeopardize public. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(n). Exemption (n) allows for the withholding of certain records which if released would jeopardize public safety. The first prong of Exemption (n) examines “whether, and to what degree, the record sought resembles the records listed as examples in the statute;” specifically, the “inquiry is whether, and to what degree, the record is one a terrorist would find useful to maximize damage.” PETA, 477 Mass. at 289-90. The second prong of Exemption (n) examines “the factual and contextual support for the proposition that disclosure of the record is ‘likely to jeopardize public safety.’” Id. at 289-90. The PETA decision further provides that “[because the records custodian must exercise ‘reasonable judgment’ in making that determination, the primary focus on review is whether the custodian has provided sufficient factual heft for the supervisor of public records or the reviewing court to conclude that a reasonable person would agree with the custodian’s determination given the context of the particular case.” Id. PETA also provides that “[t]hese two prongs of exemption (n) must be analyzed together,

Arielle Mullaney, Esq. SPR21/1405 Page 9 June 17, 2021 because there is an inverse correlation between them. That is, the more the record sought resembles the records enumerated in exemption (n), the lower the custodian’s burden in demonstrating ‘reasonable judgment’ and vice versa.” PETA at 290. Under Exemption (n), the Office indicates that it redacted “. . . security information, the disclosure of which would jeopardize public safety. Such redacted information includes details of correctional facilities, security plans and measures taken at specific facilities, and discussion concerning the implementation of such security plans and measures.” Based on the Office’s response, I find it has not established how the information is one a terrorist would find useful to maximize damage, nor, provided “sufficient factual heft” to conclude that a reasonable person would agree that disclosure of such information is “likely to jeopardize public safety or cyber security” as required by Exemption (n). Id. at 290-91. Exemption (o) Exemption (o) applies to: the home address, personal email address and home telephone number of an employee of the judicial branch, an unelected employee of the general court, an agency, executive office, department, board, commission, bureau, division or authority of the commonwealth, or of a political subdivision thereof or of an authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose, in the custody of a government agency which maintains records identifying persons as falling within those categories; provided that the information may be disclosed to an employee organization under chapter l 50E, a nonprofit organization for retired public employees under chapter 180, or a criminal justice agency as defined in G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(o). The Office posits that “[p]ersonal contact information, including personal email addresses and phone numbers, have been redacted pursuant to G.L. c. 4, § 7 (26)(o) which allows for the withholding of ‘home address, personal email address and home telephone number’ of government employees.” Based on the Office’s response, I find it has met its burden to redact the above information from the responsive records. Common law attorney-client privilege A records custodian claiming the attorney-client privilege under the Public Records Law has the burden of not only proving the existence of an attorney-client relationship, but also (1) that the communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) that the communications were

Arielle Mullaney, Esq. SPR21/1405 Page 10 June 17, 2021 made in confidence; and (3) that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. See Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 449 Mass. 444, 450 n.9 (2017); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapa & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 449 Mass. 609, 619 (2007) (stating that the party seeking the attorney-client privilege has the burden to show the privilege applies). Records custodians seeking to invoke the common law attorney-client privilege “are required to produce detailed indices to support their claims of privilege.” Suffolk, 449 Mass. at 460. Pursuant to the Public Records Law, in assessing whether a records custodian has properly withheld records based on the claim of attorney-client privilege the Supervisor of Records “shall require, as part of the decision making process, that the agency or municipality provide a detailed description of the record, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed.” G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). The Office states, “[c]ommunications have been redacted pursuant to the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine. [Suffolk]. . . . [Suffolk] allows for the withholding of ‘confidential communications between public officers and employees and governmental entities and their legal counsel undertaken for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance.’ 449 Mass. at 450. ‘Public employees must routinely seek advice from counsel on how to meet their obligations to the public’ and ‘[i]t is in the public’s interest that they be able to do so in circumstances that encourage complete candor, without inhibitions arising from fear that what they communicate will be disclosed to the world.’ Id. ‘It is now well established that communications between government agencies and agency counsel are protected by the privilege as long as they are made confidentially and for the purpose of obtaining legal advice for the agency.’ Id. at 451 (internal citations omitted).” The Office lists 14 communications that were withheld under the privilege. Although the Office references the factors under Suffolk, the Office did not explain how an attorney-client relationship exists between the author and recipients of the communications that were redacted. Also, it is unclear how there exists an attorney-client relationship between the Office and a representative of the Massachusetts State Police. Further, a privilege log shall include the “grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed.” As such, the Office must provide a privilege log in accordance with G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). In its response, the Office states that “[r]edactions were also made and documents withheld under the attorney-client privilege.” Based on the Office’s response, it is uncertain what documents, if any, were withheld under the attorney-client privilege. If the Office withheld documents that were not included in the list of redacted communications, the Office must provide a privilege log in accordance with G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). Attorney Work Product The Supreme Judicial Court opined on the issue of attorney work product in DaRosa v. New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446 (2015). In DaRosa, the SJC concluded that “opinion” work product that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or its representative

Arielle Mullaney, Esq. SPR21/1405 Page 11 June 17, 2021 falls within the scope of Exemption (d). DaRosa, 471 Mass. at 448. It also concluded that “fact” work product under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial falls within the scope of Exemption (d) where it is not a reasonably completed study or report or, if it is reasonably completed, where it is interwoven with opinions or analysis leading to opinions. Id. The Court left open “the question whether opinion work product might no longer be protected once the litigation is concluded,” noting that the answer “may depend on the particular circumstances, such as the risk of similar litigation.” Id. at 459 n.16. Based on the Office’s response, although it states that communications were redacted under the work product doctrine, the Office has not established how the redacted communications constitute work product that may be withheld as contemplated in DaRosa. Specifically, it remains uncertain how the communications were prepared by the Office in anticipation of litigation or for trial. The Office must address this matter. Additionally, it is unclear from the Office’s response, which of the claimed exemptions above, specifically apply to the redactions. The Office must indicate the exemption(s) applicable to each redacted information in the responsive records. Conclusion Accordingly, the Office is ordered to provide Mr. Arsenault with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of this response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Sincerely, Rebecca S. Murray Supervisor of Records cc: Mark Arsenault