Rachel Hutchinson v. Norfolk County District Attorney's Office (SPR 20230665)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records April 19, 2023 SPR23/0665 Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office 45 Shawmut Road Canton, MA 02021 Dear Attorney Hunt: I have received the petition of Rachel C. Hutchinson, Esq., of Todd & Weld LLP, appealing the response of the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office (Office) to a request for public records. G. L. c. 66 § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On December 13, 2022, Attorney Hutchinson requested audio or visual recordings of interviews of named individuals. On January 6, 2023, the Office responded and stated that it was withholding the responsive records pursuant to Exemptions (a), (c), (d), and (f) of the Public Records Law. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (c), (d), (f). Unsatisfied with the Office’s response, Attorney Hutchinson petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR23/0665, was opened as a result. Purpose of request; identity of requestor Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR23/0665 Page 2 April 19, 2023 It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Office’s January 6th Response In its January 6, 2023 response, the Office asserts it is withholding the responsive records pursuant to G. L. c. 41, § 97D, G. L. c. 119, § 51E, and G. L. c. 214, § 1B as they operate through Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law. The Office also states it is withholding the requested records pursuant to Exemptions (c), (d), and (f) of the Public Records Law. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities.

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR23/0665 Page 3 April 19, 2023 G. L. c. 41, § 97D provides in relevant part: All reports of rape and sexual assault or attempts to commit such offenses, all reports of abuse perpetrated by family or household members, as defined in section 1 of chapter 209A, and all communications between police officers and victims of such offenses or abuse shall not be public reports and shall be maintained by the police departments in a manner that shall assure their confidentiality; provided, however, that all such reports shall be accessible at all reasonable times, upon written request, to: (i) the victim, the victim’s attorney, others specifically authorized by the victim to obtain such information, prosecutors and (ii) victim-witness advocates as defined in section 1 of chapter 258B… G. L. c. 41, § 97D. G. L. c. 119, § 51E provides in relevant part: The department shall maintain a file of the written reports prepared under this section and sections 51A to 51D, inclusive. These written reports shall be confidential. Upon request and with the approval of the commissioner, copies of written reports of initial investigations may be provided to: (i) the child’s parent, guardian, or counsel, (ii) the reporting person or agency, (iii) the appropriate review board, (iv) a child welfare agency of another state for the purpose of assisting that agency in determining whether to approve a prospective foster or adoptive parent, or (v) a social worker assigned to the case. No such report shall be made available to any persons other than those specified in this section without the written and informed consent of the child’s parent or guardian, the written approval of the commissioner, or an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. G. L. c. 119, § 51E. G. L. c. 214, § 1B provides in relevant part: A person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce such right and in connection therewith to award damages. G. L. c. 214, § 1B. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR23/0665 Page 4 April 19, 2023 unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual is exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Id. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). Analysis under Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This exemption requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. There are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). Exemption (d) Exemption (d) allows the withholding of: inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR23/0665 Page 5 April 19, 2023 G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d). Exemption (d) is intended to avoid premature release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if disclosed. Its application is limited to recommendations on legal and policy matters found within an ongoing deliberative process. See Babets v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 237 n.8 (1988). Factual reports which are reasonably complete and inferences which can be drawn from factual investigations, even if labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt as deliberative or policy making materials. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d); see also Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (purely factual matters used in the development of government policy are subject to disclosure). The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) opined on the status of attorney work product under Exemption (d) in DaRosa v. City of New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446 (2015). In DaRosa, the SJC concluded that “opinion” work product that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or its representative falls within the scope of Exemption (d). Id. at 448. It also concluded that “fact” work product under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial falls within the scope of Exemption (d) where it is not a reasonably completed study or report or, if it is reasonably completed, where it is interwoven with opinions or analysis leading to opinions. Id. Exemption (f) Exemption (f) permits the withholding of: investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(f). A custodian of records generally must demonstrate a prejudice to investigative efforts in order to withhold requested records. Information relating to an ongoing investigation may be withheld if disclosure could alert suspects to the activities of investigative officials. Confidential investigative techniques may also be withheld indefinitely if disclosure is deemed to be prejudicial to future law enforcement activities. Bougas, 371 Mass at 62. Redactions may be appropriate where they serve to preserve the anonymity of voluntary witnesses. Antell v. Att’y Gen., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 248 (2001); Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 290 n.18 (1979). Exemption (f) invites a “case-by-case consideration” of whether disclosure “would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest.” See Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289-290. In its response, the Office asserts: [A]ll members of the public are treated the same with respect to the response of

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR23/0665 Page 6 April 19, 2023 their requests. SAIN interviews are not subject to public disclosure because they are precluded by statute. See G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (c); G.L. c. 41, § 97D; G.L. c. 119, § 51E, G.L. c. 214, § 1B. Such records contain investigatory material compiled out of public view, the disclosure of which would prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement. See G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(f) (investigatory exemption)…. Moreover, G.L. c. 41, § 97D, by its plain terms is directed to communications received by police officers. Commonwealth v. Prescott Pub. Co., 463 Mass. 258, 265 (2012). Accordingly, as the victims in the case, your clients were previously provided with the police reports. Note that those reports were not public records and are considered confidential under statute. G.L. c. 41, § 97D. SAIN interviews, by comparison, are conducted by qualified professionals trained in investigative techniques. The disclosure of these investigatory materials, necessarily compiled out of public view, would prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement and the information could contain work product. See G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d); G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(f) (investigatory exemption); Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(a)(5). In camera inspection In order to facilitate a determination as to the applicability of the Exemptions (a), (c), (d), and (f) claims made by the Office to withhold the records, the Office must provide this office with an un-redacted copy of the responsive records for in camera inspection. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4). After I complete my review of the records, I will return the records to the Office’s custody and issue an opinion on the public or exempt nature of the record. The authority to require the submission of records for an in camera inspection emanates from the Code of Massachusetts Regulations. 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4); see also G. L. c. 66, § 1. This office interprets the in camera inspection process to be analogous to that utilized by the judicial system. See Rock v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 206 (1981) (administrative agency entitled deference in the interpretation of its own regulations). Records are not voluntarily submitted, but rather are submitted pursuant to an order by this office that an in camera inspection is necessary to make a proper finding. Records are submitted for the limited purpose of review. This office is not the custodian of records examined in camera, therefore, any request made to this office for records being reviewed in camera will be denied. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4)(c). This office has a long history of cooperation with governmental agencies with respect to in camera inspection. Custodians submit copies of the relevant records to this office upon a promise of confidentiality. This office does not release records reviewed in camera to anyone under any circumstances. Upon a determination of the public record status, records reviewed in camera are promptly returned to the custodian. To operate in any other fashion would seriously impede our ability to function and would certainly affect our credibility within the legal

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR23/0665 Page 7 April 19, 2023 community. Please be aware, any cover letter submitted to accompany the relevant records may be subject to disclosure. Order Accordingly, the Office is ordered to provide this office with an un-redacted copy of the responsive records for in camera inspection without delay. Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Rachel C. Hutchinson, Esq.