Mitchell I. Greenwald, Esq. v. Lanesborough, Town of - Town Clerk's Office (SPR 20232909)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records December 15, 2023 SPR23/2909 Ruth Knysh Town Clerk Records Access Officer Town of Lanesborough 83 North Main Street Lanesborough, MA 01237 Dear Ms. Knysh: I have received the petition of Mitchell I. Greenwald, Esq. appealing the response of the Town of Lanesborough (Town) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On November 17, 2023, Ms. Weber requested, “... any and all complaints about or for me from the dates 1/01/2023 to 11/17/2023 including any and all notes and correspondences ...” The Town responded on November 30, 2023. Unsatisfied with the response, Attorney Greenwald petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR23/2909, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Ruth Knysh SPR23/2909 Page 2 December 15, 2023 The Town’s November 30th Response In its November 30, 2023 response, the Town identified 60 records responsive to the request and sent certain emails and correspondence to Attorney Greenwald. The Town advised that the balance of the records are being withheld pursuant to Exemptions (c) and (d) of the Public Records Law and attorney-client privilege. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Analysis under Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. Massachusetts courts have found that “core categories of personnel information that are ‘useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee’” may be withheld from disclosure. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). For example, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee,” may be withheld pursuant to Exemption (c). Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. Sch. Comm., 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). The courts have also discussed specific categories of records that may be redacted under Exemption (c). See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Exec. Office of Admin. and Fin., Suffolk Sup. No. 11-01184-A (June 14, 2013). This exemption does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number).

Ruth Knysh SPR23/2909 Page 3 December 15, 2023 This exemption requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its response, the Town opined that the records requested are regarding “an employee matter [and] fall squarely within the definition of an employee’s personnel information ... such records relate directly to an ongoing personnel matter and the premature disclosure of such record may impact the Town’s ability to make employment decisions.” Based on the Town’s response, it is unclear how the records constitute one of the core categories of personnel information useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee. It is additionally uncertain how the records, in their entirety, contain intimate details of a highly personal nature, nor how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. It is also not clear whether this information is available from other sources. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. Further, the Town did not provide information with respect to examining whether the public interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. Id. Additionally, the Town must clarify whether segregable portions can be provided. See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Any non-exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). Exemption (d) Exemption (d) allows the withholding of: inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d). Exemption (d) is intended to avoid premature release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if disclosed. Its application is limited to recommendations on legal and policy matters found within an ongoing deliberative process. See Babets v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 237 n.8 (1988). Factual reports which are reasonably complete and inferences which can be drawn from factual investigations, even if labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt as deliberative or policy making materials. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d); see also Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (purely factual matters used in the development of government policy are subject to disclosure).

Ruth Knysh SPR23/2909 Page 4 December 15, 2023 With respect to Exemption (d), The Town did not provide any documentation to support the withholding of the requested records and only stated, “[t]he record is also being withheld pursuant to Exemption (d) of the Public Records Law.” The Town, therefore, did not meet its burden to withhold the records pursuant to Exemption (d) of the Public Records Law. The Town is not permitted to issue a blanket denial without providing any further information with respect to the requested records. The Town is advised that a records custodian is required to not only cite an exemption, but to specifically explain the applicability of the exemption to the requested records in order to comply with the Public Records Law and its Regulations. Common law attorney-client privilege The Supreme Judicial Court confirmed the existence of a common law attorney-client privilege with respect to government matters in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 449 Mass. 444 (2007). The Supreme Judicial Court has found that the Supervisor of Records may make “a decision . . . delineating what documents among . . . requested reports are privileged or exempted from the public records act.” Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 414 Mass. 609 (1993). A records custodian claiming the attorney-client privilege under the Public Records Law has the burden of not only proving the existence of an attorney-client relationship, but also (1) that the communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) that the communications were made in confidence; and (3) that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. See Suffolk, 449 Mass. at 450 n.9; see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 449 Mass. 609, 619 (2007) (stating that the party seeking the attorney-client privilege has the burden to show the privilege applies). Records custodians seeking to invoke the common law attorney- client privilege “are required to produce detailed indices to support their claims of privilege.” Suffolk, 449 Mass. at 460. Pursuant to the Public Records Law, in assessing whether a records custodian has properly withheld records based on the claim of attorney-client privilege the Supervisor of Records “shall require, as part of the decision making process, that the agency or municipality provide a detailed description of the record, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed.” G. L. c. 66, § l0A(a). In its response, the Town stated, “... approximately 30 pages are correspondence that are protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege.” Based upon the Town’s response, I find the Town has not established the existence of an attorney-client relationship in compliance with Suffolk. Further, the Town has not provided a detailed description of the records withheld under the privilege in accordance with G. L. c. 66, § l0A(a). The Town must clarify these matters.

Ruth Knysh SPR23/2909 Page 5 December 15, 2023 Conclusion Accordingly, the Town is ordered to provide Attorney Greenwald with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law, and its Regulations within 10 business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Attorney Greenwald may appeal the substantive nature of the Town’s response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Mitchell I. Greenwald, Esq.