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David Durgin v. Dudley, Town Of - Town Clerk (SPR 20240240)
Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records · Filed 01-26-2024
ClosedAppealPetitioner Won
SPR 20240240 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by David Durgin concerning records held by Dudley, Town Of - Town Clerk, opened 01-26-2024. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records.
Case Details
- Case Number
- 20240240
- Case Type
- Appeal
- Case Subtype
- Initial
- Status
- Closed
- Requester
- David Durgin
- Custodian
- Dudley, Town Of - Town Clerk
- Date Opened
- 01-26-2024
- Date Closed
- 02-07-2024
PDF Document
Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records February 7, 2024 SPR24/0240 Jonathan Ruda Town Administrator Town of Dudley 71 West Main Street Dudley, MA 01571 Dear Ms. Ruda: I have received the petition of David Durgin appealing the response of the Town of Dudley (Town) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On December 2, 2023, Mr. Durgin requested “a copy of any and all email communications between Town administrator Jonathan Ruda and [a named individual] from Westin and Sampson and or [a named individual] of Westin and Sampson. Between 7/1/23- 12/1/23[.]” The Town provided a response on December 14, 2023. Unsatisfied with the Town’s response, Mr. Durgin petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR24/0240, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § l0A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us Jonathan Ruda SPR24/0240 Page 2 February 7, 2024 If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Town’s December 14th response In its December 14, 2023 response, the Town cited Exemption (d) of the Public Records Law and the attorney-client privilege to withhold the records. Exemption (d) Exemption (d) allows the withholding of: inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d). Exemption (d) is intended to avoid premature release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if disclosed. Its application is limited to recommendations on legal and policy matters found within an ongoing deliberative process. See Babets v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 237 n.8 (1988). Factual reports which are reasonably complete and inferences which can be drawn from factual investigations, even if labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt as deliberative or policy making materials. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d); see also Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (purely factual matters used in the development of government policy are subject to disclosure). Under Exemption (d), the Town stated, “[i]t is the Town’s position that the information contained in responsive records pertains to legal positions currently under deliberation, the premature public disclosure of which may interfere with the decision-making process. The courts and the Supervisor of Records have also construed Exemption (d) as applying to records concerning litigation involving a public body… This would include communications with the Town’s attorneys and third-party consultants about matters which may lead to litigation either against the Town or brought by the Town.” Based on the Town’s response, I find it has not met its burden of specificity to withhold the records in their entirety pursuant to Exemption (d). It is unclear which records are being withheld from disclosure under Exemption (d). To deny access to a record under the Public Records Law, a records access officer must identify the record, categories of records, or portions of the record it intends to withhold. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3)(c)(4). As such, the Town must identify the records in its possession that it is withholding under Exemption (d). Jonathan Ruda SPR24/0240 Page 3 February 7, 2024 The Town is advised that any information contained in these records that is factual in nature may be subject to disclosure as Exemption (d) does not apply to such information. Consequently, the Town must clarify whether the records contain any factual information that can be segregated. Any non-exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. See G. L. c. 66, § l0(a); Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-290 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Further, I find the Town has not established how the records at issue are “inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters” as required by Exemption (d). See DOI v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 4 (2001) (indicating that a requirement for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption 5 to apply is “its source must be a Government agency”); Cty. of Madison v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 641 F.2d 1036, 1040 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding that documents from a private party are not “intra-agency” under FOIA exemption 5); SPR95/336 Determinations of the Supervisor of Records (August 14, 1995; August 31, 1995) (finding that Exemption (d) does not protect materials submitted to an agency by third parties and only applies to governmental agencies or consultants). It is additionally uncertain how disclosure of the records would taint the ongoing deliberative process. The Town must clarify these matters. Common law attorney-client privilege A records custodian claiming the attorney-client privilege under the Public Records Law has the burden of not only proving the existence of an attorney-client relationship, but also (1) that the communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) that the communications were made in confidence; and (3) that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. See Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 449 Mass. 444, 450 n.9 (2017); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapa & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 449 Mass. 609, 619 (2007) (stating that the party seeking the attorney-client privilege has the burden to show the privilege applies). Records custodians seeking to invoke the common law attorney-client privilege “are required to produce detailed indices to support their claims of privilege.” Suffolk, 449 Mass. at 460. Pursuant to the Public Records Law, in assessing whether a records custodian has properly withheld records based on the claim of attorney-client privilege the Supervisor of Records “shall require, as part of the decision making process, that the agency or municipality provide a detailed description of the record, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed.” G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). In its response, the Town stated, “the Town is withholding these records pursuant to . . . the attorney-client privilege.” Jonathan Ruda SPR24/0240 Page 4 February 7, 2024 I find that the Town has not satisfied the three-part test set out in the Suffolk case. See Suffolk, 449 Mass. at 460. Specifically, the Town must clarify that the communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such and that the communications were made in confidence and that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. Further, the Town is advised that G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a) requires that a records custodian must provide a privilege log in accordance with the Public Records Law. The log must include the date, the names of the author and recipients, the substance of the record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed. The Town must clarify these matters. Conclusion Accordingly, the Town is ordered to provide Mr. Durgin with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: David Durgin