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Jenna Rocco v. Norfolk County District Attorney's Office (SPR 20240283)

Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records · Filed 01-30-2024

ClosedAppealPetitioner Won

SPR 20240283 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by Jenna Rocco concerning records held by Norfolk County District Attorney's Office, opened 01-30-2024. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records.

Case Details

Case Number
20240283
Case Type
Appeal
Case Subtype
Initial
Status
Closed
Requester
Jenna Rocco
Custodian
Norfolk County District Attorney's Office
Date Opened
01-30-2024
Date Closed
02-08-2024

PDF Document

Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records February 8, 2024 SPR24/0283 Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Office of Norfolk County District Attorney 45 Shawmut Road Canton, MA 02021 Dear Attorney Hunt: I have received the petition of Jenna Rocco appealing the response of the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office (Office) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On December 13, 2023, Ms. Rocco requested copies of every time specific names were mentioned in emails to or from the Office. The Office provided a response on January 9, 2024. Unsatisfied with the response, Ms. Rocco petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR24/0283, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR24/0283 Page 2 February 8, 2024 The Office’s January 9th response In its January 9, 2024 response, the Office provided Ms. Rocco with records redacted under Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law. The Office also cited Exemptions (a), (d), and (f), to withhold additional requested records. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. Under Exemption (a), the Office cites the Criminal Offender Record Information (“CORI”) Act to withhold “[a] record containing a person’s criminal history…‘because disclosure would subvert the CORI act’s limitation on access to criminal history aggregated by State law enforcement agencies.’” Criminal Offender Record Information The current definition of CORI is as follows: “Criminal offender record information,” records and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to the nature or disposition of a criminal charge,

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR24/0283 Page 3 February 8, 2024 an arrest, a pre-trial proceeding, other judicial proceedings, previous hearings conducted pursuant to section 58A of chapter 276 where the defendant was detained prior to trial or released with conditions under subsection (2) of section 58A of chapter 276, sentencing, incarceration, rehabilitation, or release. Such information shall be restricted to information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment. Criminal offender record information shall not include evaluative information, statistical and analytical reports and files in which individuals are not directly or indirectly identifiable, or intelligence information. Criminal offender record information shall be limited to information concerning persons who have attained the age of 18 and shall not include any information concerning criminal offenses or acts of delinquency committed by any person before he attained the age of 18; provided, however, that if a person under the age of 18 was adjudicated as an adult in superior court or adjudicated as an adult after transfer of a case from a juvenile session to another trial court department, information relating to such criminal offense shall be criminal offender record information. Criminal offender record information shall not include information concerning any offenses which are not punishable by incarceration. G. L. c. 6, § 167. The Office has not met its burden of specificity in claiming Exemption (a) to withhold the requested record. Based on the Office’s response, it is unclear how the record it is withholding falls within the type of records contemplated under the CORI Act. The Office merely cites the statute without any further explanation as to its applicability to the responsive record. Pursuant to the Public Records Law, the burden shall be upon the records custodian to establish the applicability of an exemption. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based . . .”); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm’r, 419 Mass. 852, 857 (1995); Flatley, 419 Mass. at 511. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c).

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR24/0283 Page 4 February 8, 2024 Analysis under Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This exemption does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This exemption requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. Citing Exemption (c), the Office states that “personal identifying information was redacted pursuant to statutory exemptions.” Based on the Office’s response, the Office has not demonstrated that the information contained in the records constitutes intimate details of a highly personal nature or that the disclosure of such information would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. It is additionally uncertain whether this information is available from other sources. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. Also, the Office did not provide additional information with respect to the balancing test which examines whether the public interest in obtaining this information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. Exemption (d) Exemption (d) allows the withholding of: inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR24/0283 Page 5 February 8, 2024 G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d). Exemption (d) is intended to avoid premature release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if disclosed. Its application is limited to recommendations on legal and policy matters found within an ongoing deliberative process. See Babets v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 237 n.8 (1988). Factual reports which are reasonably complete and inferences which can be drawn from factual investigations, even if labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt as deliberative or policy making materials. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d); see also Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (purely factual matters used in the development of government policy are subject to disclosure). The Office cites Exemption (d) to withhold “[c]orrespondence related to this office’s response to public records requests containing the above-listed terms... because they consist of internal deliberations of the NDAO, the disclosure of which could taint the deliberative process.” Based on the Office’s response, I find the Office has not met its burden to withhold the requested records in their entirety pursuant to Exemption (d). I find that the Office has not fully explained how disclosure of the requested records would taint the deliberative process. In particular, the Office has not demonstrated that a deliberative process remains “ongoing and incomplete” as required by Exemption (d). See Babets, 403 Mass. at 237 n.8 (“this exemption protects such documents from disclosure only while policy is ‘being developed,’ that is, while the deliberative process is ongoing and incomplete”). Also, the Office is reminded that “reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based” are not permitted to be withheld. See G. L. c. 4, § 7 (26)(d). The Office must clarify these matters. Exemption (f) Exemption (f) permits the withholding of: investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(f). A custodian of records generally must demonstrate a prejudice to investigative efforts in order to withhold requested records. Information relating to an ongoing investigation may be withheld if disclosure could alert suspects to the activities of investigative officials. Confidential investigative techniques may also be withheld indefinitely if disclosure is deemed to be prejudicial to future law enforcement activities. Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass 59, 62 (1976). Redactions may be appropriate where they serve to preserve the anonymity of voluntary witnesses. Antell v. Att’y Gen., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 248 (2001); Reinstein v.

Brandon P. Hunt, Esq. SPR24/0283 Page 6 February 8, 2024 Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 290 n.18 (1979). Exemption (f) invites a “case-by- case consideration” of whether disclosure “would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest.” See Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289-290. The Office cites Exemption (f) in order to withhold “records containing information provided by witnesses… because they pertain to an active and ongoing criminal investigation.” The Office further states that “[t]he records may contain information that may indirectly identify voluntary witnesses and are withheld to preserve their anonymity.” Based on the Office’s response, it is unclear how the records, in their entirety, can be withheld under Exemption (f). It is not clear from the Office’s response whether the records contain confidential investigative techniques that would be prejudicial to the ongoing investigation if disclosed. Further, it is uncertain why the Office cannot redact the records to preserve the anonymity of voluntary witnesses, and provide the remaining portions of the records. See Antell, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 248. Consequently, the Office did not meet its burden of specificity in claiming Exemption (f) to withhold the records from disclosure. See Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289-90 (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). The Office must clarify these matters. Conclusion Accordingly, the Office is ordered to provide Ms. Rocco with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law, and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Jenna Rocco