Chetan Tiwari v. Department of Correction (SPR 20243396)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records January 6, 2025 SPR24/3396 Kate Silvia Director of Communications Records Access Officer Department of Correction 50 Maple Street, Suite 3 Milford, MA 01757 Dear Ms. Silvia: I have received the petition of Attorney Chetan Tiwari appealing the response of the Department of Correction (Department) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On October 24, 2024, Attorney Tiwari requested the following: 1) Any and all recordings (audio and video) of [a named individual], while at MCINCCI from April 19, 2024 until April 24, 2024; 2) Any and all documents pertaining to [the individual] created by the DOC or any agent of the Department of Corrections, between April 1, 2024 and April 30, 2024; 3) Any and all records pertaining to the Disciplinary Report issued to [the individual], designated as Disciplinary Report No. 512522, including the report itself; 4) All reports, communications, documents pertaining to Disciplinary Report No. 512522 including but not limited to [a list of 14] Incident Reports ... 5) Any and all records pertaining to excessive force complaints mentioning or against [a list of 12] officers ... 6) Any and all records pertaining to the DOC’s excessive force policy, use of force policy, investigation policy and Body Worn Camera policy, including but not limited to the actual policies, in effect in April 2024; 7) Any and all records pertaining to investigations, responses into the grievance filed by [the individual]. 8) All grievances filed by [the individual]. 9) All documents reviewed, drafted or relied upon by the Superintendent’s Special Investigators when investigating [the individual] grievance. 10) Any and all documents pertaining to the discipline, by DOC, of [a list of 12 One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 2 January 6, 2025 people]. 11) All documents pertaining to the decision to move [the individual] to a different part of the prison. 12) All Unit Intelligence Reports pertaining to the unit(s) [the individual] was housed in from April 1, 2024 until April 30, 2024. On December 16, 2024, Attorney Tiwari modified the scope of Item 1 of the request, seeking specific body worn camera footage, and modified the scope of Item 7 to include audio recordings of specified interviews. The Department responded on November 27, 2024. Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Attorney Tiwari petitioned this office, and this appeal, SPR24/3396, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. Current Appeal In his appeal petition, with regard to Item 1, Attorney Tiwari contends that “the DOC is asserting blanket objections/exemptions to prevent the release of all video.” Additionally, he contends that “the DOC is asserting blanket objections/exemptions to prevent the release of audio recordings in response to Request No. 5.” Further, he argues that “the DOC is asserting blanket objections/exemptions to prevent the release of audio recordings in response to Request No. 7.” Based on the appeal petition, it appears that Attorney Tiwari objects only to the Department’s responses concerning Items 1, 5, and 7 of the request.

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 3 January 6, 2025 The Department’s November 27th Response In its November 27, 2024 response, the Department provided numerous responsive records. The Department cited Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law, numerous statutes, and Exemptions (b) and (c) for withholding and redacting records responsive to Items 1, 5, and 7 of the request. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (b), (c). Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) The current definition of CORI is as follows: “Criminal offender record information,” records and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to the nature or disposition of a criminal charge, an arrest, a pre-trial proceeding, other judicial proceedings, previous hearings conducted pursuant to section 58A of chapter 276 where the defendant was detained prior to trial or released with conditions under subsection (2) of section 58A of chapter 276, sentencing, incarceration, rehabilitation, or release. Such information shall be restricted to information recorded in criminal proceedings

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 4 January 6, 2025 that are not dismissed before arraignment. Criminal offender record information shall not include evaluative information, statistical and analytical reports and files in which individuals are not directly or indirectly identifiable, or intelligence information. Criminal offender record information shall be limited to information concerning persons who have attained the age of 18 and shall not include any information concerning criminal offenses or acts of delinquency committed by any person before he attained the age of 18; provided, however, that if a person under the age of 18 was adjudicated as an adult in superior court or adjudicated as an adult after transfer of a case from a juvenile session to another trial court department, information relating to such criminal offense shall be criminal offender record information. Criminal offender record information shall not include information concerning any offenses which are not punishable by incarceration. G. L. c. 6, § 167. Records of Hospitals or Clinics In its response, the Department cites G. L. c. 111, § 70, which provides in pertinent part as follows: Hospitals or clinics subject to licensure by the department of public health or supported in whole or in part by the commonwealth, shall keep records of the treatment of the cases under their care including the medical history and nurses’ notes and, in the case of a patient brought to a hospital by an ambulance service licensed pursuant to chapter 111C, a copy of the call summary set forth in paragraph (15) of subsection (b) of section 3 of said chapter 111C. ... Such records shall be in the custody of the hospital or clinic. Section ten of chapter sixty-six shall not apply to such records[.] G. L. c. 111, § 70. Holders Maintaining Personal Data The Department also cites G. L. c. 66A, § 2(c), which provides in pertinent part as follows: Every holder maintaining personal data shall ... not allow any other agency or individual not employed by the holder to have access to personal data unless such access is authorized by statute or regulations which are consistent with the purposes of this chapter or is approved by the data subject whose personal data are sought if the data subject is entitled to access under clause (i). G. L. c. 66A, § 2(c).

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 5 January 6, 2025 Additionally, G. L. c. 66A, § 1 defines “personal data” as follows: “Personal data”, any information concerning an individual which, because of name, identifying number, mark or description can be readily associated with a particular individual; provided, however, that such information is not contained in a public record, as defined in clause Twenty-sixth of section seven of chapter four and shall not include intelligence information, evaluative information or criminal offender record information as defined in section one hundred and sixty-seven of chapter six. G. L. c. 66A, § 1. Exemption (b) Exemption (b) permits the withholding of records that are: Related solely to internal personnel rules and practices of the government unit, provided however, that such records shall be withheld only to the extent that proper performance of necessary governmental functions requires such withholding G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(b). There are no authoritative Massachusetts decisions interpreting Exemption (b). The general purpose of the cognate federal exemption is to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection materials in which the public cannot reasonably be expected to have an interest. See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 362-70 (1976) (interpreting the federal Freedom of Information Act, which provides an exemption for records which are “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency”); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432 (1983) (Massachusetts Public Records Law modeled on federal Freedom of Information Act). The courts have interpreted the federal exemption to allow withholding of materials that, if released, could cause agency rules or regulations to be circumvented. See Fiumara v. Higgins, 572 F. Supp. 1093, 1102 (1983) (internal codes are exempt where disclosure may enable outsiders to circumvent agency functions). The analysis employed by the federal courts requires a two-pronged test. Material is exempt if it is predominantly used internally and if disclosed would significantly risk circumvention of agency regulations and statutes. See Marrera v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 622 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1985) (Bureau of Prisons access and identity codes were properly withheld as materials in which the public would have no legitimate interest or which would compromise security if disclosed). Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to:

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 6 January 6, 2025 personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Massachusetts courts have found that “core categories of personnel information that are ‘useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee’” may be withheld from disclosure. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). For example, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee,” may be withheld pursuant to Exemption (c). Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. Sch. Comm., 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). The courts have also discussed specific categories of records that may be redacted under Exemption (c). See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Exec. Office of Admin. and Fin., Suffolk Sup. No. 11-01184-A (June 14, 2013). Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual may be exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). Analysis under Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This exemption does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). When analyzing a privacy claim, there is a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292.

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 7 January 6, 2025 Item 1 In its November 27th response, with regard to Item 1 of the request, the Department argues the following: Please be advised that video surveillance recordings and body worn camera video are not public records. Massachusetts General Laws c. 4, § 7 (26) (b) exempts records “related solely to internal personnel rules and practices of the governments unit, provided however, that such records shall be withheld only to the extent that the proper performance of necessary governmental function require withholding.” Video taken within a correctional facility raises serious security concerns as such videos contain images of sensitive security measures such as camera angles or blind spots. This information, if released, could be used to undermine the safety and security of the facilities, risking the safety of incarcerated individuals and staff, as well as the public at large. Additionally, release of the video may reveal the particular angle of the camera or disclose the location of a hidden surveillance camera. Although incarcerated individuals may be aware that there are surveillance cameras at NCCI Gardner, they may not be aware of all of the locations of all of the surveillance cameras. Release of the videos may disclose those locations, thereby hindering the Department of Correction’s ability to monitor NCCI Gardner in the future. Please see decision of the Supervisor SPR18/710, SPR20/0068 and SPR24/3089. Moreover, surveillance videos, including body worn cameras, depicting activity housing units portray images of incarcerated individuals housed at the facilities, which is prohibited from dissemination under G.L. c. 4, § 7 (26) (a) (documents exempted specifically or by necessary implication from disclosure by statute, i.e., the CORI statute and 103 CMR 153). Also, 103 CMR 157.10(3), which governs access to evaluative information by third parties, would apply to any video. These videos depict the faces of incarcerated individuals inside of a state prison, thereby making their identities ascertainable. G.L. c. 6, § 167, defines CORI as “records and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to ... incarceration, rehabilitation, or release.” Thus, the video in question is CORI, as defined by G.L. c. 6, § 172. With regard to the surveillance video recordings, I find that the Department has met its burden to show how disclosing any portion of the surveillance video would depict “internal personnel rules and practices,” such as sensitive security measures related to video monitoring of the facility, and the “proper performance of necessary governmental functions,” such as maintaining a secure penal institution, requires such withholding. Therefore, I find the Department has met its burden to withhold the responsive surveillance video under Exemption (b).

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 8 January 6, 2025 However, based on the Department’s response, the Department has not met its burden to withhold the body worn camera footage, in its entirety, under Exemptions (a) and (b). Based on the Department’s response, it is unclear how the body worn camera footage may be withheld under Exemption (a) and CORI. Specifically, it is not clear how the withheld records constitute “information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment.” See G. L. c. 6, § 167. Further, it is unclear how disclosing the body worn camera footage would depict “internal personnel rules and practices,” or how disclosure of the body worn camera footage “would significantly risk circumvention of agency regulations and statutes,” as required under Exemption (b). The Department must clarify these matters. Additionally, it is unclear how the body worn camera footage can be withheld in its entirety. Particularly, it is uncertain why the body worn camera footage cannot be redacted so that segregable portions can be provided. See Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289-90 (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Any nonexempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). Item 5 In its November 27th response, with regard to Item 5 of the request, the Department provides numerous records in redacted form, and argues the following: These records have been redacted based on various exemptions under the public records statute: CORI The enclosed responsive records have been redacted to remove any criminal offender record information (CORI) of identifiable inmates under G.L. c. 6, § 167. G.L. c. 6, § 167, defines CORI as “records and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to ... incarceration, rehabilitation, or release.” Access to CORI information is strictly controlled. . . . Outside of law enforcement representatives, however, CORI access is limited. As you are not a law enforcement agency within the scope of §§ 172 (a) (1-3), it falls under G.L. 6, § 172 (a) (4)[.] . . . As the responsive records contain CORI of identifiable inmates as defined in G.L. c. 6, § 167, pursuant to G.L. c. 4, § 7 (26) (a), CORI is exempt from disclosure under the public records statute as records that are “specifically or by necessary implication exempted to disclosure by statute.” . . .

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 9 January 6, 2025 The Department, as a criminal justice agency, has a duty and an obligation to withhold CORI from non-authorized individuals. Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union (MCOFU) v. Department of Correction, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 1111, 2010 WL 343856 (2010), citing to Hastings v. Commissioner of Correction, 406 Mass. 898, 900 (1990); Mass. Sober Housing Corp. v. Automatic Sprinkler Appeals Board, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 70 I, 708 (2006) (and cases cited); Hastings v. Commissioner of Correction, 424 Mass. 46, 50 n. 10 (1997) (citing Boston Police Superior Officers Fed’n. v. Boston, 414 Mass. 458,462 (1993)). . . . Medical Information The responsive documents also contain medical information, which is exempt from disclosure pursuant to G.L. c. 4, §7(26)(c). General Laws c. 4, § 7 (26) (c) exempts “personnel and medical files or information” from the definition of public record. Pursuant to G.L. c. 66A, § 1, medical/mental health records may only be inspected by the patient to whom they relate. The exemption applies even where the inmate is deceased; after a patient’s death, the records may only be accessed by “the duly appointed executor or administrator of the deceased person’s estate or the attorney for such executor or administrator upon delivery of a written authorization from such executor or administrator ....” G.L. c. 111, § 70. Additionally, G.L. c. 111, §70 exempts medical records for any healthcare facility supported in whole or in part by the Commonwealth from disclosure. Accordingly, medical information pertaining to a specific inmate is not a public record. Moreover, under 105 CMR 205, Minimum Standards Governing Medical Records and the Conduct Of Physical Examinations in Correctional Facilities, “[Prison] medical staff shall maintain and use medical records in a manner which ensures the confidentiality of the information contained therein. Only those persons who need access to the record in order to provide medical services to the inmate or fulfill statutory obligations, and those persons specifically authorized by the inmate to see the record, shall have access to the records and information.” Personal Data and Personnel Information Additionally, the responsive documents also contain personal data and personnel information, which have been redacted, as such information is also exempt from disclosure under the public records law. . . . The DOC may “not allow any other agency or individual not employed by the holder to have access to personal data unless such access is authorized by statute or regulations which are consistent with the purposes of this chapter or is approved by the data subject whose personal data are sought.” G.L. c. 66A, §

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 10 January 6, 2025 2(b). . . . Further, the dissemination of this information would violate G.L. c. 4, § 7 (26) (c), which exempts “personnel and medical files or information, also any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 9-10 (2003), holding that employee disciplinary information may be “part of the core categor[y] of personnel information that [is] useful in making employment decisions regarding the employee” and thus exempt from disclosure. (Citations omitted). See also Wakefield Teachers Association v. School Committee of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 799 (2000) (holding that disciplinary information is considered part of a personnel file, and “[i]nformation falling within the ‘personnel and medical files or information’ category is absolutely exempt from disclosure”) and Souza v. Massachusetts State Police, 2012 WL 6608985. G.L. c. 4, §7 (26) (c) contains two distinct and independent clauses, each requiring its own analysis. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432-34 (1983). Analysis under the second privacy clause is subjective, requiring a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Attorney General v. Real Prop. Dept., 380 Mass. 623,625 (1980); Torres v. Attorney General, 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984). The privacy clause of exemption (c) specifically protects “intimate details of a highly personal nature.” Attorney General v. Real Prop. Dept., 380 Mass. 623,625 (1980). As the Appeals Court found, employees have the right to object to the release of personnel records, including disciplinary records, pursuant to G.L. c. 66A, Section 2. John Doe, et al. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 428 (1988). Release of investigative findings and conclusions, even if an employee is ultimately exonerated, or where a finding is unsustained, could nevertheless lead to damage to the employee’s reputation, which would have a direct impact on the employee, if and when the employee were to pursue employment elsewhere. The employee could still be faced with the possibility that some individuals may harbor a suspicion that the investigative finding resulted from a technicality due to insufficiency of the evidence, for example, and wrongly assume that the employee had actually engaged in some form of misconduct. Release of the findings and conclusions of these investigations could have a detrimental effect on reputations not only for employment purposes but also within the perception of the community at large. Based on the Department’s response, it is unclear how the responsive records may be redacted pursuant to Exemption (a) and the statutes cited by the Department. Specifically, it is not clear how the redacted information constitutes “information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment.” See G. L. c. 6, § 167. Also, it is unclear how the redacted records, which concern excessive use of force

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 11 January 6, 2025 complaints, would constitute the type of record of treatment, medical history, nurses’ notes, or call summary that may be withheld under G. L. c. 111, § 70. Additionally, it is unclear how the redacted information constitutes the type of “personal data” contemplated under G. L. c. 66A, §§ 1 and 2(c). The Department must clarify these matters. Further, the Department is advised that the Supreme Judicial Court has held that Exemption (c) “clearly and unambiguously states that the privacy exemption does not apply to an ‘investigation’ of law enforcement misconduct.” Eric Mack v. Dist. Att’y for the Bristol Dist., 494 Mass. 1, 12 (2024). Additionally, the Court held that the phrase “related to,” as used in Exemption (c), “is construed broadly.” Id. at 12 n.9. Specifically, the Court held that the exemption did not apply to records related to an investigation into whether two police officers had committed any crimes or violated their department’s use of force policy. Id. at 12. Exemption (c) did not apply even where the investigation concluded there was no basis to charge the officers with crimes. Id. at 6. In this case, based on the Department’s response, it is unclear whether the responsive records are related to law enforcement misconduct investigations. Further, based on the Department’s response, it is unclear how the responsive records constitute one of the core categories of personnel information useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee. It is additionally uncertain how the records contain intimate details of a highly personal nature, or how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. Also, the Department did not provide information with respect to the balancing test, which examines whether the public interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. The Department must clarify these matters. Item 7 With its November 27th response, the Department provides numerous records responsive to Item 7 of the request, in redacted form, and states “all grievances have been provided, which include investigatory notes and responses within them. Additionally, Intake #21250 has been provided in response to request #9.” In his appeal petition, regarding the records responsive to Item 7, Attorney Tiwari argues the following: [T]he ‘Finding(s) and Conclusion(s)’ section of the report is redacted. No reason has been provided for the redaction. As such, I request that the Supervisor order the DOC to provide unredacted reports. [One of the records] also references audio recordings of the interview of [numerous individuals] conducted when investigating [the specified] grievance. These audio recordings are public records and have not been provided. Nor have

Kate Silvia SPR24/3396 Page 12 January 6, 2025 they been mentioned in the DOC’s response. The Department is advised that, under the Public Records Law, the burden shall be on the custodian to establish the applicability of an exemption to withhold or redact records. Based on the Department’s response, it is unclear which exemption the Department is citing in order to redact the records responsive to Item 7 of the request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (a written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based”). See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm’r, 419 Mass. 852, 857 (1995); Flatley, 419 Mass. at 511. Additionally, the Department is advised that the duty to comply with requests for records extends to those records that exist and are in the possession, custody, or control of the custodian of records at the time of the request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(ii). In accordance with the Public Records Law, custodians are expected to use their superior knowledge of the records in their custody to assist requestors in obtaining the desired information. See 950 C.M.R. 32.04(5). Based on the Department’s response, and the information provided in Attorney Tiwari’s appeal petition, it is unclear whether the Department possesses additional records responsive to Item 7 of the request. If the Department does possess additional responsive records, it must either provide the records, or cite an exemption to the Public Records Law, and explain with specificity how such an exemption applies to withhold or redact the records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (a written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based”). Conclusion Accordingly, the Department is ordered to provide Attorney Tiwari with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Chetan Tiwari, Esq.