Christopher Roberts v. Lexington, Town of - Police Department (SPR 20250170)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records January 29, 2025 SPR25/0170 Donna Dutton Administrative Assistant Lexington Police Department Records Division 173 Bedford Street Lexington, MA 02420 Dear Ms. Dutton: I have received the petition of Christopher Roberts appealing the response of the Lexington Police Department (Department) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On December 12, 2024, Mr. Roberts requested a specified motor vehicle report #24-014476. The Department responded on December 19, 2024, providing responsive records with redactions. Unsatisfied with the response, Mr. Roberts petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/0170, was opened as a result. Status of the requestor; reason for the request Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a); see also Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Therefore, Mr. Roberts’ status as “the damage investigator for the utility company,” shall have no bearing on the public nature of the record. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Donna Dutton SPR25/0170 Page 2 January 29, 2025 It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Att’y for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Department’s December 19th Response In its December 19, 2024 response, the Department claimed Exemptions (a) and (c) to redact the requested records. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-546 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) In its response, the Department cited the Criminal Offender Record Information

Donna Dutton SPR25/0170 Page 3 January 29, 2025 (CORI) Act in support of the redactions. G. L. c. 6, § 167 provides in pertinent part: [R]ecords and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to the nature or disposition of a criminal charge, an arrest, a pre-trial proceeding, other judicial proceedings, previous hearings conducted pursuant to section 58A of chapter 276 where the defendant was detained prior to trial or released with conditions under subsection (2) of section 58A of chapter 276, sentencing, incarceration, rehabilitation, or release. Such information shall be restricted to information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment. Criminal offender record information shall not include evaluative information, statistical and analytical reports and files in which individuals are not directly or indirectly identifiable, or intelligence information . . . Criminal offender record information shall not include information concerning any offenses which are not punishable by incarceration. G. L. c. 6, § 167. In its response, the Department states, it redacted some information because it is “protected under CORI[.]” Based on the foregoing, I find the Department has not met its burden to demonstrate how the police report is exempt under the CORI Act. Specifically, it is unclear how the record contains “information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment,” as defined in G. L. c. 6, § 167. The Department must clarify this matter. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Analysis under Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This exemption does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal

Donna Dutton SPR25/0170 Page 4 January 29, 2025 sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). When analyzing a privacy claim, there is a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. Under Exemption (c), the Department states, the report has been redacted because “[t]he disclosure of personal data which may constitute [an] invasion of personal privacy.” Based on the Department’s response, it has not explained how the redacted information constitutes intimate details of a highly personal nature, or how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. Further, the Department did not provide information with respect to the balancing test, which examines whether the public interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. The Department must clarify these matters. Conclusion Accordingly, the Department is ordered to provide Mr. Roberts with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law, and its Regulations within ten (10) business. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Mr. Roberts may appeal the substantive nature of the Department’s response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Christopher Roberts