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Dustin Whiteaker v. Clinton, Town of - Town Administrator (SPR 20251606)

Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records · Filed 06-06-2025

ClosedAppealPetitioner Won

SPR 20251606 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by Dustin Whiteaker concerning records held by Clinton, Town of - Town Administrator, opened 06-06-2025. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records.

Case Details

Case Number
20251606
Case Type
Appeal
Case Subtype
Initial
Status
Closed
Requester
Dustin Whiteaker
Custodian
Clinton, Town of - Town Administrator
Date Opened
06-06-2025
Date Closed
06-20-2025
Time to Comply
10 Business Days

PDF Document

Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records June 20, 2025 SPR25/1606 Michael J. Ward Town Administrator Town of Clinton 242 Church Street Clinton, MA 01510 Dear Mr. Ward: I have received the petition of Dustin Whiteaker appealing the response of the Town of Clinton (Town) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On May 22, 2025, Mr. Whiteaker requested, “...a copy of this Parrow consulting report that the fire department employees participated in.” The Town responded on June 6, 2025. Unsatisfied with the response, Mr. Whiteaker petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/1606, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Michael J. Ward SPR25/1606 Page 2 June 20, 2025 Current appeal In his appeal, Mr. Whiteaker asserts, “I don’t feel the report is exempt from public info requests...” The Town’s June 6th Response In its June 6, 2025 response, the Town cited Exemptions (b) and (d) of the Public Records Law to withhold the requested record in its entirety. Exemption (b) Exemption (b) permits the withholding of: records that are related solely to internal personnel rules and practices of the government unit, provided however, that such records shall be withheld only to the extent that proper performance of necessary government functions requires such withholding G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(b). There are no authoritative Massachusetts decisions interpreting Exemption (b). The general purpose of the cognate federal exemption is to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection materials in which the public cannot reasonably be expected to have an interest. See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 362-70 (1976) (interpreting the federal Freedom of Information Act, which provides an exemption for records which are “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency”); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427,432 (1983) (Massachusetts Public Records Law modeled on federal Freedom of Information Act). The courts have interpreted the federal exemption to allow withholding of materials that, if released, could cause agency rules or regulations to be circumvented. See Fiumara v. Higgins, 572 F. Supp. 1093, 1102 (1983) (internal codes are exempt where disclosure may enable outsiders to circumvent agency functions). The analysis employed by the federal courts requires a two-pronged test. Material is exempt if it is predominantly used internally and if disclosure would significantly risk circumvention of agency regulations and statutes. See Marrera v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 622 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1985) (Bureau of Prisons access and identity codes were properly withheld as materials in which the public would have no legitimate interest or which would compromise security if disclosed). Exemption (d) Exemption (d) allows the withholding of: inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions

Michael J. Ward SPR25/1606 Page 3 June 20, 2025 being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d). Exemption (d) is intended to avoid premature release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if disclosed. Its application is limited to recommendations on legal and policy matters found within an ongoing deliberative process. See Babets v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 237 n.8 (1988). Factual reports which are reasonably complete and inferences which can be drawn from factual investigations, even if labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt as deliberative or policy making materials. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d); see also Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (purely factual matters used in the development of government policy are subject to disclosure). In its response, the Town stated, “[t]he Town has received your request for a copy of the report recently produced by John Parow Consulting & Associates regarding its review of the Clinton Fire Department. Per Town Counsel, the report is currently exempt from disclosure as provided under M.G.L. c. 4, sec. 7, cl. 26(b) and 26(d) and M.G.L. c. 66, sec. 10, and consequently, a copy will not be provided at this time.” The Town’s June 6th response did not contain the specificity required in a denial of access to public records. It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. As a result, I find that the Town did not meet its burden of specificity in claiming Exemptions (b) and (d) of the Public Records Law to withhold the requested report from disclosure. See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Any non-exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). Conclusion Accordingly, the Town is ordered to provide Mr. Whiteaker with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations within ten business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Mr. Whiteaker may appeal the substantive nature of the Town’s response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1).

Michael J. Ward SPR25/1606 Page 4 June 20, 2025 Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Erik J. Whiteaker