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Cheryl Ryan v. Bellingham, Town of - Police Department (SPR 20252330)
Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records · Filed 08-25-2025
ClosedAppealPetitioner Won
SPR 20252330 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by Cheryl Ryan concerning records held by Bellingham, Town of - Police Department, opened 08-25-2025. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records.
Case Details
- Case Number
- 20252330
- Case Type
- Appeal
- Case Subtype
- In Cam
- Status
- Closed
- Requester
- Cheryl Ryan
- Date Opened
- 08-25-2025
- Date Closed
- 09-15-2025
- In Camera Opened
- 08-25-2025
- In Camera Closed
- 09-15-2025
PDF Document
Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records August 22, 2025 SPR25/2330 Lieutenant Stephen Daigle Public Information Officer Bellingham Police Department 30 Blackstone Street Bellingham, MA 02019 Dear Lieutenant Daigle: I have received the petition of Cheryl Ryan appealing the response of the Bellingham Police Department (Department) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On August 6, 2025, Ms. Ryan requested “any and all police reports related to a Disturbance call on 08/02/2025 at 2142hrs, Call number 25-18488 and a Medical Transport at 2204hrs, Call number 25-18489, Refer to Fire Case 25-2132-IN.” The Department responded on August 11, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Ms. Ryan petitioned this office, and this appeal, SPR25/2330, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us Lieutenant Stephen Daigle SPR25/2330 Page 2 August 22, 2025 If there are any fees associated with a response, a written good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. Current Appeal In her appeal petition, Ms. Ryan argues the following: It is my belief that this police incident was not a Domestic but rather a Disturbance as listed in their police logs. . . . No one was arrested, no one was cited for domestic violence, no one was offered an Emergency RO nor was there any attempt by officers to explain to anyone that they had a right to an RO. The Officers did not separate the parties, no officer stayed behind to safeguard the safety of a victim and no “victim” was identified. This was not a Domestic Violence incident. Furthermore, the Bellingham Police Department listed the call as a Disturbance AND placed the call in its Police Log. Under Chapter 41 Section 98F, Domestic incidents “shall be kept in a separate log and shall not be a public record, nor shall such entry be disclosed to the public,” Thus, placing the incident in the public log leads a reasonable person to believe it was not a Domestic, unless the BPD violated the law by placing it in public records. The Department’s August 11th Response In its August 11, 2025 response, the Department cites G. L. c. 41, § 98F, as it operates through Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law, along with Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law, for withholding “police reports related to call numbers 25-18488 and 25-18489.” See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (c). Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). Lieutenant Stephen Daigle SPR25/2330 Page 3 August 22, 2025 This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. In its response, the Department cites G. L. c. 41, § 98F, which provides in pertinent part as follows: Each police department and each college or university to which officers have been appointed pursuant to section 63 of chapter 22C shall make, keep and maintain a daily log, written in a form that can be easily understood, recording, in chronological order, all responses to valid complaints received, crimes reported, the names, addresses of persons arrested and the charges against such persons arrested. All entries in said daily logs shall, unless otherwise provided in law, be public records available without charge to the public during regular business hours and at all other reasonable times; provided, however, that the following entries shall be kept in a separate log and shall not be a public record nor shall such entry be disclosed to the public, or any individual not specified in section 97D: (i) any entry in a log which pertains to a handicapped individual who is physically or mentally incapacitated to the degree that said person is confined to a wheelchair or is bedridden or requires the use of a device designed to provide said person with mobility, (ii) any information concerning responses to reports of domestic violence, rape or sexual assault, (iii) any entry concerning the arrest of a person for assault, assault and battery or violation of a protective order where the victim is a family or household member, as defined in section 1 of chapter 209A, or (iv) any entry concerning the arrest of a person who has not yet reached 18 years of age. G. L. c. 41, § 98F. In its August 11th response, the Department argues the following under c. 41, § 98F: G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a) exempts records that are “specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute.” Under G.L. c. 41, § 98F, records of responses to incidents of domestic violence must be maintained in a separate log and “shall not be a public record” and “shall not be disclosed to the public.” The incident in question was domestic in nature and involved juveniles. As such, disclosure is prohibited by statute. Lieutenant Stephen Daigle SPR25/2330 Page 4 August 22, 2025 Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Medical Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual may be exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties Lieutenant Stephen Daigle SPR25/2330 Page 5 August 22, 2025 in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its August 11th response, under Exemption (c), the Department argues the following: G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c) exempts records that relate to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The responsive report contains highly personal information, including the identities of juveniles and details regarding an individual’s mental health crisis. Such information is of a highly intimate nature, and disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. The exempt portions cannot be reasonably segregated from any potentially non-exempt portions of the record. In Camera Inspection In order to facilitate a determination as to the applicability of the Exemptions (a) and (c) claims made by the Department to withhold responsive records, the Department must provide this office with un-redacted copies of the responsive records for in camera inspection. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4). After I complete my review of the records, I will return the records to the Department’s custody and issue an opinion on the public or exempt nature of the records. The authority to require the submission of records for an in camera inspection emanates from the Code of Massachusetts Regulations. 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4); see also G. L. c. 66, § 1. This office interprets the in camera inspection process to be analogous to that utilized by the judicial system. See Rock v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 206 (1981) (administrative agency entitled deference in the interpretation of its own regulations). Records are not voluntarily submitted, but rather are submitted pursuant to an order by this office that an in camera inspection is necessary to make a proper finding. Records are submitted for the limited purpose of review. This office is not the custodian of records examined in camera, therefore, any request made to this office for records being reviewed in camera will be denied. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4)(c). This office has a long history of cooperation with governmental agencies with respect to in camera inspection. Custodians submit copies of the relevant records to this office upon a promise of confidentiality. This office does not release records reviewed in camera to anyone under any circumstances. Upon a determination of the public record status, records reviewed in camera are promptly returned to the custodian. To operate in any other fashion would seriously impede our ability to function and would certainly affect our credibility within the legal community. Please be aware, any cover letter submitted to accompany the relevant records may be subject to disclosure. Order Accordingly, the Department is ordered to provide this office with un-redacted copies of the responsive records for in camera inspection without delay. Lieutenant Stephen Daigle SPR25/2330 Page 6 August 22, 2025 Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Cheryl Ryan Marianne Mahar