Claire McGale v. Holyoke, City of - City Clerk (SPR 20252595)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records September 12, 2025 SPR25/2595 Kathleen E. Degnan, Esq. Assistant City Solicitor City of Holyoke City Hall Annex 20 Korean Veterans Plaza Holyoke, MA 01040 Dear Attorney Degnan: I have received the petition of Claire McGale appealing the response of the City of Holyoke (City) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66 § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On July 24, 2025, Ms. McGale requested: [A]ccess to all emails, documents, reports, and communication records that discuss, plan, consider, constitute or pertain to community needs assessments related to mental health and/or substance use within the City of Holyoke, Massachusetts, for the period from January 1, 2019, to the present. This includes but is not limited to [n]eeds assessment reports[;] [c]ommunity health surveys[;] [f]ocus group summaries[;] [s]takeholder meeting notes[;] [c]orrespondence related to community input[s] [d]ata analyses or evaluations[.] Prior Appeal This request was the subject of a prior appeal. See SPR25/2360 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (August 26, 2025). In my August 26th determination, I found it unclear whether the City had provided a response to Ms. McGale’s request. The City responded on August 29, and August 30, 2025. Unsatisfied with the responses, Ms. McGale petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/2595, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Kathleen Degnan SPR25/2595 Page 2 September 12, 2025 form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The City’s August 29th and August 30th Responses In its August 29, 2025 response, the City stated, “your request is much too vague and overbroad. In fact, your request is so vague and overbroad that the city cannot respond to your request due to its lack of context and specificity…the [C]ity is currently working on needs assessments, health surveys, etc. If these are the documents that you are requesting, I must state that your request is premature because these documents have not yet been completed. For the reasons set forth herein, the [C]ity cannot respond to your request due to its lack of clarity or because your request is premature.” In an August 30, 2025, email communication to the City, Ms. McGale stated, “I agree that my records request is broad and I am well aware that it may take some time to fill. However, I disagree with your assertion that the request is vague. I have identified two related areas of focus, detailed exactly the types of documents I am looking for, and provided a timeframe which can be considered to be January 1, 2029 to the date I filed this request, July 24, 2025.” In its August 30, 2025 response, the City stated the following: You are correct that your request is broad, and you are incorrect that your request is not not [sic] vague. However, I did share your request with the health department before I responded to you and they do not have any of the documents that you have requested in the form that you have requested. For example, I was told that they do have conversations with the city hospital regarding needs assessments, but those conversations occurred at the hospital. Any documents that may have been created in relation to these conversations belong to the hospital, and legally, they are not public records. Perhaps, if you could specify your requested documents or if you would share with me which department from whom which you are requesting the documents, the [C]ity may be able to identify

Kathleen Degnan SPR25/2595 Page 3 September 12, 2025 your requested documents. Absent that, the [C]ity has no definitive way of responding to your request. Current Appeal In her September 2, 2025 appeal to this office, Ms. McGale stated, “I am appealing the responses…Issues concerning my public records request have remained unresolved…I disagree with the assertion that the request is vague. I have identified two related areas of focus, detailed exactly the types of documents I am looking for, and provided a timeframe…” Breadth of Request; Reasonable Description of Records Sought Please be advised, in Friedman v. Div. of Admin. Law Appeal and Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, the Suffolk Superior Court, in its Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, stated: [The requester] has a right to seek public records from his government, provided he does so in a reasonable manner. [The agencies], in turn, have a right not to be inundated with drain-the-ocean records requests, provided they fulfill the basic expectations of the [Public Records Law] in a fair and transparent manner. See Friedman v. Div. of Admin. Law Appeal and Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, Suffolk Sup. No. 2284CV02061-C, at 3 (February 14, 2023). The Court in Friedman noted, “the extraordinary volume of records called for in this case has compelled the Defendants to produce responsive materials in a ‘rolling’ fashion, rather than in accordance with deadlines contemplated by the [Public Records Law].” Id. at 1. The Court stated that: [T]he parties shall be expected to agree upon, to the greatest extent possible, the following: (a) appropriate definitions, time frames, and parameters regarding substance and scope for the identification of requested documents; (b) appropriate search terms to be used for the retrieval of responsive documents; (c) a reasonable time frame for the production of requested documents, if the statute’s presumptive deadlines are not realistic; (d) appropriate rules to govern the withholding of documents falling within the scope of a statutory privilege or privacy doctrine; and (e) an appropriate methodology for computing the reasonable fees that may be charged for responsive document production. Id. at 2.

Kathleen Degnan SPR25/2595 Page 4 September 12, 2025 In addition, please be aware that the request must reasonably describe the specific records sought. In a recent case, the Superior Court found that under the Public Records Law “[t]he reasonable description requirement contemplates that a requesting party will identify documents or categories of documents with sufficient particularity that government employees will be able to understand exactly what they are looking for, and then make a prompt production.” See Jaideep Chawla v. Dept. of Revenue, Suffolk Sup. No. 1784CV02087, at 2 (January 23, 2019). The court further indicated “[r]equests for documents that are articulated with very broad language that calls upon non-lawyer administrative personnel to interpret the scope of what is sought, and then make fine judgments about what documents are and are not sufficiently ‘related’ to the category of materials requested, will not satisfy this statutory standard.” Id. As such, requests that seek “all records relating to…,” “all records concerning…,” or “all records regarding…” are not sufficiently particular as to satisfy the statutory standard of a request that “reasonably described the public record sought.” See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(i). Based on a review of Ms. McGale’s request, this office finds that her request is very broad in scope. Additionally, consistent with the decision in Chawla, I find that the language “all emails, documents, reports, and communication records that discuss, plan, consider, constitute or pertain to…” does not satisfy the statutory standard for a request that reasonably describes the public records sought. See Chawla, at 2. Ms. McGale may wish to provide clarification regarding the specific records she is seeking. Once Ms. McGale has provided the needed clarification, the City must provide a response within 10 business days. This office encourages Ms. McGale and the City to communicate to facilitate providing records more efficiently and affordably. The City must use its knowledge of the records to facilitate providing any responsive records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(vii) (a municipality shall suggest a reasonable modification of the scope of the request or offer to assist the requestor to modify the scope of the request if doing so would enable the municipality to produce the records sought more efficiently and affordably). Conclusion Accordingly, I will consider this administrative appeal closed. If Ms. McGale is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office share jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(ix), 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of judicial remedies). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Claire McGale