MA Public Records Search
← Back to Search

Carlos Henriquez v. Department of Correction (SPR 20252778)

Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Administratively closed · Filed 09-22-2025

ClosedAppealResolved

SPR 20252778 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by Carlos Henriquez concerning records held by Department of Correction, opened 09-22-2025. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Administratively closed.

Case Details

Case Number
20252778
Case Type
Appeal
Case Subtype
Initial
Status
Closed
Requester
Carlos Henriquez
Custodian
Department of Correction
Date Opened
09-22-2025
Date Closed
10-06-2025

PDF Document

Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records October 6, 2025 SPR25/2778 Kate Silvia Director of Communications Department of Correction 50 Maple Street, Suite 3 Milford, MA 01757 Dear Ms. Silvia: I have received the petition of Carlos Henriquez appealing the response of the Department of Correction (Department) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On August 27, 2025, Mr. Henriquez requested the following [1.] List of ADA approved chair, as established in the facility of the Massachusetts Treatment Center via their intranet; [2.] List of ADA approved chair or similar listing documenting the assignment of chairs to inmates as reasonable accommodation, as established in each of the other facilities within the Department of Correction. The Department responded on September 4, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Mr. Henriquez petitioned this office, and this appeal, SPR25/2778, was opened as a result. Subsequent to the opening of this appeal, the Department provided a further response to this office by email on September 23, 2025. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Kate Silvia SPR25/2778 Page 2 October 6, 2025 Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Department’s September 4th and September 23rd Responses In its September 4, 2025 response, the Department provides a list in redacted form, and cites Exemption (a), the CORI statute, and Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law for redacting the responsive list. In its September 23, 2025 response, the Department further elaborates on its claims for redacting the record. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (c). In his appeal petition, Mr. Henriquez contends that the exemptions cited by the Department for redacting the list he received “are inapplicable.” Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities.

Kate Silvia SPR25/2778 Page 3 October 6, 2025 Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) The current definition of CORI is as follows: “Criminal offender record information,” records and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to the nature or disposition of a criminal charge, an arrest, a pre-trial proceeding, other judicial proceedings, previous hearings conducted pursuant to section 58A of chapter 276 where the defendant was detained prior to trial or released with conditions under subsection (2) of section 58A of chapter 276, sentencing, incarceration, rehabilitation, or release. Such information shall be restricted to information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment. Criminal offender record information shall not include evaluative information, statistical and analytical reports and files in which individuals are not directly or indirectly identifiable, or intelligence information. Criminal offender record information shall be limited to information concerning persons who have attained the age of 18 and shall not include any information concerning criminal offenses or acts of delinquency committed by any person before he attained the age of 18; provided, however, that if a person under the age of 18 was adjudicated as an adult in superior court or adjudicated as an adult after transfer of a case from a juvenile session to another trial court department, information relating to such criminal offense shall be criminal offender record information. Criminal offender record information shall not include information concerning any offenses which are not punishable by incarceration. G. L. c. 6, § 167. In its September 4th response, the Department argues the following under CORI: Please be advised that the enclosed responsive record has been redacted as this information constitutes criminal offender record information (CORl) of identifiable inmates under G.L. c. 6, § 167. G.L. c. 6, § 167, defines CORI as “records and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to ... incarceration, rehabilitation, or release.” Access to CORI information is strictly controlled. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause

Kate Silvia SPR25/2778 Page 4 October 6, 2025 shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First clause Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual may be exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). While statutorily exempting personnel information from the expansive definition of public records, the Legislature did not explicitly define “personnel [file] or information.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Judicial decisions advise that the term is neither rigid, nor exact, and that the determination is case-specific. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corporation v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass App Ct 1, 5 (2003). The custodian’s classification of materials as “personnel information” is not conclusive. Wakefield Teacher’s Association v. School Committee of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). Instead, the nature or character of the documents, as opposed to the documents’ label, is crucial to the analysis. See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., 436 Mass. at 386. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court) has refined the analysis to be employed when considering the public record status of personnel records. The Court has held that personnel information that is “useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of exemption (c). Wakefield Teacher’s Association, 431 Mass. at 798, quoting Oregonian Publ. Co.v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 329 Or. 401 (1999). The Court further defined those records that may be withheld as personnel information to include, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee.” Wakefield Teacher’s Association, 431 Mass. at 798. Second clause Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal

Kate Silvia SPR25/2778 Page 5 October 6, 2025 nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its September 4th response, under Exemption (c), the Department argues the following: [T]his information also constitutes medical information. Dissemination of Incarcerated Individual’s names would violate G.L. c. 4, § 7 (26)(c), which exempts “personnel and medical files or information, also any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” In its September 23rd response, the Department further explains that “the document that Mr. Henriquez references that is redacted are names of those who have an ADA accommodation which constitutes medical information.” Based on the Department’s response, where the record contains medical information of specifically named individuals, and the Department has redacted only the names and identifying information of the individuals, I find the Department may properly redact such information pursuant to Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Where the Department has met its burden to redact the record pursuant to Exemption (c) of the Public records Law, I find it is unnecessary to address the Department’s claims under Exemption (a) and CORI. Records in Existence In his appeal petition, Mr. Henriquez contends that the Department “failed to provide a similar list for the other facilities within the DOC as originally requested.” Please be advised that the duty to comply with requests for records extends to those records that exist and are in the possession, custody, or control of the custodian of records at the time of the request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(ii). Further, under the Public Records Law, a public employee is not required to answer questions, or do research, or create documents in response to

Kate Silvia SPR25/2778 Page 6 October 6, 2025 questions. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a); 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 157, 165 (May 18, 1977). However, in accordance with the Public Records Law, custodians are expected to use their superior knowledge of the records in their custody to assist requestors in obtaining the desired information. See 950 C.M.R. 32.04(5). In an email to this office on October 3, 2025, the Department confirmed that it does not possess additional records responsive to Mr. Henriquez’s request. Where the Department has confirmed that it does not possess additional responsive records, and the Department has no duty to create records, I find that the Department has met its burden in responding to this request under the Public Records Law. Conclusion Accordingly, I will consider this administrative appeal closed. If Mr. Henriquez is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office shares jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth. See G. L. c. 66, §§ 10(b)(ix), 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of judicial remedies). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Carlos Henriquez