James M. Crowley v. Cambridge, City of - Office of the City Solicitor (SPR 20252951)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records October 17, 2025 SPR25/2951 Seah Levy Public Records Access Officer City of Cambridge 795 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 320 Cambridge, MA 02139 Dear Ms. Levy: I have received the petition of James M. Crowley appealing the response of the City of Cambridge (City) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On June 17, 2025, Mr. Crowley requested, “copies of all emails, correspondence, reports, notes, photographs, recording, and any other item related to, created as a result of, or provided in connection with Cambridge Police Department Professional Standards Unit, Staff Investigation SI-2018-004.” The City provided a response on July 1, 2025, seeking clarification of the request due to its lack of particularity. On July 1, 2025, Mr. Crowley provided a specific search term as clarification. Previous Appeals, Petition, and In Camera Review This request was the subject of previous appeals, a time petition from the City, and an in camera review. See SPR25/1915 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (July 15, 2025), SPR25/2039 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (July 18, 2025), and SPR25/2040 Determinations of the Supervisor of Records (July 25, 2025 and August 29, 2025). In my July 18th determination, I found that the City had established good cause for a time extension of thirty (30) business days. In my August 29th determination, I found that while portions of the responsive record may fall under an exemption, the City had not met its burden to demonstrate that all the redactions fall under Exemptions (a), (c), and (f) of the Public Records Law. Accordingly, I ordered the City to review the record, redact only where necessary, and provide Mr. Crowley with the responsive record. The City responded on October 3, 2025. Unsatisfied with the City’s response, Mr. Crowley petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/2951, was opened as a result. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Seah Levy SPR25/2951 Page 2 October 17, 2025 The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The City’s October 3rd Response In its October 3, 2025 response, the City provided the responsive record, redacted pursuant to Exemptions (a), (c), (f), and (p) of the Public Records Law. Current Appeal In his appeal petition, Mr. Crowley stated, “[n]ot only was this response tardy by several weeks, it follows the city’s delay in the prompt presentation of the unredacted report you ordered for the in camera review.” In a further email to this office on October 8, 2025, Mr. Crowley stated that the “in camera review… should be the last word on this matter.” Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, §7 (26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or

Seah Levy SPR25/2951 Page 3 October 17, 2025 necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. In its October 3, 2025 response, the City cited G. L. c. 41, § 97D, which provides in pertinent part: All reports of rape and sexual assault or attempts to commit such offenses, all reports of abuse perpetrated by family or household members, as defined in section 1 of chapter 209A, and all communications between police officers and victims of such offenses or abuse shall not be public reports and shall be maintained by the police departments in a manner that shall assure their confidentiality; provided, however, that all such reports shall be accessible at all reasonable times, upon written request, to: (i) the victim, the victim’s attorney, others specifically authorized by the victim to obtain such information, prosecutors and (ii) victim-witness advocates as defined in section 1 of chapter 258B, domestic violence victims’ counselors as defined in section 20K of chapter 233, sexual assault counselors as defined in section 20J of chapter 233... G. L. c. 41, § 97D. Under Exemption (a), the City stated: The responsive record contains allegations related to abuse perpetrated by a family or household member; this is a confidential record pursuant to G.L. c. 41, § 97D, and thus is not considered public record. The record also contains file numbers regarding domestic violence cases the officers worked on. Crowley is not one of the enumerated individuals entitled to access these documents. Namely, Crowley is neither the victim nor an attorney for the victim, a prosecutor, a district attorney, or an assistant district attorney. Further, there is no indication that Crowley is an individual “specifically authorized by the victim to obtain such information,” or a victim-witness advocate, domestic violence victims’ counselor, sexual assault counselor, law enforcement officer, or person “authorized to admit persons to bail.” In addition, the disclosure of the file numbers related to such

Seah Levy SPR25/2951 Page 4 October 17, 2025 record would enable disclosure of the individual’s identities, and as such, that information should be withheld under G.L. c. 41, § 97D. Based on the information provided in the City’s response, where the responsive record contains reports that are restricted from disclosure in their entirety by the legislature under G. L. c. 41, § 97D as it operates through Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law, I find that the City has met its burden redact this information from the responsive record under Exemption (a). Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292.

Seah Levy SPR25/2951 Page 5 October 17, 2025 Under Exemption (c), the City stated: Mack v. District Attorney for Bristol District … did not address whether Exemption (c) applies when the officers are victims of misconduct… police officers who are victims stand on a different footing, their anonymity is not sought to shield them from police accountability, but rather to enable them to speak freely about police concerns… As such, Mack does not apply here, and the balancing test should be applied in assessing the applicability of Exemption (c)… First, disclosure of the officers’ names would discourage future members of the Department from coming forward to report superiors for misconduct, especially sexual harassment… It may also expose the officers to unjustified criticism or animus by other members of the Department... Second, disclosure of their identities would enable the public to learn the intimate details of the sexual harassment they endured, such as which officer was sent an inappropriate text message which included sexual innuendos, such information is of a highly personal nature… Third, while there has been some publicity, the identities of the officers have been protected; their names have been withheld from the public… The name of a fourth officer has also been withheld, as there were only four female officers in the unit. Disclosure of the fourth officer’s name would reveal to those familiar with the Department the identities of the other three officers, whose names have been redacted to protect the individual officers’ identities. Based on the application of the balancing test, the right to privacy of the individual officers’ identities outweighs the public’s right to know. Exemption (f) Exemption (f) permits the withholding of: investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(f). A custodian of records generally must demonstrate a prejudice to investigative efforts in order to withhold requested records. Information relating to an ongoing investigation may be withheld if disclosure could alert suspects to the activities of investigative officials. Confidential investigative techniques may also be withheld indefinitely if disclosure is deemed to be prejudicial to future law enforcement activities. Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 62 (1976). Redactions may be appropriate where they serve to preserve the anonymity of voluntary witnesses. Antell v. Att’y Gen., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 248 (2001); Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. at 290 n.18. Exemption (f) invites a “case-by-case consideration” of whether disclosure “would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective

Seah Levy SPR25/2951 Page 6 October 17, 2025 law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest.” See Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289-90. As a matter of course, witness provided information is essential to efficient and effective law enforcement. This exemption is intended to allow investigative officials to provide an assurance of confidentiality to private citizens so that they will speak openly and voluntarily about matters. Bougas, 371 Mass at 62. Any information contained in a witness statement, which if disclosed would create a grave risk of directly or indirectly identifying the voluntary witness is subject to withholding. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). The disclosure of the names and other identifying information of victims, complainants and voluntary witnesses may deter other potential witnesses and citizens from providing information to law enforcement agencies in future investigations. Therefore, Exemption (f) will allow the withholding of the name and identifying details of any victims, complainants and voluntary witnesses, and where the individuals can be indirectly identified even with redaction. Under Exemption (f), the City stated: …[P]olice officers of the Cambridge Police Department alleged misconduct by another police officer, and such allegations triggered an investigation. Such officers remain members of the Department. Disclosure of their identities may expose them to unjustified criticism or animus by their colleagues and lead to further discord within the Department. The name of a fourth officer has been withheld, as there were only four female officers in the unit. As such, disclosure of the fourth officer’s name would reveal to those familiar with the Department the identities of the other three officers, whose names have been redacted to protect the individual officers’ identities. Based on the City’s response, I find that the City has met its burden under Exemption (f) to withhold from the record the identities and any information that will directly or indirectly identify the officers who are complainants or witnesses. See Antell, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 248 (redactions may be appropriate under Exemption (f) where they serve to preserve the anonymity of voluntary witnesses). Where the City has met its burden to withhold the identities of the officers under Exemption (f), I decline to opine on the applicability of Exemption (c) to the responsive records. Exemptions (o) and (p) Exemption (o) applies to: the home address, personal email address and home telephone number of an employee of the judicial branch, an unelected employee of the general court, an agency, executive office, department, board, commission, bureau, division or authority of the commonwealth, or of a political subdivision thereof or of an authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose, in the custody

Seah Levy SPR25/2951 Page 7 October 17, 2025 of a government agency which maintains records identifying persons as falling within those categories; provided that the information may be disclosed to an employee organization under chapter l 50E, a nonprofit organization for retired public employees under chapter 180, or a criminal justice agency as defined in section 167 of chapter 6. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(o). Exemption (p) applies to: the name, home address, personal email address and home telephone number of a family member of a commonwealth employee, contained in a record in the custody of a government agency which maintains records identifying persons as falling within the categories listed in subclause (o). G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(p). Under Exemption (p), the City stated: Here, information such as the names of the employee’s family members and other identifying details has been redacted to protect the individual officer’s identity and ensure the privacy of the officer’s family members. The names of family members and details regarding the families of other officers have been redacted to protect the privacy and ensure the safety of the family members of government employees. Disclosure of such information would identify and intrude upon the safety of officers’ families and that of the officers. Based on the City’s response, where the responsive record contains the type of information contemplated under Exemptions (o) and (p) of the Public Records Law, I find that the City has met its burden in redacting this specific information. Conclusion Accordingly, I will now consider this administrative appeal closed. If Mr. Crowley is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office shares jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of applicable judicial remedies).

Seah Levy SPR25/2951 Page 8 October 17, 2025 Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: James M. Crowley