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Demetri Kasperson v. Southbridge, Town of - Office of the Town Manager (SPR 20253132)

Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Administratively closed · Filed 10-24-2025

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SPR 20253132 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by Demetri Kasperson concerning records held by Southbridge, Town of - Office of the Town Manager, opened 10-24-2025. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Administratively closed.

Case Details

Case Number
20253132
Case Type
Appeal
Case Subtype
Initial
Status
Closed
Requester
Demetri Kasperson
Custodian
Southbridge, Town of - Office of the Town Manager
Date Opened
10-24-2025
Date Closed
11-06-2025

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Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records November 6, 2025 SPR25/3132 Gayle Raducha Administrative Assistant Town Manager’s Office Town of Southbridge 41 Elm Street Southbridge, MA 01550 Dear Ms. Raducha: I have received the petition of Demetri Kasperson appealing the response of the Town of Southbridge (Town) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On October 21, 2025, Mr. Kasperson requested “[a]ll emails and notices sent to Southbridge Liquor License holders regarding annual renewals for 206 licenses.” The Town responded on October 22, 2025. Unsatisfied with the response, Mr. Kasperson petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/3132, was opened as a result. Subsequent to the opening of this appeal, the Town provided a further response on October 28, 2025. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Att’y for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Gayle Raducha SPR25/3132 Page 2 November 6, 2025 If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. Current Appeal In his October 24, 2025 petition to this office, Mr. Kasperson objected to the Town’s redactions as unnecessary, stating, “[the Town] has previously provided the email addresses of liquor license holders. I don’t believe redacting these email addresses falls under MA Public Records Law exemption C this is a public notice sent by the town as part of official town business…” Upon review of Mr. Kasperson’s appeal petition, it appears he objects only to the redaction of personal email addresses from the records he received. The Town’s October 22nd Response In its October 22, 2025 response, the Town provided Mr. Kasperson with redacted responsive records. In an October 22, 2025 email to Mr. Kasperson, the Town stated, “[p]er the Guide to the Massachusetts Public Records Law, personal email addresses are not subject to FOIA disclosure.” In an October 23, 2025 email to Mr. Kasperson, the Town stated, “Exemption C. Personal information.” In an October 28, 2025 communication to this office and Mr. Kasperson, the Town asserted Exemption (a) and Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law to redact the responsive records. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-546 (1977).

Gayle Raducha SPR25/3132 Page 3 November 6, 2025 This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Second Clause - Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The

Gayle Raducha SPR25/3132 Page 4 November 6, 2025 public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its October 28th response, the Town informed Mr. Kasperson that, “[t]his information is not public and falls under Exemption A and Exemption C of the MA Public Records Law. If this information were public, it could easily be used illegally, for personal gain or as a means of harassment. Notices and emails are sent privately to the Liquor License holders. They are not distributed publicly. The email addresses have no indication of which business owns the email address…” Based on the Town’s responses, to the extent that the Town has redacted personal email addresses, I find that it may permissibly withhold the personal email addresses from disclosure under Exemption (c). Conclusion Accordingly, I will now consider this administrative appeal closed. If Mr. Kasperson is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office shares jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth. See G. L. c. 66, §§ 10(b)(ix), 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of judicial remedies). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Demetri Kasperson