David Chritson v. Middlesex District Attorney's Office (SPR 20253146)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records November 6, 2025 SPR25/3146 Meagan Horn, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Middlesex District Attorney’s Office 15 Commonwealth Avenue Woburn, MA 01801 Dear Attorney Horn: I have received the petition of David Chritson appealing the response of the Middlesex District Attorney’s Office (Office) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On December 23, 2024, Mr. Chritson requested “all records ‘made or received’ by the Middlesex District Attorney’s Office and/or agents thereof, and related in any way to [a named individual].” I understand the Office assigned reference number 24-230 to this request. Previous Appeals This request was the subject of previous appeals. See SPR25/0651 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (March 11, 2025); SPR25/1136 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (May 8, 2025); SPR25/1479 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (June 6, 2025) and SPR25/2434 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (September 2, 2025 and October 6, 2025). In my October 6th determination, following in camera review, I found that although the responsive emails contained opinion and analysis exempt under Exemption (d), other information contained in the emails may not be withheld pursuant to Exemption (d). Subsequently, the Office responded on October 21, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Office’s response, Mr. Chritson petitioned this office, and this appeal, SPR25/3146, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Meagan Horn, Esq. SPR25/3146 Page 2 November 6, 2025 § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. Current Appeal In his appeal petition, Mr. Chritson argues the following: 1. Email attachment sent on October 7, 2022 at 8:37 AM, titled “David Chritson Report Review.docx”. Per the Supervisor’s Oct. 6, 2025 order, this “reasonably completed factual report … [or factual study], may not be withheld pursuant to Exemption (d).” 2. Email sent on March 29, 2023 at 3:01 PM. The MDAO claims that third-party attorney-client “[w]ork product has been redacted from the emails under the deliberative process exemption….” This claim of attorney-client work product was waived when the Somerville Police Department (“SPD”) disclosed to the MDAO, a third party, the legal advice that SPD received from City attorneys. 3. Email attachment on February 24, 2025, 12:56 PM, titled “Femino Ltr to Chritson.pdf”. The above records must be released pursuant to the Supervisor’s order dated Oct. 6, 2025. Upon review of the appeal petition, I understand Mr. Chritson objects only to the application of Exemption (d) to the records described above. The Office’s October 21st Response In its October 21, 2025 response, the Office provides numerous records in redacted form and cites Exemptions (c) and (d) of the Public Records Law for redacting the records. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c), (d).

Meagan Horn, Esq. SPR25/3146 Page 3 November 6, 2025 Exemption (d) Exemption (d) allows the withholding of: inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d). Exemption (d) is intended to avoid premature release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if disclosed. Its application is limited to recommendations on legal and policy matters found within an ongoing deliberative process. See Babets v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 237 n.8 (1988). Factual reports which are reasonably complete and inferences which can be drawn from factual investigations, even if labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt as deliberative or policy making materials. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d); see also Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (purely factual matters used in the development of government policy are subject to disclosure). The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) opined on the status of attorney work product under Exemption (d) in DaRosa v. City of New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446 (2015). In DaRosa, the SJC concluded that “opinion” work product that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or its representative falls within the scope of Exemption (d). Id. at 448. It also concluded that “fact” work product under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial falls within the scope of Exemption (d) where it is not a reasonably completed study or report or, if it is reasonably completed, where it is interwoven with opinions or analysis leading to opinions. Id. In its October 21st response, under Exemption (d), the Office argues the following: Those records, which consist of ten emails and one email attachment, are provided here. Work product has been redacted from the emails under the deliberative process exemption to the Public Records Law, G.L. c. 4, § 7, cl. 26 (exemption (d)). See DaRosa v. City of New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446, 449 (2015) (opinion work product protected from disclosure by exemption (d)). Based on the Office’s October 23rd response, and in conjunction with my previous in camera review, I find the Office has met its burden to redact the responsive records pursuant to Exemption (d) of the Public Records Law. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d). Conclusion Accordingly, I will consider this administrative appeal closed. If Mr. Chritson is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office shares

Meagan Horn, Esq. SPR25/3146 Page 4 November 6, 2025 jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth. See G. L. c. 66, §§ 10(b)(ix), 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of judicial remedies). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: David Chritson