Matthew Capasso v. Department of Children and Families (SPR 20253233)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records November 18, 2025 SPR25/3233 Adam J. Smith Records Access Officer Department of Children and Families 1 Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 Dear Mr. Smith: I have received the petition of Matthew Capasso appealing the response of the Department of Children and Families (Department/DCF) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On September 4, 2025, Mr. Capasso requested, “[an identified individual’s] complete, unredacted case record and all related internal and external communications held by the DCF North Central Area Office for the period September 10, 2024 through September 4, 2025 . . . including but not limited to[;] 51A/51B reports, screening notes, investigation summaries, dictation/case notes, contact logs, assessments, action plans, safety plans, supervisory review, closing recommendations, hearing materials, and exhibits. . .” Previous Appeals This request was the subject of previous appeals. See SPR25/2654 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (September 17, 2025) and SPR25/2914 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (October 20, 2025). In my October 20th determination, I found that the Department had not met its burden of specificity to withhold records in their entirety under Exemptions (a) and (c) of the Public Records Law. The Department responded on November 3, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Mr. Capasso petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/3233, was opened as a result. Status of the Requestor Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Adam J. Smith SPR25/3233 Page 2 November 18, 2025 circumstances of the requestor. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a); see also Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, Mr. Capasso’s status shall have no bearing on the public status of any existing responsive records. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Att’y for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Department’s November 3rd Response In its November 3, 2025 response, the Department cited G. L. c. 119, §§ 51E, 51F, G. L. c. 112 §§ 135-135B, G. L. c. 66A (Fair Information and Practices Act), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(8), and 45 C.F.R. § 205.50, as they operate through Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law to withhold “case files and reports prepared under sections G.L. c. 119, §§ 51A to 51E pertaining to named individuals” in their entirety. Additionally, the Department cited Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law to withhold responsive records in their entirety. Current Appeal In his November 4, 2025 petition to this office, Mr. Capasso objected to the Department withholding records under Exemption (a) and Exemption (c). Fair Information Practices Act (FIPA) The Department is advised that FIPA and the Public Records Law are to be construed to work together consistent with the legislative purpose. 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 157, 160 (May 18, 1977). FIPA cannot provide a basis for withholding the requested information unless the records fall within a statutory exemption to the definition of public records. See Allen v. Holyoke Hosp., 398 Mass. 372, 379 (1986) (“determining whether the record sought is protected by FIPA

Adam J. Smith SPR25/3233 Page 3 November 18, 2025 depends on whether the record is a public record pursuant to G. L. c. 4, § 7 Twenty-sixth, and subject to the disclosure provisions of G. L. c. 66A”). FIPA, by itself, cannot justify withholding information. A custodian must first specifically explain how the withheld information is exemption from the Public Records Law. Once a record is found to be exempt from the definition of public records, FIPA may also operate to restrict disclosure. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-546 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. Under Exemption (a), the Department cites G. L. c. 119, §§ 51E and 51F, which provide in pertinent parts: The department shall maintain a file of the written reports prepared under this section and sections 51A to 51D, inclusive. These written reports shall be confidential. Upon request and with the approval of the commissioner, copies of written reports of initial investigations may be provided to: (i) the child’s parent, guardian, or counsel, (ii) the reporting person or agency, (iii) the appropriate review board, (iv) a child welfare agency of another state for the purpose of assisting that agency in determining whether to approve a prospective foster or adoptive parent, or (v) a social worker assigned to the case. No such report shall be made available to any persons other than those specified in this section without the written and informed consent of the child’s parent or guardian, the written

Adam J. Smith SPR25/3233 Page 4 November 18, 2025 approval of the commissioner, or an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. Pursuant to chapter 18C, the child advocate shall have access to these reports. G. L. c. 119, § 51E. The department shall maintain a central registry of information sufficient to identify children whose names are reported under sections 51A to 51B. Data and information relating to individual cases in the central registry shall be confidential and shall be made available only with the approval of the commissioner or upon court order; provided, however, that the department, upon request, may release this data and information to a child welfare agency of another state for the purpose of assisting that agency in determining whether to approve a prospective foster or adoptive parent. The commissioner shall establish rules and regulations governing the availability of such data and information. Pursuant to chapter 18C, the child advocate shall have access to the information in the registry. G. L. c. 119, § 51F. In its November 3rd response, the Department argues the following: [t]hese statutes unambiguously prohibit public disclosure of files, reports, data and information pertaining to individual DCF Case Files, as these records, data and information “shall be confidential.” DCF may only provide Case Files, reports, data and information pertaining to DCF investigations to authorized individuals and entities enumerated in statute. As your request seeks Case Files, data and information pertaining to a named individual, irrespective of the specified incident, any records that may exist must be withheld as these categories of records are confidential….Please be advised, merely confirming the existence of a case file related to named individuals constitutes disclosure of confidential information regarding those individuals….Such disclosure in response to a public records request would confirm the identity of children and family members associated with an individual case in DCF’s central registry… The Department also cites G. L. c. 112, §§ 135-135B, which provides in pertinent part: All communications between a social worker licensed pursuant to the provisions of section one hundred and thirty-two or a social worker employed in a state, county or municipal governmental agency, and a client are confidential. . . . No such social worker, colleague, agent or employee of any social worker, whether professional, clerical, academic or therapeutic, shall disclose any information acquired or revealed in the course of or in connection with the performance of the social worker’s professional services, including the fact, circumstances, findings or records of such services. G. L. c. 112, § 135A.

Adam J. Smith SPR25/3233 Page 5 November 18, 2025 Further, the Department argues, “Case Files are created from investigations and reports completed by licensed social workers in their professional capacity as employees of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Social worker reports and records contained in the investigative or clinical case files, including communications with witnesses, contain interviews and statements which are privileged pursuant to social worker-client privilege. Com. v. O’Brien, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 186 (1989). DCF must withhold social worker reports and records contained in the potential Case Files as they are privileged records exempt from public disclosure pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 135A and, therefore, exempt from public records law…” Additionally, in its response, the Department cites 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(8) (governing state plans for foster care and adoption assistance), 42 U.S.C. §510a(b)(2)(B)(viii)-(xi) (governing grants to states for child abuse or neglect prevention and treatment programs), 110 C.M.R. 12.00 (regulating the release of Department records), and 45 C.F.R. § 205.50 (safeguarding information for financial assistance programs). Based on the information provided in the Department’s response, where the responsive records are the type contemplated under G. L. c. 119, §§ 51E and 51F, along with G. L. c. 112, § 135A, I find that the Department has met its burden to withhold the responsive records under the statutes cited above as they operate through Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Medical Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual may be exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v.

Adam J. Smith SPR25/3233 Page 6 November 18, 2025 Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. Under Exemption (c), the Department argues, Case Files and data associated with individual case files is withheld under Exemption (c) as these records and data are private information, the disclosure of which constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Case files and associated data is of a highly personal nature and contain details related to allegations and investigations of neglect, physical abuse and sexual abuse of children. Case Files, data and information specific to individual cases must be withheld to protect the minor victims of the investigations from the stigma that may be associated with having parents or guardians who are accused of being unfit. In re Care & Protection of Sharlene, 445 Mass. 756, 744 (2006) (Spina, J. concurring, with whom Cowin, J., joins) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 119, §1). The privacy interests of the children and families involved in the investigation outweigh the public interest in disclosure of Case Files, therefore, these records are exempt from public records law pursuant to Exemption (c)… Where the Department has met its burden to withhold the responsive records under Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law, I decline to opine on the Departments claims under Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law.

Adam J. Smith SPR25/3233 Page 7 November 18, 2025 Greater Right of Access to the Records Where the above referenced statutes list authorized persons that may have access to the responsive records, Mr. Capasso may have a right of access to the responsive records outside the Public Records Law. This office encourages Mr. Capasso and the Department to communicate directly to determine if there is another means affording Mr. Capasso a greater right of access to the responsive records. Conclusion Accordingly, where the Department has met its burden to withhold records under Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law, I will now consider this administrative appeal closed. If Mr. Capasso is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office shares jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth. See G. L. c. 66, §§ 10(b)(ix), 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of judicial remedies). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Matthew Capasso Steven Treat, Esq.