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Kristen Fellini v. Chelmsford, Town of - Police Department (SPR 20253530)
Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records · Filed 12-01-2025
ClosedAppealPetitioner Won
SPR 20253530 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by Kristen Fellini concerning records held by Chelmsford, Town of - Police Department, opened 12-01-2025. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed. Supervisor of Public Records determination: Petitioner won — agency ordered to provide records.
Case Details
- Case Number
- 20253530
- Case Type
- Appeal
- Case Subtype
- Initial
- Status
- Closed
- Requester
- Kristen Fellini
- Date Opened
- 12-01-2025
- Date Closed
- 12-15-2025
PDF Document
Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records December 15, 2025 SPR25/3530 Samantha Murnane Records Access Officer Chelmsford Police Department 2 Olde North Road Chelmsford, MA 01824 Dear Ms. Murnane: I have received the petition of Kristen Fellini appealing the response of the Chelmsford Police Department (Department) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On September 8, 2025, Ms. Fellini requested the following records: Any and all records . . . that reference [an identified individual] . . . . To include all police reports, traffic reports, calls for medical service, incident reports & correspondences by any form of communication such as written, video, messaging, emails, etc for any date and time. Please include any 911 audio regarding the calls for service for each incident listed. Previous Appeal This request was the subject of a previous appeal. See SPR25/2911 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (October 20, 2025). In my October 20th determination, I ordered the Department to clarify its claims under Exemptions (c) and (f) for redacting some of the records responsive to the request, as well as its claims under Exemptions (a), (c), and (f) for withholding numerous other records. I additionally found that the Department must clarify which records it intends to withhold under Exemption (f). The Department responded on November 7, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Ms. Fellini petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/3530, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us Samantha Murnane SPR25/3530 Page 2 December 15, 2025 form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Department’s November 7th Response In its previous September 16, 2025 response, the Department provided “12 reports and one QSheet” with redactions and cited Exemptions (c) and (f) of the Public Records Law in support of its redactions. The Department additionally indicated it was withholding numerous other responsive records pursuant to Exemptions (a), (c), and (f), and further stated that it is no longer in possession of “911 audio for the reports provided except for the Motor Vehicle Accident on 12/11/24[.]” In its November 7, 2025 response, the Department provided an additional responsive record with redactions pursuant to Exemption (c) and additional information regarding its claims for redacting the responsive records under Exemptions (c) and (f). The Department also provided additional information regarding its claims for withholding other responsive records pursuant to Exemptions (a), (c), and (f), and additionally provided clarification regarding which exemptions it intended to claim in withholding the responsive records. Current Appeal In her December 1, 2025 appeal petition, among other things, Ms. Fellini contends that the Department, “continues to assert broad exemptions with largely conclusory reasoning and repeatedly claims that records [‘]cannot be segregated[’] because they are short documents.” Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, §7 (26)(a). Samantha Murnane SPR25/3530 Page 3 December 15, 2025 A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. G. L. c. 41, § 97D In its previous response, the Department identified 27 responsive records and cited G. L. c. 41, § 97D, operating under Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law, to withhold them in their entirety. The statute provides the following in relevant part: All reports of rape and sexual assault or attempts to commit such offenses, all reports of abuse perpetrated by family or household members, as defined in section 1 of chapter 209A, and all communications between police officers and victims of such offenses or abuse shall not be public reports and shall be maintained by the police departments in a manner that shall assure their confidentiality… G. L. c. 41, § 97D. In its November 7, 2025 response, the Department identified an additional responsive report that it previously withheld under Exemption (c) and noted, “[upon] further review, the Department has determined that the report is appropriately withheld pursuant to §97D and Exemption (a).” The Department also provided the following additional information regarding its claims for withholding the above 27 records under Exemption (a) and G. L. c. 41, § 97D: The 27 reports fall within the scope of G.L. c.41, §97D, and thus Exemption (a), because the reports concern “abuse perpetrated by family or household members, as defined in section 1 of chapter 209A.” While no “rape and sexual assault or attempts to commit such offenses” is at issue here, G.L. c.209A, §1 defines “abuse” as “the occurrence of any of the following acts between family or household members: Samantha Murnane SPR25/3530 Page 4 December 15, 2025 (a) attempting to cause or causing physical harm; (b) placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm; (c) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress; (d) coercive control.” Here, the reports cover the occurrence of coercive control among family members; as such, §97D applies and triggers Exemption (a). Further, . . . the records cannot be segregated as the . . . release of any substantive information therein would provide details about the abuse, as defined pursuant to G.L. c.209A, §1, alleged in the records. . . . Upon review, it remains unclear how the 27 responsive records identified in the Department’s previous response, in their entirety, are restricted under G. L. c. 41, § 97D as it operates through Exemption (a). It is also unclear how the additional responsive record identified by the Department in its November 7th response is restricted under G. L. c. 41, § 97D. The Department merely cites the statute without any further explanation as to the statute’s applicability to the additional responsive record. Further, it is uncertain how all of the 28 responsive records are the type contemplated by G. L. c. 41, § 97D. It is additionally unclear how the 28 responsive records may be withheld in their entirety. It should be noted that any non- exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G.L. c. 66, § 10(a). See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). The Department must clarify these matters. Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) Act In its previous response, the Department identified “nine (9) reports and three (3) Q- Sheets” responsive to the request and claimed the CORI Act, as it operates through Exemption (a), to withhold them in their entirety. The current definition of CORI is as follows: “Criminal offender record information,” records and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to the nature or disposition of a criminal charge, an arrest, a pre-trial proceeding, other judicial proceedings, previous hearings conducted pursuant to section 58A of chapter 276 where the defendant was detained prior to trial or released with conditions under subsection (2) of section 58A of chapter 276, sentencing, incarceration, rehabilitation, or release. Such information shall be restricted to information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment. Criminal offender record information shall not include evaluative information, statistical and analytical reports and files in which individuals are not directly or indirectly identifiable, or intelligence information. Criminal offender record information shall be limited to information concerning persons who have attained the age of 18 and shall not include any information concerning criminal offenses or acts of delinquency committed by Samantha Murnane SPR25/3530 Page 5 December 15, 2025 any person before he attained the age of 18; provided, however, that if a person under the age of 18 was adjudicated as an adult in superior court or adjudicated as an adult after transfer of a case from a juvenile session to another trial court department, information relating to such criminal offense shall be criminal offender record information. . . . . G. L. c. 6, § 167. In its November 7, 2025 response, the Department provided the following additional information regarding its claims for withholding the responsive “nine (9) reports and three (3) Q- Sheets” under Exemption (a) and CORI: [To] the Department’s knowledge, the 9 reports and 3 Q-Sheets at issue all relate to information recorded in criminal proceedings that were not dismissed before arraignment. Further . . . the records cannot be segregated as the records consist of primarily short documents. . . . Additionally, the Department notes that even if the subject’s name and identifying information were redacted, release of the 9 reports and 3 Q-Sheets at issue would still provide information regarding [an identified individual’s] criminal proceedings that were not dismissed before arraignment, as [the] public records request was specific to [an identified individual’s] name and date of birth. Based upon the Department’s November 7th response and previous response, I find that although the Department states that the records “all relate to information recorded in criminal proceedings that were not dismissed before arraignment[,]” it remains unclear how the “nine (9) reports and three (3) Q-Sheets[,]” in their entirety, fall within the CORI Act. The Department must clarify these matters. Records of Youthful Offender In its previous response, the Department withheld the entirety of “ten (10) reports that are juvenile in nature” and cited G. L. c. 119, § 60A and Exemption (a) in support of its position. G. L. c. 119, § 60A provides the following provides in relevant part: The records of a youthful offender proceeding conducted pursuant to an indictment shall be open to public inspection in the same manner and to the same extent as adult criminal court records. All other records of the court in cases of delinquency arising under sections fifty-two to fifty-nine, inclusive, shall be withheld from public inspection except with the consent of a justice of such court; provided, however, that such records shall be open, at all reasonable times, to inspection by the child proceeded against, his parents, guardian or attorney; provided further, that nothing herein shall be construed to provide access to privileged or confidential communications and information; and provided further, that said protections shall be construed to include information and communications entered at the indictment. Samantha Murnane SPR25/3530 Page 6 December 15, 2025 G. L. c. 119, § 60A. In its November 7, 2025 response, the Department noted that, “upon further investigation, 8 of the 10 reports referenced [in the Department’s previous response] . . . were [‘]cases of delinquency arising under sections fifty two to fifty-nine, inclusive[’].” The Department additionally clarified that it, “has determined that 2 of the 10 reports [previously withheld under the cited statute] did not trigger §60A, specifically 1) a motor vehicle accident report from 1998 and 2) a motor vehicle accident report from 2000.” The Department went on to explain that it is “no longer in possession of the 1998 motor vehicle accident report. . .” and further noted that the eight responsive records withheld under G. L. c. 119, § 60A “cannot be segregated. . . .” Upon review, it remains unclear how the eight responsive reports, as clarified by the Department, are the type contemplated under G. L. c. 119, § 60A. The Department merely cites the above statute without any further explanation as to its applicability to the responsive records. Specifically, it is unclear how each of the eight withheld reports constitutes a record in a case “of delinquency arising under sections fifty-two to fifty-nine,” as required by the statute. It additionally remains unclear why segregable portions of the responsive records cannot be provided. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a); Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289-90. The Department must clarify. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Medical Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual may be exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). Second Clause - Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Samantha Murnane SPR25/3530 Page 7 December 15, 2025 Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its previous response, the Department provided “12 reports and one QSheet” with redactions and cited Exemptions (c) where it was “vital in protecting information [contained in the records], “such as Date of Birth, Social Security Numbers, License Numbers, etc. and medical information.” The Department also withheld two responsive reports pursuant Exemption (c). In its November 7, 2025 response, the Department clarified that it no longer intends to withhold two reports it previously identified and withheld under Exemption (c), and clarified that the Department instead withholds “the first report [of the two] . . . pursuant to Exemption (f)[.]” Regarding the second report previously withheld under Exemption (c), the Department stated, “[upon] further investigation, the second report triggers the application of §97D[.]” The Department also provided an additional record responsive to “a motor vehicle accident report from 2000” with redactions pursuant to Exemption (c) and noted that this record was one of the ten records the Department withheld in its previous response under G. L. c. 119, § 60A. The Department also provided the following additional information regarding its claims for redacting the “12 reports and one QSheet[:]” [With] regard to the redactions made on the 12 reports and 1 Q-Sheet . . . the redactions pertain to substance use disorder, which falls within of the types of personal information which the privacy portion of Exemption (c) was designed to protect. Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 482 Mass. 427, 443 n.17 (2019). The Department analyzed the privacy interests of the private citizens referenced therein and determined that 1) disclosure would result Samantha Murnane SPR25/3530 Page 8 December 15, 2025 in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; 2) the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) the same information is not available from other sources. . . . Based on the Department’s response and previous response, to the extent that the “12 reports and one QSheet” contain information “[pertaining] to [the] substance use disorder” of a specifically named individual, the Department may permissibly redact such portions from the records under Exemption (c). However, it remains unclear how an individual’s date of birth constitutes intimate details of a highly personal nature. Also, it not certain how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. Further, the Department did not provide information with respect to examining whether the public interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. Id. Moreover, the Department has not met its burden of specificity in claiming Exemption (c) to redact the “motor vehicle accident report from 2000” it previously withheld under G. L. c. 119, § 60A and subsequently provided with redactions in its November 7th response. The Department merely cites Exemption (c) without any further explanation as to its applicability to the cited accident report. The Department must provide additional information regarding how the redacted information in the responsive accident report is exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Law. Exemption (f) Exemption (f) permits the withholding of: investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(f). A custodian of records generally must demonstrate a prejudice to investigative efforts in order to withhold requested records. Information relating to an ongoing investigation may be withheld if disclosure could alert suspects to the activities of investigative officials. Confidential investigative techniques may also be withheld indefinitely if disclosure is deemed to be prejudicial to future law enforcement activities. Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass 59, 62 (1976). Redactions may be appropriate where they serve to preserve the anonymity of voluntary witnesses. Antell v. Att’y Gen., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 248 (2001); Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 290 n.18. Exemption (f) invites a “case-by-case consideration” of whether disclosure “would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest.” Id. at 289-90. Samantha Murnane SPR25/3530 Page 9 December 15, 2025 As a matter of course, witness provided information is essential to efficient and effective law enforcement. This exemption is intended to allow investigative officials to provide an assurance of confidentiality to private citizens so that they will speak openly and voluntarily about matters. Bougas, 371 Mass at 62. Any information contained in a witness statement, which if disclosed would create a grave risk of directly or indirectly identifying the voluntary witness is subject to withholding. Globe Newspaper Co., 388 Mass. at 438. The disclosure of the names and other identifying information of victims, complainants and voluntary witnesses may deter other potential witnesses and citizens from providing information to law enforcement agencies in future investigations. Therefore, Exemption (f) will allow the withholding of the name and identifying details of any victims, complainants and voluntary witnesses, and where the individuals can be indirectly identified even with redaction. To properly claim that Exemption (f) applies, a custodian must demonstrate that the disclosure of the records would have a prejudicial effect on its investigative efforts. This can be accomplished by describing how the records fall into one of three categories. These are the three categories that justify withholding records under Exemption (f): The records reflect an ongoing investigation, such that any information relating to an ongoing investigation that could potentially alert suspects or targets to the activities of investigative officials; The records reflect internal techniques, procedures, or sources, such that their disclosure would prejudice not only ongoing, but future law enforcement efforts; or Disclosure of records would cause a chilling effect, because the exemption allows investigative officials to provide an assurance of confidentiality to individuals so that they will speak openly about matters under investigation. Such records in this third category include: any details in statements that directly or indirectly identify a private citizen who volunteers as a witness; an entire statement if the identity of witnesses is known to the requestor; and information voluntarily provided by an individual or entity to aid in the investigation. In its previous response, the Department provided “12 reports and one QSheet” with redactions pursuant to Exemptions (f), noting that “the complainants, victims, and witnesses may not speak openly about matters under investigation without the assurance of confidentiality. . .” The Department additionally withheld 911 audio responsive to a “Motor Vehicle Accident on 12/11/24[.]” In its November 7, 2025 response, the Department identified a responsive report withheld in its previous response under Exemption (c) and clarified that it “was withheld pursuant to Exemption (f)[.]” The Department additionally provided the following regarding its withholding of 911 audio and the additional responsive report under Exemption (f): [With] regard to the report initially withheld pursuant to Exemption (c) as well as the 911 call, the Department has determined that Exemption (f) applies as the Samantha Murnane SPR25/3530 Page 10 December 15, 2025 records reflect an ongoing investigation, such that any information released could potentially alert suspects or targets to the activities of investigative officials. Additionally, with regard to the 911 call, the Department has further determined that release would cause a chilling effect, because 1) the call directly or indirectly identifies private citizens who volunteered as witnesses and 2) the identity of witnesses may be known . . . . [The] records cannot be segregated as the records consist of primarily short documents. . . . To the extent that the withheld records contain identifying information of voluntary witnesses, I find the Department may permissibly withhold such information from disclosure under Exemption (f). However, based on the Department’s response, it is unclear how the two responsive records relate to an ongoing investigation, and how the records can be withheld in their entirety under Exemption (f). It is not clear from the Department’s response whether the records contain confidential investigative techniques that would be prejudicial to the ongoing investigation if disclosed. Additionally, the Department did not demonstrate how disclosure of any portion of the responsive records “would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest[,]” as required under Exemption (f). Records in Existence The duty to comply with requests for records extends to those records that exist and are in the possession, custody, or control of the custodian of records at the time of the request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(ii). In accordance with the Public Records Law, custodians are expected to use their superior knowledge of the records in their custody to assist requestors in obtaining the desired information. See 950 C.M.R. 32.04(5). Information in Ms. Fellini’s appeal raises questions regarding records in the possession of the Department, specifically with respect to the “the 1998 motor vehicle accident report[,]” that the Department is “no longer in possession of[,]” as noted in in its November 7, 2025 response. Ms. Fellini states, “the Department simply states that it is [‘]no longer in the possession of the Department,[’] without describing what search was performed or whether the record may exist in another Chelmsford repository or archive.” Consequently, if the Department no longer possesses the responsive accident report, I find that the Department must demonstrate that it permissibly destroyed the records in compliance with the Municipal Records Retention Schedule. Conclusion Accordingly, the Department is ordered to provide Ms. Fellini with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law, and its Regulations within 10 business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Samantha Murnane SPR25/3530 Page 11 December 15, 2025 Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Kristen Fellini