Mary LaBelle, Esq. v. Newbury, Town of - Police Department (SPR 20253539)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records December 12, 2025 SPR25/3539 Deputy Chief Aaron Wojtkowski Newbury Police Department 7 Morgan Avenue Newbury, MA 01951 Dear Deputy Chief Wojtkowski: I have received the petition of Mary LaBelle, Esq., appealing the response of the Newbury Police Department (Department) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On November 23, 2025, Attorney LaBelle requested a specific report concerning a November 21, 2025 incident involving an identified individual. The Department responded on November 28, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Attorney LaBelle petitioned this office, and this appeal, SPR25/3539, was opened as a result Status of Requestor Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, Attorney LaBelle’s interest in obtaining the requested information shall have no bearing on the public nature of the record. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Deputy Chief Aaron Wojtkowski SPR25/3539 Page 2 December 12, 2025 It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Att’y for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Department’s November 28th Response In its November 28, 2025 response, the Department stated that it “intends to deny [the] request as it has been determined that the . . . incident report involves allegations of an alleged sexual assault and is except [sic] from public disclosure. . . .” The Department further cited Exemptions (a) and (c) of the Public Records Law in support of its position. Current Appeal In her December 1, 2025 appeal petition, Attorney Labelle specifies that she did not make her request in her capacity as an attorney and provides information confirming that the record concerns allegations of sexual assault. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.”

Deputy Chief Aaron Wojtkowski SPR25/3539 Page 3 December 12, 2025 The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. In its November 28th response, under Exemption (a), the Department cited the Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) statute, G. L. c. 120, § 21, G. L. c. 119, § 60A, and G. L. c. 41, § 97D to withhold the responsive report in its entirety. Upon review, the Department merely cited the CORI statute, G. L. c. 120, § 21, and G. L. c. 119, § 60A without any further explanation as to its applicability to the responsive report. CORI The current definition of CORI is as follows: “Criminal offender record information,” records and data in any communicable form compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an identifiable individual and relate to the nature or disposition of a criminal charge, an arrest, a pre-trial proceeding, other judicial proceedings, previous hearings conducted pursuant to section 58A of chapter 276 where the defendant was detained prior to trial or released with conditions under subsection (2) of section 58A of chapter 276, sentencing, incarceration, rehabilitation, or release. Such information shall be restricted to information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before arraignment. Criminal offender record information shall not include evaluative information, statistical and analytical reports and files in which individuals are not directly or indirectly identifiable, or intelligence information. Criminal offender record information shall be limited to information concerning persons who have attained the age of 18 and shall not include any information concerning criminal offenses or acts of delinquency committed by any person before he attained the age of 18; provided, however, that if a person under the age of 18 was adjudicated as an adult in superior court or adjudicated as an adult after transfer of a case from a juvenile session to another trial court department, information relating to such criminal offense shall be criminal offender record information. . . . G. L. c. 6, § 167. G.L. c. 120, § 21 G.L. c. 120, § 21 governs records of a child delinquency commitment to the Department of Youth Services, and provides in pertinent part: The records of commitment to the department shall be withheld from public inspection except with the consent of the department, but such records concerning

Deputy Chief Aaron Wojtkowski SPR25/3539 Page 4 December 12, 2025 any child who at the time of commitment was between seven and 18 years of age shall be open, at all reasonable times, to the inspection of the child, his or her parent or parents, guardian or attorney, or any of them. A commitment to the department shall not be received in evidence or used in any way in any proceeding in any court except in subsequent proceedings for waywardness or delinquency against the same child, and except in imposing sentence in any criminal proceeding against the same person. G.L. c. 120, § 21. G. L. c. 119, § 60A G. L. c. 119, § 60A concerns the inspection of records in youthful offender and delinquency cases, and provides in pertinent part: The records of a youthful offender proceeding conducted pursuant to an indictment shall be open to public inspection in the same manner and to the same extent as adult criminal court records. All other records of the court in cases of delinquency arising under sections fifty-two to fifty-nine, inclusive, shall be withheld from public inspection except with the consent of a justice of such court; provided, however, that such records shall be open, at all reasonable times, to inspection by the child proceeded against, his parents, guardian or attorney; provided further, that nothing herein shall be construed to provide access to privileged or confidential communications and information; and provided further, that said protections shall be construed to include information and communications entered at the indictment. G. L. c. 119, § 60A. G. L. c. 41, § 97D G. L. c. 41, § 97D provides in relevant part: All reports of rape and sexual assault or attempts to commit such offenses, all reports of abuse perpetrated by family or household members, as defined in section 1 of chapter 209A, and all communications between police officers and victims of such offenses or abuse shall not be public reports and shall be maintained by the police departments in a manner that shall assure their confidentiality; provided, however, that all such reports shall be accessible at all reasonable times, upon written request, to: (i) the victim, the victim’s attorney, others specifically authorized by the victim to obtain such information, prosecutors and (ii) victim-witness advocates as defined in section 1 of chapter 258B, domestic violence victims’ counselors as defined in section 20K of chapter 233, sexual assault counselors as defined in section 20J of chapter 233, if such access is necessary in the performance of their duties; and provided further, that

Deputy Chief Aaron Wojtkowski SPR25/3539 Page 5 December 12, 2025 all such reports shall be accessible at all reasonable times, upon written, telephonic, facsimile or electronic mail request to law enforcement officers, district attorneys or assistant district attorneys and all persons authorized to admit persons to bail pursuant to section 57 of chapter 276. . . . G. L. c. 41, § 97D. In its November 28, 2025 response, under Exemption (a), the Department explained that G. L. c. 41, § 97D “states that police reports of [the] nature [of the responsive record] [‘]shall not be public reports[’] and must be maintained in a way that ensures confidentially.” Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Medical and Personnel Information Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual may be exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). While statutorily exempting personnel information from the expansive definition of public records, the Legislature did not explicitly define “personnel [file] or information.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Judicial decisions advise that the term is neither rigid, nor exact, and that the determination is case-specific. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). The custodian’s classification of materials as “personnel information” is not conclusive. Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n v. Sch. Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). Instead, the nature or character of the documents, as opposed to the documents’ label, is crucial to the analysis. See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., 436 Mass. at 386. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court) has refined the analysis to be employed when considering the public record status of personnel records. The Court has held that personnel information that is “useful in making employment decisions regarding an

Deputy Chief Aaron Wojtkowski SPR25/3539 Page 6 December 12, 2025 employee” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of exemption (c). Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798, quoting Oregonian Publ. Co.v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 329 Or. 401 (1999). The Court further defined those records that may be withheld as personnel information to include, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee.” Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798. Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its November 28, 2025 response, the Department cited Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law without any explanation of its applicability to the responsive report. Based on the Department’s response, in conjunction with information provided in Attorney LaBelle’s appeal, I find that where the responsive report is restricted from disclosure in its entirety by the Legislature under G. L. c. 41, § 97D, as it operates through Exemption (a), the Department has met its burden in responding to this request under the Public Records Law. See G. L. c. 41, § 97D (providing that these reports “shall not be public reports and shall be maintained by the police departments in a manner that shall assure their confidentiality”). Consequently, I decline to opine on the applicability of the Department’s additional claims under Exemption (a) and Exemption (c) to withhold the requested report.

Deputy Chief Aaron Wojtkowski SPR25/3539 Page 7 December 12, 2025 Conclusion Accordingly, I will now consider this administrative appeal closed. Attorney LaBelle is advised that this office shares jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A(c). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Mary LaBelle, Esq.