William Brower v. West Springfield, Town of (SPR 20253594)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records December 19, 2025 SPR25/3594 Kate R. O’Brien Scott, Esq. Chief of Staff and General Counsel Town of West Springfield 26 Central Street, Suite 32 West Springfield, MA 01089 Dear Attorney O’Brien Scott: I have received the petition of William Brower appealing the response of the Town of West Springfield (Town) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66 § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On November 20, 2025, Mr. Brower sought the following from January 1, 2020 to present: [1] All training records, certificates, completion dates, and comprehension assessment for [an identified individual] and any prior West Springfield VSO on Chapter 115 benefits, appeal procedures, public-records law, ethics, professional conduct, and customer-service standards (including mandatory annual training under M.G.L. c. 115 § 3B)[;] [2] Current job description, employment contract, code-of-conduct agreement, and any performance standards signed by [an identified individual] and prior VSOs[;] [3] All internal policies, manuals, or guidance documents (town or EOVS-issued) governing VSO duties, ethical standards, impartiality, appeal assistance, and use of profanity or intimidation toward veterans. Where these documents are publicly available online, please provide the exact URL and document title/code instead of printing copies[;] [4] All complaints, grievances, or disciplinary records against any West Springfield town employee (not limited to the VSO) involving use of profanity, intimidation/retaliation against complainants, or refusal to perform mandantory duties[;] [5] All complaints, grievances, or disciplinary records against any West Springfield town employee (not limited to the VSO) involving use of profanity, intimidation/retaliation against complainants, or refusal to perfrom mandatory duties[;] One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Kate R. O’Brien Scott, Esq. SPR25/3594 Page 2 December 19, 2025 [6] Any settlements, separation agreements, or monetary payments made by the Town related to the categories in items 4-5[;] [7] Any notices, audits, correspondence, or corrective-action plans from the Executive Office of Veterans’ Services (EOVS) or the Commonwealth regarding training deficiencies, professionalism violations, or reimbursement reductions for the West Springfield VSO office[;] [8] For any complaints or settlements identified in items 4-6, all records describing the resolution process and remedial actions the Town agreed to implement (e.g., training, policy changes, discriplinary measures)[;] [9] Security-camera footage (video and audio, if needed) of the Veterans’ Service Officer area on November 19, 2025, for the entire duration of [an identified individual’s] visit. The Town provided a response on December 4, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Town’s response, Mr. Brower petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/3594, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Town’s December 4th Response In its December 4, 2025 response, the Town provided records responsive to Items 1-3, and 9. The Town stated it has no records responsive to Items 4 and 6. The Town cited Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law to withhold records responsive to Item 5. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Further, the Town stated it would provide records for Items 7-8, “on or before December 26.”

Kate R. O’Brien Scott, Esq. SPR25/3594 Page 3 December 19, 2025 Current Appeal In his appeal, Mr. Brower states, “I appeal the Town[’s] December 2025 response to my November 20, 2025 public records request, specifically items 2, 4, 5, and 8.” Mr. Brower does not appear to object to the Town’s response to Items 1, 3, 6, 7, or 9. Item 2 – Records Provided In complaince with the Public Records Law, the Supervisor of Records may only issue determinations where a violation of G. L. c. 66, § 10 has occurred. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). Where the Town has provided records responsive to Item 2, I find that no violation of G. L. c. 66, § 10 has been asserted by Mr. Brower with regard to this part of the Town’s response. Item 4 – Unclear if Records Exist Based on Mr. Brower’s petition and the Town’s response, it is unclear whether the Town possesses records responsive to Item 4. The duty to comply with requests for records extends to those records that exist and are in the possession, custody, or control of the custodian of records at the time of the request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(ii). Consequently, the Town must clarify whether it possesses records responsive to Item 4. Item 5 – Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Personnel While statutorily exempting personnel information from the expansive definition of public records, the Legislature did not explicitly define “personnel [file] or information.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Judicial decisions advise that the term is neither rigid, nor exact, and that the determination is case-specific. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). The custodian’s classification of materials as “personnel information” is not conclusive. Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n v. Sch. Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). Instead, the nature or character of the documents, as opposed to the documents’ label, is crucial to the analysis. See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., 436 Mass. at 386.

Kate R. O’Brien Scott, Esq. SPR25/3594 Page 4 December 19, 2025 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court) has refined the analysis to be employed when considering the public record status of personnel records. The Court has held that personnel information that is “useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of exemption (c). Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798, quoting Oregonian Publ. Co.v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 329 Or. 401 (1999). The Court further defined those records that may be withheld as personnel information to include, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee.” Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798. Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interest at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. There are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). When analyzing a privacy claim, there is a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. Under Exemption (c), the Town states, “[t]o the extent any such records exist, they would constitute personnel records or personal information the disclosure of which may consistute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Such records are exempt from disclosure…” Under the Public Records Law, the burden shall be upon the records custodian to establish the applicability of an exemption. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (a written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based . . .”); see also Globe Newspaper

Kate R. O’Brien Scott, Esq. SPR25/3594 Page 5 December 19, 2025 Co. v. Police Comm’r, 419 Mass. 852, 857 (1995); Flatley, 419 Mass. at 511. The Town’s response did not contain the specificity required in a denial of acess to public records. The Town cites Exemption (c) without an explanation of the applicability of the exemption to responsive records. Particularly, it is unclear how the responsive records constitute one of the core categories of personnel information useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee. Further, the Town has not demonstrated that the requested records constitute intimate details of a highly personal nature, nor that disclosing the requested records would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. It is also unclear whether the requested information is available from other sources. Additionally, the Town must provide additional information with respect to the balancing test which exames whether the public interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. Furthermore, it is unclear from the Town’s response which specific records the Town intends to withhold. The Town must identify the records, categories of records, or portions of records it intends to withhold under Exemption (c). It is additionally uncertain how the records can be withheld in their entirety. See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289- 90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Any non-exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). The Town must clarify these matters. Item 8 – Timeframe for Providing Records G. L. c. 66, § 10(b) provides, in pertinent part, that if the magnitude or difficulty of a request unduly burdens the other responsibilities of the agency or municipality such that the agency or municipality cannot provide records within 10 business days, the agency or municipality must inform the requestor in writing within 10 business days. With respect to the timeframe to produce responsive records, the written response shall: identify a reasonable timeframe in which the agency or municipality shall produce the public records sought; provided, that . . . for a municipality the timeframe shall not exceed 25 business days following the initial receipt of the request for public records; and provided further, that the requestor may voluntarily agree to a response date beyond the timeframes set forth herein. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(vi). Where the Town indicated in its December 4th response that it intended to provide a response within the allowed statutory timeframe, it is unclear the basis of Mr. Brower’s appeal regarding Item 8 of the request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(vi) (records access officer may identify a reasonable timeframe in which the agency or municipality shall produce the public records sought; provided, that for an agency, the timeframe shall not exceed 15 business days following the initial receipt of the request for public records and for a municipality the timeframe shall not

Kate R. O’Brien Scott, Esq. SPR25/3594 Page 6 December 19, 2025 exceed 25 business days following the initial receipt of the request for public records; and provided further, that the requestor may voluntarily agree to a response date beyond the timeframes set forth herein). Conclusion Accordingly, the Town is ordered to provide Mr. Brower with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Mr. Brower may appeal the substantive nature of the Town’s response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: William Brower