William Brower v. Springfield, City of - Department of Veterans’ Services (SPR 20253673)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records December 29, 2025 SPR25/3541 Joe DeCaro Director Springfield Department of Veterans’ Services 36 Court Street, Room 101 Springfield, MA 01103 Dear Mr. DeCaro: I have received the petition of William Brower appealing the response of the Springfield Department of Veterans’ Services (Department) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66 § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On November 28, 2025, Mr. Brower sought “the following records in electronic format onlyfrom [sic] January 1, 2020 – present[:]” [1] The written policy (or policies) governing the timing of Chapter 115 benefit payments, specifically stating whether payments are issued . . . [in advance] . . . of the month ofresidency [sic] or . . . [in arrears] . . . (after the month ofresidency [sic])[;] [2] Copies of any memos, training materials, or guidance from the Executive Office ofVeterans’ [sic] Services (EOVS) or DVS explaining when Chapter 115 checks are approved and issued[;] [3] For every Chapter 115 payment ever made to or on behalf of [an identified individual] by any Massachusetts municipality from January 1, 2020 – present: [a] Date the application/approval was submitted [b] Date the payment was . . . [approved] . . . [c] Date the check was . . . [issued/written] . . . [d] The exact month(s) and year the payment was intended to cover. . . [e] Amount paid and any breakdown . . . [;] [4] Any case notes or correspondence referencing the timing or approval process for [an identified individual’s] payments. The Department provided a response on December 12, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Mr. Brower petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/3673, was opened as a result. While this appeal was pending, the Department provided a supplemental response in an email to Mr. Brower and copied to this office on December 19, 2025. Further, the One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Joe DeCaro SPR25/3673 Page 2 December 29, 2025 Department provided additional information to this office in an email on December 24, 2025. Status of the Requestor; Reason for the Request Please be advised, the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, Mr. Brower’s status will play no role in a determination as to whether the records should be disclosed or redacted under the Public Records Law. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Deparment’s December 12th and December 19th Responses In its December 12, 2025 response to Items 1, 2, and 4 of Mr. Brower’s request, the Department indicated that it did not possess responsive records and provided the following additional information in support of its position: The . . . [Department] has been advised that there is no written policy outlining whether payments are issued in advance or in arrears, memos, training materials, guidance from the Massachusetts Executive Office of Veteran Services or United States Department of Veteran Services explaining the approval or issuance of these checks, or case notes which would reference timing or approval process for payments. . . .

Joe DeCaro SPR25/3673 Page 3 December 29, 2025 Regarding Items 1, 2, and 4, the Department additionally provided a URL to a page of the Executive Office of Veterans Services website offering information on “Chapter 115 Benefits/Safety Net Program” and stated, “[w]e suggest you refer to the Massachusetts Executive Office of Veteran Services webpage regarding Chapter 115 benefits at the [provided] link[.]” The Department additionally cited Exemption (c) to deny Item 3 of Mr. Brower’s request, in its entirety, and advised, “[t]he release of any information, even with redactions, could directly identify a public assistance recipient, as Chapter 115 benefits are a low-income public assistance program designed for low-income Veterans and their families[.]” The Department additionally advised that it “does not maintain records for other municipalities” and stated, “any application and payment history information would be maintained by the Massachusetts Executive Office of Veteran Services.” The Department also provided the telephone number and online contact information for the Executive Officer of Veteran Services and stated, “[i]ndividuals with veteran benefits should direct requests for their information to the Massachusetts Executive Officer of Veteran Services by telephone . . . or via web inquiry form[.]” In its supplemental December 19, 2025 response, the Department explained, “[w]e have advised [Mr. Brower] to contact the Veteran Services Division for information related to any Chapter 115 Veteran Benefits, as information related to this is exempt under M.G.L. ch. 4, § 7 (26) (c), as responding to any information would directly identify a public assistance recipient.” Additionally, the Department stated, “Mr. Brower should contact the Executive Office of Veteran Services for questions regarding any Chapter 115 Benefits or his local Veteran Services Office in the town where he lives” and again identified the Executive Office of Veteran Services as the government entity where “[b]enefit applications and eligibility questions would be best directed[.]” The Department further advised, “[f]or records possessed by the City [of Springfield] related to any current or previous Chapter 115 Benefits, Mr. Brower can visit the office with photographic identification to receive that information.” Current Appeal In his December 12, 2025 appeal, Mr. Brower describes the Department’s claims under Exemption (c) to withhold records responsive to Item 3 of his request as “a clear error,” and contends that he is “entitled to [his] own records” and cites “108 CMR 10.06. . .”, as promugulated by the Executive Office of Veterans Services, in support of his claim. Mr. Brower additionally states that the Department’s response that it does not possess records responsive to Items 1 and 2 of his request is, “an admission of non-compliance with record-keeping duties” and maintains that the Department, “[f]ailed to conduct or certify an adequate search” for Items 1, 2, and 4. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an

Joe DeCaro SPR25/3673 Page 4 December 29, 2025 unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In this case, where the Department has explained that release of the records responsive to Item 3 would identify a recipient of government assistance, I find that the Department has met its burden to withhold the records responsive to Item 3 of the request pursuant to the second clause of Exemption (c). See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). No Duty to Create Records Please be advised, under the Public Records Law the City is not required to create a record in response to the request. See G. L. c. 66, § 6A(d). The duty to comply with requests for records extends to those records that exist and are in the possession, custody, or control of the custodian of records at the time of the request. See G. L. c. 66, §10(a)(ii). Additionally, please note that under the Public Records Law, a public employee is not required to answer questions, do research, or create documents in response to questions. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a); 32 Op. Atty Gen. 157, 165 (May 18, 1977).

Joe DeCaro SPR25/3673 Page 5 December 29, 2025 In its December 24, 2025 correspondence to this office, a representative of the Department confirmed that it does not possess records responsive to Items 1, 2, and 4 of Mr. Brower’s request. Specifically, the Department representative advised the following: The Public Records Division was advised by the City’s Veteran Services Director that there are no records located regarding Mr. Brower’s original request seeking a written policy stating the dates that payments are issued in advance or in arrears, memos, training materials, guidance from the Executive Office of Veteran Services or the U.S. Department of Veteran Services explaining when Chapter 115 checks are approved and issued, or case notes that would reference the timing or approval process for his payments. Accordingly, the City does not possess responsive records to items 1, 2, and 4[.] Consequently, where the Department has confirmed that it does not possess records responsive to Items 1, 2, and 4 of the request, and has no duty to create records responsive to the request, I find the Department has met its duty in responding to these portions of the request. Conclusion Accordingly, I will consider this administrative appeal closed. If Mr. Brower is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office shares jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth. See G. L. c. 66, §§ 10(b)(ix), 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of judicial remedies). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: William Brower