Erin Johnson v. Department of State Police (SPR 20253725)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records January 2, 2026 SPR25/3725 Allison Mondello Public Records Manager Department of State Police 50 Maple Street Milford, MA 01757 Dear Ms. Mondello: I have received the petition of Erin Johnson appealing the response of the Department of State Police (Department/MSP) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On October 2, 2025, Ms. Johnson requested the following: …copies of all Massachusetts State Police records related to the June 11, 2017 motor vehicle crash in Millis, MA, involving a Millis Police Department cruiser driven by [an identified] Officer and a pickup truck driven by [an identified individual]. Specifically, I request: [1] Crash reconstruction reports and diagrams[;] [2] Collision analysis files and scene photographs[;] [3] Witness interviews and statements collected by MSP[;] [4] Radio/dispatch logs and CAD reports[;] [5] Any supplemental reports or findings provided to the Millis Police Department or the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office[.] Prior Appeals The requested records were the subject of prior appeals. See SPR25/3558 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (December 17, 2025) and SPR25/3135 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (October 31, 2025). In my December 17th determination, I ordered the Department to clarify whether it possesses responsive records. The Department responded on December 18, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Ms. Johnson petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/3725, was opened as a result. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Allison Mondello SPR25/3725 Page 2 January 2, 2026 The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Department’s December 18th Response In its December 18, 2025 response, the Department provided responsive records with redactions, citing Exemptions (a) and (c) of the Public Records Law. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (c). Additionally, the Department stated, “[i]n regard to the portion of your request which is seeking ‘any supplemental reports or findings provided to the Millis Police Department or the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office,’ please submit your request directly to the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office.” Current Appeal In her appeal, Ms. Johnson states the following: First, MSP’s redactions are overbroad and improperly applied. Entire sentences and paragraphs are withheld as “Medical” or “Privacy,” including factual descriptions of injuries, operator condition, witness observations, and analytical findings that form the basis of the report’s conclusions. . . . Second, the report relies on and summarizes underlying records that were not produced, including witness statements, investigative materials, and references to medical examiner information. . . . Third, MSP improperly directed me to seek related records from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner and the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office.

Allison Mondello SPR25/3725 Page 3 January 2, 2026 Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-546 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. Under Exemption (a), the Office cites G. L. c. 38, § 2, which provides in relevant part: The chief medical examiner, with approval of the secretary of the executive office of public safety, shall promulgate rules for the disclosure of autopsy reports, which shall not be deemed to be public records, to those who are legally entitled to receive them. G. L. c. 38, § 2. In its December 18th response, the Department states, “…please note that the black unmarked boxes within the report contain information related to OCME toxicology and/or post- mortem testing. Please note that OCME information and/or records are withheld pursuant to M.G.L. c. 4, § 7 (26)(a) & (c) and M.G.L. c. 38, §2. For information regarding toxicology results and/or post-mortem testing, please submit your request directly to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner….”

Allison Mondello SPR25/3725 Page 4 January 2, 2026 Given that such information is the type of information contemplated under the statute cited above, I find that the Department may properly redact the information related to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner’s (OCME) toxicology and post-mortem testing under G. L. c. 38, § 2, as it operates through Exemption (a). Where the Department has met its burden under Exemption (a), I decline to opine on the applicability of Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law to redact this information. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Medical and Personnel Information Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual may be exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). While statutorily exempting personnel information from the expansive definition of public records, the Legislature did not explicitly define “personnel [file] or information.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Judicial decisions advise that the term is neither rigid, nor exact, and that the determination is case-specific. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). The custodian’s classification of materials as “personnel information” is not conclusive. Wakefield Teacher’s Association v. School Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). Instead, the nature or character of the documents, as opposed to the documents’ label, is crucial to the analysis. See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., 436 Mass. at 386. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court) has refined the analysis to be employed when considering the public record status of personnel records. The Court has held that personnel information that is “useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of exemption (c). Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798, quoting Oregonian Publ. Co.v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 329 Or. 401 (1999). The Court further defined those records that may be withheld as personnel information

Allison Mondello SPR25/3725 Page 5 January 2, 2026 to include, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee.” Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798. Further, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that Exemption (c) “clearly and unambiguously states that the privacy exemption does not apply to an ‘investigation’ of law enforcement misconduct.” Eric Mack v. Dist. Att’y for the Bristol Dist., 494 Mass. 1, 12 (2024). Additionally, the Court held that the phrase “related to,” as used in Exemption (c), “is construed broadly.” Id. at 12 n.9. Specifically, the Court held that the exemption did not apply to records related to an investigation into whether two police officers had committed any crimes or violated their department’s use of force policy. Id. at 12. Exemption (c) did not apply even where the investigation concluded there was no basis to charge the officers with crimes. Id. at 6. Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. Under Exemption (c), the Department states, “[p]lease see redaction index appended to the responsive record you are being provided.” In the columns of the “Redaction Log” included with its December 18th response, the Department lists “Medical” and “Privacy” as the “Reason” for the redactions.

Allison Mondello SPR25/3725 Page 6 January 2, 2026 To the extent that the records contain medical information that relates to a specifically named individual, I find the Department may permissibly withhold such portions from disclosure under Exemption (c). However, based on the Department’s response, it is unclear how the remaining redacted information constitutes intimate details of a highly personal nature, nor how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. It is also not clear whether this information is available from other sources. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. Further, the Department did not provide any supporting information with respect to examining whether the public interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. Id. Additionally, where the responsive record relates to an officer involved motor vehicle crash, it is unclear whether the responsive record may be “related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Please note that the amended language of Exemption (c) does not permit its application to records “related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation.” The Department must clarify this. Additional Records Based on the Department’s response and in conjunction with Ms. Johnson’s appeal, it is unclear if the Department possesses additional records responsive to the request. Specifically, it is unclear whether the Department possesses “underlying records that were not produced, including witness statements, investigative materials, and references to medical examiner information” and “any supplemental reports or findings provided to the Millis Police Department or the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office.” The duty to comply with requests for records extends to those records that exist and are in the possession, custody, or control of the custodian of records at the time of the request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(ii). Custodians are expected to use their superior knowledge of the records in their custody to assist requestors in obtaining the desired information. See 950 C.M.R. 32.04(5). Consequently, the Department must clarify whether additional records exist. Conclusion Accordingly, the Department is ordered to provide Ms. Johnson with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Ms. Johnson may appeal the substantive nature of the Department’s response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1).

Allison Mondello SPR25/3725 Page 7 January 2, 2026 Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Erin Johnson