Jesse Cook-Dubin v. Pittsfield, City of - Police Department (SPR 20253738)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records January 5, 2026 SPR25/3738 Abigail Hunt Records Access Officer Pittsfield Police Department 39 Allen Street Pittsfield, MA 01201 Dear Ms. Hunt: I have received the petition of Jesse Cook-Dubin, Esq., appealing the response of the Pittsfield Police Department (Department) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On November 13, 2025, Attorney Cook-Durbin requested an accident report related to an identified individual on October 16, 2025 at 7:30am. The Department responded on December 19, 2025. Unsatisfied by the response, Attorney Cook-Dubin petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR25/3738, was opened as a result. Status of the Requestor; Reason for the Request Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a); see also Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, Attorney Cook-Dubin’s status shall have no bearing on the public status of any existing responsive records. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Abigail Hunt SPR25/3738 Page 2 January 5, 2026 It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Department’s December 19th Response In its December 19, 2025 response, the Department cited Exemptions (a) and (c) of the Public Records Law to withhold the responsive records in their entirety. Current Appeal In his December 19, 2025 petition to this office, Attorney Cook-Dubin objected to the Department withholding responsive records under Exemption (c) and stated, “[t]he Pittsfield Police Department has denied our request on the grounds that medical files and information are not obtainable under the Public Records Law. I acknowledge that medical information is normally exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Law. However, [we] have the right to release [an identified individual’s] medical information…” Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-546 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.”

Abigail Hunt SPR25/3738 Page 3 January 5, 2026 The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. In its December 19th response, the Department cites G. L. c. 119, § 60A, which provides in pertinent part as follows: The records of a youthful offender proceeding conducted pursuant to an indictment shall be open to public inspection in the same manner and to the same extent as adult criminal court records. All other records of the court in cases of delinquency arising under sections fifty-two to fifty-nine, inclusive, shall be withheld from public inspection except with the consent of a justice of such court; provided, however, that such records shall be open, at all reasonable times, to inspection by the child proceeded against, his parents, guardian or attorney; provided further, that nothing herein shall be construed to provide access to privileged or confidential communications and information; and provided further, that said protections shall be construed to include information and communications entered at the indictment. G. L. c. 119, § 60A. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or date relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Medical Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual may be exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987).

Abigail Hunt SPR25/3738 Page 4 January 5, 2026 Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interest at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. There are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). When analyzing a privacy claim, there is a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its December 19th response, under Exemption (c), the Department argued, “this records contains intimate details of a highly personal nature and medical information relating to a specifically named individual.” Burden of Specificity in Claiming Exemptions Under the Public Records Law, the burden shall be upon the records custodian to establish the applicability of an exemption. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (a written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based . . .”); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm’r, 419 Mass. 852, 857 (1995); Flatley, 419 Mass. at 511. Additionally, the Department must identify the records, categories of records, or portions of records it intends to withhold, and explain with specificity how any exemptions apply to withhold the records. To deny access to a record under the Public Records Law, a records access officer must identify the record, categories of records, or portions of the record it intends to withhold. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3)(c)(4).

Abigail Hunt SPR25/3738 Page 5 January 5, 2026 Upon review, to the extent that the records contain medical information that relates to a specifically named individual(s), I find the Department may permissibly withhold such portions from disclosure under Exemption (c). However, it remains unclear how all the records constitute medical information or contain intimate details of a highly personal nature, or how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. Further it is uncertain why the records must be withheld in their entirety. See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Any non-exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). The Department must clarify these matters. Additionally, based on the Department’s December 19th response, it is unclear how the responsive records are the type contemplated under G. L. c. 119, § 60A. Specifically, it is unclear how the withheld records constitute records in a case “of delinquency arising under sections fifty-two to fifty-nine,” as required by the statute. The Department must clarify this matter. Greater Right of Access to the Records Where the statutes list authorized persons that may have access to the responsive records, Attorney Cook-Dubin may have a right of access to the responsive records outside the Public Records Law. This office encourages Attorney Cook-Dubin and the Department to communicate directly to determine if there is another means affording Attorney Cook-Dubin a greater right of access to the responsive records. Conclusion Accordingly, the Department is ordered to provide Attorney Cook-Dubin with a response to his request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law, and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Jesse Cook-Dubin, Esq.