DeMarco, Celeste v. Wellesley, Town of - Town Clerk (SPR 20260019)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records February 10, 2026 SPR26/0019 K. C. Kato Town Clerk Town of Wellesley 525 Washington Street, First Floor Wellesley, MA 02482 Dear Ms. Kato: I have received the petition of Celeste DeMarco appealing the response of the Town of Wellesley (Town) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On December 11, 2025, Ms. DeMarco requested the following: 1. Produce the full, original forwarded message that [a named individual] provided to [another individual], referenced in [the individual’s]’s statement: “Thanks for forwarding this information . . .” This request includes the forwarded material in its entirety, along with any attachments, metadata, and internal or external communications connected to that forwarded message. The Town responded on December 26, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Town’s response, Ms. DeMarco petitioned this office, and this appeal, SPR26/0019, was opened as a result. Status of the Requestor Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, Ms. DeMarco’s status will play no role in a determination as to whether the records should be disclosed or redacted under the Public Records Law. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

K. C. Kato SPR26/0019 Page 2 February 10, 2026 Previous Appeal This request was the subject of a previous appeal. See SPR26/0019 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (January 16, 2026). In my January 16th determination, I ordered the Town to provide this office with an un-redacted copy of the responsive record for in camera inspection. The Town provided the record and I would like to thank the Town for its cooperation. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Town’s December 26th Response In its December 26, 2025 response, the Town provided a responsive record, and states the following: An email dated February 25, 2018 was attached and referenced in the request. The responsive record of the communication requested is attached and redacted in accordance with Exemption (a) and Exemption (c) to the Public Records Law. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a).

K. C. Kato SPR26/0019 Page 3 February 10, 2026 A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. In its response, the Town cites the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), a federal statute, which provides in pertinent part: No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein other than directory information, as defined in paragraph (5) of subsection (a)) of students without the written consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or organization, other than to the following . . . 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1). The statute goes on to list seven categories of individuals, agencies, and organizations to which “education records” may be released. The following pertinent definitions are provided in 34 C.F.R. 99.3: Education records. (a) The term means those records that are: (1) Directly related to a student; and (2) Maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a party acting for the agency or institution. . . . Personally Identifiable Information The term includes, but is not limited to— (a) The student’s name; (b) The name of the student’s parent or other family members; (c) The address of the student or student’s family;

K. C. Kato SPR26/0019 Page 4 February 10, 2026 (d) A personal identifier, such as the student’s social security number, student number, or biometric record; (e) Other indirect identifiers, such as the student’s date of birth, place of birth, and mother’s maiden name; (f) Other information that, alone or in combination, is linked or linkable to a specific student that would allow a reasonable person in the school community, who does not have personal knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to identify the student with reasonable certainty; or (g) Information requested by a person who the educational agency or institution reasonably believes knows the identity of the student to whom the education record relates. 34 C.F.R. 99.3. Additionally, the Town cites 34 C.F.R. 99 (FERPA related regulations) and 603 C.M.R. 23.00 (Massachusetts student records regulations). In its response, under the statutes and regulations cited above, the Town argues the following: The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and implementing regulations protect the privacy of students’ education records by limiting disclosures of Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) contained in such records. 20 U.S.C § 1232g, 34 C.F.R. Part 99. “Education records” means those records that are: (1) directly related to a student; and (2) maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a party acting for the agency or institution. 34 C.F.R. § 99.3. PII includes “[i]nformation that, alone or in combination, is linked or linkable to a specific student that would allow a reasonable person in the school community, who does not have personal knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to identify the student with reasonable certainty.” In addition to FERPA, the Massachusetts Student Records Law mandates that “no third party shall have access to information in or from a student record without the specific, informed written consent of the eligible student or the parent.”603 CMR 23.07(4). “Student records” include “the Transcript and the Temporary Record … regardless of physical form or characteristics concerning a student that is organized on the basis of the student’s name or in a way that such student may be individually identified, and that is kept by the public schools of the Commonwealth.” 603 CMR 23.02. Portions of the records contain personally identifiable information about students, referencing incidents of alleged bullying. This record directly relates to one or more students and is maintained by Wellesley Public Schools, an educational agency. Therefore, the portions of the records have been redacted to remove this information under Exemption (a).

K. C. Kato SPR26/0019 Page 5 February 10, 2026 Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its response, under Exemption (c), the Town argues the following: The record contains personal emails. Personal email addresses are personal in nature and a private citizen whose personal email address is unpublished may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information. Release of this information may result in an unwarranted invasion of privacy to an individual of normal sensibilities. Further, this information is likely not available from other sources. The public interest in disclosing personal email addresses does not

K. C. Kato SPR26/0019 Page 6 February 10, 2026 outweigh these individuals’ privacy interests. In addition, the email references bullying and harassment by individuals. It also references Harassment Prevention Orders. We have redacted the names of individuals who obtained HPOs. The fact that a person of normal sensibilities would be embarrassed that a relationship deteriorated to such an extent to warrant such an order. The fact that an individual allegedly received unwarranted and harassing messages to warrant issuance of an HPO is also an intimate detail of a highly personal nature to that individual. It is a sensitive matter to be the recipient of such wanted communication and, if released, could subject the individual to additional harassment from the alleged aggressor or harassment from other individuals. While this information has been disclosed by the individual subject to the HPO, it does not warrant release of the name of the individuals who obtained the order. The release by someone other than the individual who sought the order does not absolve the privacy interest of those individuals. In the case of substance abuse or family status, select members of the public may know that a person is going through drug counseling or a divorce. That does not make the issue any less personal. The same is true here. In Camera Inspection Upon in camera inspection of the responsive record, I find that the Town has met its burden to redact student identifying information from the email at issue pursuant to FERPA, as it operates through Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1); G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). Additionally, the Town has met its burden to redact personal email addresses under Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Consequently, I find the Town has met its burden in responding to the request under the Public Records Law. Conclusion Accordingly, I will consider this administrative appeal closed. If Ms. DeMarco is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office shares jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth. See G. L. c. 66, §§ 10(b)(ix), 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of judicial remedies).

K. C. Kato SPR26/0019 Page 7 February 10, 2026 Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Celeste DeMarco Jay M. Wolman, Esq.