Storey, James v. Dartmouth, Town of (SPR 20260030)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records January 20, 2026 SPR26/0030 Cody Haddad Town Administrator Town of Dartmouth 400 Slocum Road Dartmouth, MA 02747 Dear Mr. Haddad: I have received the petition of James Storey appealing the response of the Town of Dartmouth (Town) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On September 16, 2025, Mr. Storey requested “the following police reports and IOD application”: [1] Plane crash report from Feb 2, 2007[;] [2] Stolen vehicle report involving [an identified individual] on or about Jan 1, 2008[;] [3] Attempted murder stabbing call at Dartmouth woods Dr on July 13, 2010[;] [4] [An identified individual’s] suicide April 19, 2015[;] [5] Hit and run accident with death, May 13, 2015 Hathaway rd[;] [6] [An identified individual’s] suicide Nov 10, 2017[;] [7] Barricaded suspect Old Fall River Rd July 24, 2018[; and] [8] Any paperwork or IOD forms submitted to Chubb by [an identified officer] before or after [an identified individual’s] medical evaluation by [an identified individual]. Please include any reply/approval/denial/recommendations by Chubb. The Town responded on October 12, 2025. Unsatisfied with the Town’s response, Mr. Storey petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/0030, was opened as a result. Status of Requestor Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Cody Haddad SPR26/0030 Page 2 January 20, 2026 circumstances of the requestor. See Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, Mr. Storey’s status will play no role in a determination as to whether the records should be disclosed or redacted under the Public Records Law. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. Current Appeal In his appeal petition, Mr. Storey contends: I am requesting a review of a records request … related to medical information provided to the towns risk management insurance company Chubb … Bullet 8. The town cannot rely on exemption c because they are [an identified individual’s] own personal medical conditions, which were required to be submitted to the Town’s insurer. The internal affairs report stated these documents were sent to Chubb insurance on May 7th and referenced as an enclosure in the IA report. I have called Chubb and was informed there were no records sent to them from the Dartmouth Police Department regarding [an identified individual’s] claim…. As there was most certainly a law enforcement misconduct investigation involving those documents, they are most certainly not excluded, especially as a privacy concern because they are [an identified individual’s] medical records. Attached is a copy of the misconduct investigation. The investigation stated “[an identified officer] alleges that [an identified officer] discriminated against him based on his PTSD by denying his PTSD-IOD claim, refusing to send the PTSD-IOD claim to the Town’s insurance company, and

Cody Haddad SPR26/0030 Page 3 January 20, 2026 denying the existence of PTSD.[”] … If I am not entitled to these documents as a records request, am I entitled to them via personnel records laws and medical records laws? Mr. Storey is advised that the Office of the Supervisor of Records is statutorily empowered with the authority to determine the public record status of government records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10. Further, in compliance with the Public Records Law, the Supervisor of Records may only issue determinations where a violation of G. L. c. 66, § 10 has been alleged. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). Please note Mr. Storey’s question, “…am I entitled to [the requested documents] via personnel records laws and medical records laws?” is outside the jurisdiction of this office. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a); 950 C.M.R. 32.00. Given that such issues do not fall within the authority of this office, I am unable to address such issues in this determination. Mr. Storey is advised that if he seeks guidance on alternative processes to request these documents, he may wish to seek advice from private legal counsel. The Town’s October 12th Response In its October 12, 2025 response, the Town cited Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law to withhold the responsive records. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Personnel Information While statutorily exempting personnel information from the expansive definition of public records, the Legislature did not explicitly define “personnel [file] or information.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Judicial decisions advise that the term is neither rigid, nor exact, and that the determination is case-specific. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). The custodian’s classification of materials as “personnel information” is not conclusive. Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n v. Sch. Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). Instead, the nature or character of the documents, as opposed to the documents’ label, is crucial to the analysis. See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., 436 Mass. at 386.

Cody Haddad SPR26/0030 Page 4 January 20, 2026 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court) has refined the analysis to be employed when considering the public record status of personnel records. The Court has held that personnel information that is “useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of exemption (c). Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798, quoting Oregonian Publ. Co.v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 329 Or. 401 (1999). The Court further defined those records that may be withheld as personnel information to include, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee.” Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798. Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its October 12th response, under Exemption (c), the Town asserted: I am writing in response to your public records request seeking documents related to an investigation involving [an identified officer]. After careful review, your request is being denied pursuant to the Massachusetts Public Records Law, specifically under Exemption C, the privacy exemption. …

Cody Haddad SPR26/0030 Page 5 January 20, 2026 The records you have requested are part of a personnel file and are not related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. As such, their disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and are exempt from disclosure under the statute. Based on the Town’s response, it is unclear how the requested records constitute one of the core categories of personnel information that is useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee. It is additionally uncertain how the information contains intimate details of a highly personal nature, nor how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. It is also not clear whether this information is available from other sources. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. Further, the Town did not provide information with respect to examining whether the public interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. Id. The Town must clarify these matters. Additionally, it is unclear how the records can be withheld in their entirety. The Town must explain whether the records can be redacted so that segregable portions can be provided. See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Any non-exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). Further, based on the Town’s response, it is unclear what records it possesses that it withheld from disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (a written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based . . .”). Therefore, the Town must identify the records it has in its possession that it is withholding under Exemption (c). The Town is advised that the Supreme Judicial Court has held that Exemption (c) “clearly and unambiguously states that the privacy exemption does not apply to an ‘investigation’ of law enforcement misconduct.” Eric Mack v. Dist. Att’y for the Bristol Dist., 494 Mass. 1, 12 (2024). Additionally, the Court held that the phrase “related to,” as used in Exemption (c), “is construed broadly.” Id. at 12 n.9. Specifically, the Court held that the exemption did not apply to records related to an investigation into whether two police officers had committed any crimes or violated their department’s use of force policy. Id. at 12. Exemption (c) did not apply even where the investigation concluded there was no basis to charge the officers with crimes. Id. at 6. In this case, where the requested records are referenced in the Town’s internal investigation of [an identified officer], it is unclear whether the records may be “related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Please note that the amended language of Exemption (c) does not permit its application to records “related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation.” The Town must clarify this.

Cody Haddad SPR26/0030 Page 6 January 20, 2026 Conclusion Accordingly, the Town is ordered to provide Mr. Storey with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Mr. Storey may appeal the substantive nature of the Town’s response within ninety days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: James Storey