← Back to Search
Unfiltered, Framingham v. Wayland, Town of (SPR 20260167)
Massachusetts Public Records Appeal · Public records appeal decision · Filed 01-16-2026
ClosedAppeal
SPR 20260167 is a Massachusetts Public Records Law appeal filed by Unfiltered, Framingham concerning records held by Wayland, Town of, opened 01-16-2026. Type: Appeal. Status: Closed.
Case Details
- Case Number
- 20260167
- Case Type
- Appeal
- Status
- Closed
- Requester
- Unfiltered, Framingham
- Custodian
- Wayland, Town of
- Date Opened
- 01-16-2026
- Date Closed
- 01-30-2026
PDF Document
Extracted Text (searchable & copyable)
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records January 30, 2026 SPR26/0167 Trudy L. Reid Town Clerk Town of Wayland 41 Cochituate Road Wayland, MA 01778 Dear Ms. Reid: I have received the petition of Framingham Unfiltered (requestor) appealing the response of the Town of Wayland (Town) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On January 6, 2026, the requestor sought, “[a]ll emails between the town manager and anyone on the topic of [an identified individual], date range 11/1/2025 and present.” The Town responded on January 14, 2026. Unsatisfied by the response, the requestor petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/0167, was opened as a result. Subsequently, the Town provided a response on January 29, 2026. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us Trudy L. Reid SPR26/0167 Page 2 January 30, 2026 If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Town’s January 14th Response In its January 14, 2026 response, the Town provided some responsive records and cited Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law and attorney-client privilege to withhold the remaining responsive records in their entirety. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Current Appeal In the requestor’s January 16, 2026 petition to this office, the requestor objected to the Town withholding records under Exemption (c) and attorney-client privilege and stated, “[t]he Town’s position effectively conceals the circumstances of a senior official’s departure. The public has a compelling interest in knowing whether a law enforcement administrator was disciplined, investigated, or permitted to retire in lieu of termination. Exemptions must be narrowly construed and cannot be invoked to shield embarrassment or avoid scrutiny…” In a January 29, 2026 response, the Town provided the requestor with a privilege log identifying twelve (12) records that it intends to withhold under attorney-client privilege. Common Law Attorney-Client Privilege A records custodian claiming the attorney-client privilege under the Public Records Law has the burden of not only proving the existence of an attorney-client relationship, but also (1) that the communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) that the communications were made in confidence; and (3) that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. See Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 449 Mass, 450 n.9 (2007); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapa & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 449 Mass. 609, 619 (2007 (stating that the party seeking the attorney-client privilege has the burden to show the privilege applies). Records custodians seeking to invoke the common law attorney-client privilege “are required to produce detailed indices to support their claims of privilege.” Suffolk, 449 Mass. at 460. Pursuant to the Public Records Law, in assessing whether a records custodian has properly withheld records based on the claim of attorney-client privilege the Supervisor of Records “shall require, as part of the decision making process, that the agency or municipality provide a detailed description of the record, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the ground upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed.” G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). In its January 29, 2026 response, the Town provided a privilege log identifying twelve (12) records that it intends to withhold under the attorney-client privilege, and includes the dates, the names of authors, recipients, and descriptions of the records, and the basis on which the Trudy L. Reid SPR26/0167 Page 3 January 30, 2026 privilege is being claimed. Upon review, the Town has satisfied the requirement that the communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such However, per Suffolk, the Town has not satisfied the requirement that the communications were made in confidence nor the requirement that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. The Town must clarify these matters. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or date relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Personnel While statutorily exempting personnel information from the expansive definition of public records, the Legislature did not explicitly define “personnel [file] or information.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Judicial decisions advise that the term is neither rigid, nor exact, and that the determination is case-specific. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). The custodian’s classification of materials as “personnel information” is not conclusive. Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n v. Sch. Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). Instead, the nature or character of the documents, as opposed to the documents’ label, is crucial to the analysis. See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., 436 Mass. at 386. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court) has refined the analysis to be employed when considering the public record status of personnel records. The Court has held that personnel information that is “useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of exemption (c). Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798, quoting Oregonian Publ. Co.v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 329 Or. 401 (1999). The Court further defined those records that may be withheld as personnel information to include, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee.” Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798. Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interest at stake. Torres v. Trudy L. Reid SPR26/0167 Page 4 January 30, 2026 Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. There are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). When analyzing a privacy claim, there is a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. Burden of Specificity Under the Public Records Law, the burden shall be upon the records custodian to establish the applicability of an exemption. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (a written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based . . .”); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm’r, 419 Mass. 852, 857 (1995); Flatley, 419 Mass. at 511. In this case, the Town’s January 14th response did not contain the specificity required in a denial of access to public records. The Town merely cites Exemption (c) without an explanation for its applicability to the responsive records. Further, it is unclear why the records must be withheld in their entirety. See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Any non- exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). The Town must clarify these matters. Conclusion Accordingly, the Town is ordered to provide the requestor with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law, and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Trudy L. Reid SPR26/0167 Page 5 January 30, 2026 Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Framingham Unfiltered