McCormick, Kariem v. Department of Revenue - Child Support Services Division (SPR 20260331)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records February 12, 2026 SPR26/0331 Amy M. Clayman, Esq. Counsel to the Commissioner Records Access Officer Department of Revenue – Child Support Enforcement Division P.O. Box 9561 Boston, MA 02114 Dear Attorney Clayman: I have received the petition of Kariem McCormick appealing the response of the Department of Revenue (Department) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On November 8, 2025, Mr. McCormick requested the following: [1] A complete audit and written accounting of all child support payments made on my behalf from all sources (employer wage garnishments, unemployment benefits, tax refund intercepts, retirement offsets, and direct payments). [2] A breakdown of how each payment was applied to principal, interest, and arrears for each case. [3] Copies of any payment ledgers, adjustment records, and arrearage calculations currently on file. [4] A review and correction of any duplicate or misapplied payments. [5] A written response confirming the outcome of the audit and any adjustments made to my account. Previous Appeals This request was the subject of previous appeals. See SPR26/0170 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (January 21, 2026) and SPR26/0247 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (January 28, 2026). In my January 28th determination, I closed the appeal in light of the Department providing a response on January 28, 2026. Unsatisfied with the Department’s One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Amy M. Clayman, Esq. SPR26/0331 Page 2 February 12, 2026 response, Mr. McCormick petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/0331, was opened as a result. The Department subsequently provided a further response on February 2, 2026. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. Status of the Requestor; Reason for the Request Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a); see also Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, Mr. McCormick’s interest in obtaining the records shall have no bearing on the public status of the responsive records. It is unclear if Mr. McCormick may have a greater right of access to the responsive records outside the Public Records Law. The parties are encouraged to communicate to determine if there is another means affording Mr. McCormick a greater right of access to the responsive records. The Department’s January 28th and February 2nd Responses In its January 28, 2026 response, the Department cited G. L. c. 119A, § 5A to argue that the records sought are not public. In its February 2, 2026 response, the Department reiterated its position and added, “Mr. McCormick already knows the process for requested child support information.”

Amy M. Clayman, Esq. SPR26/0331 Page 3 February 12, 2026 Current Appeal In his appeal petition, Mr. McCormick argued: The absence of a balance statement, arrears calculation, and allocation breakdown renders the production incomplete as an accounting record… Even if G.L. c. 119A, § 5A excludes “personal data” from the Public Records Law, that exclusion does not establish that DOR may refuse disclosure to the individual to whom the records pertain. It only means the Public Records Law is not the mechanism for third-party public access. DOR has already indicated that I have a right to this information. Accordingly, if DOR maintains a case ledger, arrears accounting, payment allocation detail, balance history, and related accounting records, I request that DOR provide them through the proper statutory/regulatory process for participant access… Finally, if DOR’s position is that the Public Records Law does not apply, DOR should identify in writing the specific process and authority by which a child support participant may obtain his own case ledger and allocation history, including where and how such a request must be submitted and what records will be provided. This appeal is limited solely to the sufficiency of the accounting production… In a subsequent email to this office and the Department on February 2, 2026, Mr. McCormick stated: This appeal is not premised on third-party public access. DOR correctly notes that child support records are excluded from public disclosure under G. L. c. 119, § 5A. However, the exclusion of IV-D records from public records law does not eliminate an individual’s right to obtain his own case records. It only removes such records from public inspection by unrelated third parties… [T]he dispute is not about public access, but about whether I have been provided a complete and meaningful accounting of funds collected and disbursed in my cases. Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, §7 (26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is

Amy M. Clayman, Esq. SPR26/0331 Page 4 February 12, 2026 restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. In its responses, the Department cited G. L. c. 119, § 5A, which provides in pertinent part: Personal data collected and maintained by the IV–D agency shall not be a public record under chapter 66 and access to this data shall be available only to employees of the IV–D agency and its contractors only to the extent reasonably necessary for the performance of said contractors duties… G. L. c. 119, § 5A. In its January 28, 2026 response, the Department explained: The records requested by Mr. McCormick are not public records. Mr. McCormick is seeking child support records related to his own child support cases… These records are not public records, but confidential child support records containing personally identifying information and financial information pertaining to his own cases. Such records are specifically excluded from the public records law by G. L. c. 119A, § 5A which states “personal data collected and maintained by the IV-D agency shall not be a public record under chapter 66 …” (emphasis added). Section 5A protects child support customers’ privacy in highly personal child support matters so that such records cannot be obtained by any member of the public. Child support case records simply are not public records. Mr. McCormick’s remedy is to seek judicial review in the Probate and Family Court… The Public Records Division is not the forum for determining whether DOR has satisfied its accounting obligations in a child support case. DOR is the single state agency charged with establishing and enforcing child support in Massachusetts under Title IV, Part D of the Social Security Act and G. L. c. 119A, § 1… Mr. McCormick disputes DOR’s accounting in his child support cases. He requested an administrative review and was dissatisfied with the agency’s final determination. The Public Records Division is not the appropriate

Amy M. Clayman, Esq. SPR26/0331 Page 5 February 12, 2026 forum for Mr. McCormick to contest the results of his administrative review or for determining whether DOR has performed accurate accounting in his cases… DOR has in fact provided all requested payment and account records to Mr. McCormick. Based on the information provided in the Department’s responses and Mr. McCormick’s appeal petition, where the responsive records are the type restricted from disclosure entirely by the Legislature under G. L. c. 119, § 5A as it operates through Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law (providing, “[p]ersonal data collected and maintained by the IV–D agency shall not be a public record under chapter 66…”), I find that the Department has met its burden in responding to this request. Issues Outside the Authority of This Office Please be advised that the Office of the Supervisor of Records is statutorily empowered with the authority to determine the public record status of government records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10. Further, in compliance with the Public Records Law, the Supervisor of Records may only issue determinations where a violation of G. L. c. 66, § 10 has been alleged. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). To the extent Mr. McCormick’s appeal alleges additional violations of G. L. c. 119A, which governs the Department of Revenue’s authority and legal framework for the handling of child support enforcement, and where Mr. McCormick states “the dispute is not about public access, but about whether I have been provided a complete and meaningful accounting of funds collected and disbursed in my cases,” I find that the additional concerns raised in Mr. McCormick’s appeal are outside the jurisdiction of this office. Given that such issues do not fall within the authority of this office, I am unable to address such issues in this determination. Mr. McCormick is advised that he may wish to seek advice from private legal counsel concerning these matters. Conclusion Accordingly, I will now consider this administrative appeal closed. If Mr. McCormick is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office shares jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of applicable judicial remedies). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Kariem McCormick