Brower, William v. Springfield, City of (SPR 20260371)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records February 18, 2026 SPR26/0371 Alesia Days, Esq. Records Access Officer City of Springfield 36 Court Street, Room 210 Springfield, MA 01103 Dear Attorney Days: I have received the petition of William Brower appealing the response of the City of Springfield (City) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On November 29, 2025, Mr. Brower requested the following: [A] [An identified individual] – January 1, 2019 to present [1] Complete employment record (hire date, promotions, assignments). [2] All citizen complaints, internal-affairs investigations, write-ups, or disciplinary actions (sustained or unsustained), including the nature of each complaint, findings, and any penalties imposed. [3] All training and certification records (annual in-service, public records law, customer service, de-escalation, handling citizen inquiries), including dates completed and any deficiencies or failures to complete required training. [4] Any performance evaluations or supervisory notes related to public-facing duties or refusal to provide information. [B] [An identified individual] – November 1-29, 2025 [5] Any request or communication (written or verbal) from the Springfield Veterans’ Services Office ([an identified individual] or any staff) asking the Springfield Police Department to call, contact, or take any action regarding [an identified individual]. [6] The exact reason(s), allegation(s), and evidence provided by Veterans’ Services for each such request. [7] All call logs, CAD notes, dispatch records, audio recordings, incident reports, and officer notes for every SPD interaction involving [an identified individual] in One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Alesia Days, Esq. SPR26/0371 Page 2 February 18, 2026 November 2025 (including the outbound intimidation call to me as well as the later November 29, 2025 inbound call to [an identified individual]). [C] Pattern of Witness Intimidation / Harassment – January 1, 2015 to present [8] Every complaint, internal-affairs investigation, citizen report, or lawsuit alleging that Springfield Police officers: - contacted, warned, threatened, visited, or otherwise harassed a civilian - at the request or direction of any city, county, or state employee (including Veterans’ Services, HR, Mayor’s office, etc.) - after the civilian filed a complaint, grievance, appeal, public-records request, or report of misconduct against that employee or department - without first conducting an independent investigation into the underlying allegation - where the action accused was witness intimidation, witness tampering, retaliation, or misuse of police authority, or the allegation could be construed as such by a reasonable individual. For each instance, include: - Date and summary of the incident - Officer(s) involved (name and rank) - Finding (sustained, unsustained, exonerated, unfounded) - Any discipline, penalty, or remedial action imposed - Any mandatory retraining or policy changes resulting from the complaint. [D] Prior Allegations of Records / Communication Denial & Supervisor Refusal – January 1, 2015 to present [9] Every complaint, IA investigation, or citizen report alleging that SPD personnel (including lieutenants, dispatchers, or officers): - refused to provide basic public-record or incident-report information (verbally or otherwise) - refused to transfer callers to a higher-ranking supervisor or captain’s voicemail when requested - claimed they were “the supervisor” when multiple higher ranks existed - engaged in unprofessional, evasive, or obstructive conduct during public inquiries… For each instance, include: - Date and summary of the incident - Officer(s) involved (name and rank) - Finding (sustained, unsustained, exonerated, unfounded) - Any discipline, penalty, or remedial action imposed

Alesia Days, Esq. SPR26/0371 Page 3 February 18, 2026 - Any mandatory retraining or policy changes resulting from the complaint. It is my understanding that the City assigned the request reference number #25-4332. On December 15, 2025, the City provided redacted responsive records and a fee estimate of $6,278.75 to produce additional records. Subsequently on December 15, 2025, Mr. Brower modified his request as follows: Part A ([an identified individual]) – Limit to directly relevant matters only… Please produce only those complaints, internal affairs investigations, write-ups, disciplinary actions, performance evaluations, or supervisory notes (January 1, 2019 – present) that involve allegations of: - Refusal to provide public records, incident reports, or basic information to citizens - Obstructive, evasive, or unprofessional conduct during public inquiries or phone contacts - Refusal to transfer callers to higher-ranking supervisors or claiming to be the highest authority when higher ranks exist - Any police contact, call, or action taken at the request or direction of the Springfield Veterans’ Services Office (or any other city employee or department). Parts C and D (Pattern complaints, January 1, 2015 – present) – Limit to two officers only… Please limit these parts entirely to complaints, internal affairs investigations, citizen reports, or lawsuits involving only: [1] [An identified individual] [2] The officer(s) who placed the outbound call to me in November 2025 at the request of Veterans’ Services (as referenced in Part B) For these two officers only, include any allegations matching the original descriptions in Parts C and D (witness intimidation/harassment/retaliation/misuse of authority at the direction of a city employee, or refusal to provide records/supervisor transfer). Previous Appeal This request was the subject of a previous appeal. See SPR25/3747 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (January 2, 2026). In my January 2nd determination, I ordered the City to clarify its claims to withhold certain responsive records under the attorney-client privilege and I encouraged Mr. Brower to provide the City with the needed clarification regarding the records he seeks. Further, I found that where Mr. Brower modified the scope of his request on December 15, 2025, it was unnecessary to opine on the City’s prior December 15th fee estimate. The City

Alesia Days, Esq. SPR26/0371 Page 4 February 18, 2026 responded on January 5, 2026. Unsatisfied with the City’s response, Mr. Brower petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/0371, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The City’s January 5th Response In its January 5, 2026 response, the City provided “a compilation of the files released to the requester including a portion of the requested officer disciplinary records, an email privilege log, and a good faith cost estimate … and a copy of the communication timeline of Mr. Brower’s Public Record Request[.]” The records were redacted pursuant to Exemptions (a) and (c) of the Public Records Law. In addition, the City stated: On 12/15/2025, the City’s Good Faith Cost Estimate was sent to the requester… On 12/15/2025, the requester responded with a modification to the scope of their request. On 12/16/2025, the requester was informed in an email message that portions of requested records were released as well advised of the exempt material that was withheld… As of 12/30/2025, no clarification response or payment of the good faith cost estimate were received. Accordingly, his request was closed on 12/30/2025. In response to the Supervisor of Records Determination… please note that the City notified the requester on 12/16/2025 that an email privilege log was available to retrieve in the NextRequest Portal. In addition, we have not received an indication that Mr. Brower will pay for the cost estimate or have we received a

Alesia Days, Esq. SPR26/0371 Page 5 February 18, 2026 response to the clarification message regarding the unknown two officers. Furthermore, the City has been communicating with the requester throughout the process of his numerous requests and has attempted to assist him formulate an effective and clear request… Current Appeal In his appeal petition, Mr. Brower argued against the redactions in the City’s production and stated: The City’s response… consists of minimal, heavily redacted documents (mostly my own complaint submissions recycled back) with no meaningful disclosure on core items. This inadequate production, combined with misrepresentations about pre-determination releases, constitutes willful non-compliance, bad faith, and continued obstruction… Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, §7 (26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 54 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-46 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. In its January 5, 2026 production of redacted records, the City’s redaction log noted that the redaction under Exemption (a) contained, “[i]nformation or entire records that are expressly exempt by statute,” and listed common examples of such information.

Alesia Days, Esq. SPR26/0371 Page 6 February 18, 2026 Upon review, the City did not cite any statutes in support of redacting the responsive records under Exemption (a). The City is reminded that for Exemption (a) to apply, a statute must either expressly state that the withheld record is not subject to disclosure under the Public Records Law, or limit dissemination of said information to a defined group or individuals or entities. Accordingly, the City must clarify which statute(s) permit it to redact the responsive records and explain with specificity how Exemption (a) applies to the redacted information. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (a written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based”). The City must clarify this matter. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Medical and Personnel Information While statutorily exempting personnel information from the expansive definition of public records, the Legislature did not explicitly define “personnel [file] or information.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Judicial decisions advise that the term is neither rigid, nor exact, and that the determination is case-specific. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). The custodian’s classification of materials as “personnel information” is not conclusive. Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n v. Sch. Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). Instead, the nature or character of the documents, as opposed to the documents’ label, is crucial to the analysis. See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., 436 Mass. at 386. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court) has refined the analysis to be employed when considering the public record status of personnel records. The Court has held that personnel information that is “useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of exemption (c). Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798, quoting Oregonian Publ. Co.v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 329 Or. 401 (1999). The Court further defined those records that may be withheld as personnel information to include, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee.” Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798.

Alesia Days, Esq. SPR26/0371 Page 7 February 18, 2026 Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual may be exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its January 5, 2026 production of redacted records, the City’s redaction log listed common examples of information that may be the redacted under Exemption (c). Based on the City’s response, it is unclear how the City may redact the responsive records under Exemption (c). The City has not demonstrated that the redactions constitute medical or personnel information, nor how they contain intimate details of a highly personal nature that would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. Further, it is uncertain whether any of this information is available from other sources. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. The City must also provide information with respect to the balancing test which examines whether the public interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. Id. The City must clarify these matters.

Alesia Days, Esq. SPR26/0371 Page 8 February 18, 2026 Common Law Attorney-Client Privilege A records custodian claiming the attorney-client privilege under the Public Records Law has the burden of not only proving the existence of an attorney-client relationship, but also (1) that the communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) that the communications were made in confidence; and (3) that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. See Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 449 Mass, 450 n.9 (2007); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapa & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 449 Mass. 609, 619 (2007) (stating that the party seeking the attorney-client privilege has the burden to show the privilege applies). Records custodians seeking to invoke the common law attorney-client privilege “are required to produce detailed indices to support their claims of privilege.” Suffolk, 449 Mass. at 460. Pursuant to the Public Records Law, in assessing whether a records custodian has properly withheld records based on the claim of attorney-client privilege the Supervisor of Records “shall require, as part of the decision making process, that the agency or municipality provide a detailed description of the record, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed.” G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). In its January 5, 2026 response, the City included a privilege log detailing an email withheld under the attorney-client privilege. In this case, the City provided a detailed description of the communication withheld under the attorney-client privilege, including the names of the author and recipients and the date of the communication. The City has also clarified that the communication withheld under the attorney-client privilege was between a client and an attorney. However, the City must also clarify that the withheld communication was made during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such, and describe the substance of such withheld communication and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed in accordance with G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). Further, the City must provide information regarding whether the communication was made in confidence and demonstrate that the privilege has not been waived. The City must clarify these matters. Reasonable Description of Records Sought Please be advised that in Friedman v. Div. of Admin. Law Appeal and Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, the Suffolk Superior Court, in its Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, stated: [The requester] has a right to seek public records from his government, provided he does so in a reasonable manner. [The agencies], in turn, have a right not to be inundated with drain-the-ocean records requests, provided they fulfill the basic expectations of the [Public Records Law] in a fair and transparent manner.

Alesia Days, Esq. SPR26/0371 Page 9 February 18, 2026 See Friedman v. Div. of Admin. Law Appeal and Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, Suffolk Sup. No. 2284CV02061-C, at 3 (February 14, 2023). In a recent case, the Superior court found that under the Public Records Law “[t]he reasonable description requirement contemplates that a requesting party will identify documents or categories of documents with sufficient particularity that government employees will be able to understand exactly what they are looking for, and then make a prompt production.” See Jaideep Chawla v. Dept. of Revenue, Suffolk. Sup. No. l 784CV02087, at 2 (January 23, 2019). In its January 5, 2026 response, the City maintains that it is still seeking further clarification regarding “two unnamed officers” referenced in Mr. Brower’s request. Please be advised that it is valid for the custodian of records to suggest a “reasonable modification of the scope of the request or offer to assist the requestor to modify the scope of the request if doing so would enable the agency or municipality to produce records sought more efficiently and affordably.” See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(vii). Consequently, Mr. Brower is encouraged to provide the City with the needed clarification regarding the records he seeks. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(i) (the request must reasonably describe the public records sought). In accordance with the Public Records Law, custodians are expected to use their superior knowledge of the records in their custody to assist requestors in obtaining the desired information. See 950 C.M.R. 32.04(5). The duty to comply with requests for records extends to those records that exist and are in the possession, custody, or control of the custodian of records at the time of the request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(ii), (b)(ii). To the extent Mr. Brower seeks additional records other than those included in the City’s January 5, 2026 production, he is encouraged to provide the City with sufficient particularity required for the City to identify the additional documents he is seeking. Conclusion Accordingly, the City is ordered to provide Mr. Brower with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law, and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Mr. Brower may appeal the substantive nature of the City’s response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: William Brower Justin P. Morin