Manjapra, Kris v. Cambridge, City of - Office of the City Clerk (SPR 20260473)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records February 24, 2026 SPR26/0473 Seah Levy Public Records Access Officer City of Cambridge Office of the City Solicitor 795 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139 Dear Ms. Levy: I have received the petition of Kris Manjapra appealing the response of the City of Cambridge (City) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On January 4, 2026, Mr. Manjapra requested, “…any available information about alleged sexual abuse of minors by [an identified individual], birthdate February 17, 1953. He is the minister of a church, and someone from the community has come forward about a court case in 2001. Our church group is trying to get the full picture of reports of sexual abuse of minors made about [an identified individual].” The City responded on January 16, 2026, and assigned reference number P260006- 010426 to the request. Unsatisfied with the City’s response, Mr. Manjapra petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/0473, was opened as a result. Status of the Requestor; Reason for the Request Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a); see also Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, Mr. Manjapra’s purpose in making the request has no bearing on the public status of any existing responsive records. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Seah Levy SPR26/0473 Page 2 February 24, 2026 The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The City’s January 16th Response In its January 16, 2026 response, the City stated, “[t]he City has located records responsive to your request.” The City cited G. L. c. 41, § 97D, as the statute operates through Exemption (a), and Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law, to withhold responsive records. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (c). Current Appeal In his appeal, Mr. Manjapra contends: The response indicates that the City has located records responsive to my request … but will not share any amount of it at any level of detail or abstraction. … I am only asking for high-level information that does not involve divulging the protected information in the reports. The City’s responsive records span which decades? How many reports are there? This information could be shared without divulging any information about the content of reports. … Please note that the St. Augustine’s Corporation has a mechanism to remove [an identified individual] as minister, and I am seeking any information that will help the Directors of the Corporation to act swiftly and decisively in the interest of public safety, our responsibility to our youth, and civic responsibility.

Seah Levy SPR26/0473 Page 3 February 24, 2026 Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-546 (1977). This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. In its January 16th response, the City cited G. L. c. 41, § 97D to withhold the responsive records. G. L. c. 41, § 97D provides in pertinent part: All reports of rape and sexual assault or attempts to commit such offenses, all reports of abuse perpetrated by family or household members, as defined in section 1 of chapter 209A, and all communications between police officers and victims of such offenses or abuse shall not be public reports and shall be maintained by the police departments in a manner that shall assure their confidentiality… G. L. c. 41, § 97D. In its January 16th response, under Exemption (a), the City merely cites the above statute without any explanation of its applicability to the responsive records. Based upon the City’s response, it is unclear how the responsive records are restricted under G. L. c. 41, § 97D as it operates through Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law. It is

Seah Levy SPR26/0473 Page 4 February 24, 2026 also uncertain how the responsive records are the type contemplated under G. L. c. 41, § 97D. The City must clarify these matters. Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Medical and Personnel Information Medical information that is of a personal nature and relates to a specifically named individual may be exempt from disclosure. Brogan v. Sch. Comm. of Westport, 401 Mass. 306, 308 (1987); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Ret. Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 438 (1983). Generally, medical information is sufficiently personal to warrant exemption. Globe Newspaper Co., 338 Mass. at 432-34. There is a strong public policy in Massachusetts that favors confidentiality as to medical data about a person’s body. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam’r, 404 Mass. 132, 135 (1987). While statutorily exempting personnel information from the expansive definition of public records, the Legislature did not explicitly define “personnel [file] or information.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Judicial decisions advise that the term is neither rigid, nor exact, and that the determination is case-specific. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). The custodian’s classification of materials as “personnel information” is not conclusive. Wakefield Teacher’s Association v. School Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). Instead, the nature or character of the documents, as opposed to the documents’ label, is crucial to the analysis. See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., 436 Mass. at 386. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court) has refined the analysis to be employed when considering the public record status of personnel records. The Court has held that personnel information that is “useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of exemption (c). Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798, quoting Oregonian Publ. Co.v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 329 Or. 401 (1999). The Court further defined those records that may be withheld as personnel information to include, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee.” Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798.

Seah Levy SPR26/0473 Page 5 February 24, 2026 Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. In its January 16th response, the City merely cites Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law without any explanation of its applicability to the responsive records. Based on the City’s response, it is unclear how the responsive records contain intimate details of a highly personal nature, or how disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities. It is additionally uncertain whether any of the withheld information is available from other sources. PETA, 477 Mass. at 292. Also, the City did not provide information with respect to the balancing test, which examines whether the public interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. Id. The City must clarify these matters. Additionally, the City must clarify how the responsive records can be withheld in their entirety and why segregable portions cannot be provided. See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). Any non-exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a).

Seah Levy SPR26/0473 Page 6 February 24, 2026 Further, based on the City’s response, it is unclear what records it possesses that it withheld from disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (a written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based . . .”). Therefore, the City must identify the records it has in its possession that it is withholding under Exemptions (a) and (c). Conclusion Accordingly, the City is ordered to provide Mr. Manjapra with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Mr. Manjapra may appeal the substantive nature of the City’s response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Kris Manjapra