Gill, Sasha v. Massachusetts Convention Center Authority (SPR 20260539)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records March 3, 2026 SPR26/0539 Alain P. Mathieu Interim General Counsel Massachusetts Convention Center Authority 415 Summer Street Boston, MA 02210 Dear Attorney Mathieu: I have received the petition of Sasha Gill, Esq. appealing the response of the Massachusetts Convention Center Authority (Authority) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On December 17, 2025, Attorney Gill requested: [1] All records, investigative reports and findings pertaining to all investigations conducted by the MCCA since [an identified individual] was named Executive Director[;] [2] All records, correspondence/communication, investigative reports and findings pertaining to the investigation conducted by the MCCA regarding an employee’s attempted accessing of an email in April 2025[;] [3] All records, including correspondence, pertaining to the decision to terminate the employment of [an identified individual][;] [4] All Board meeting minutes regarding [an identified individual]’s performance as Executive Director/CEO of the MCCA[;] [5] All complaints made against [an identified individual] for any reason during his tenure as Executive Director of the MCCA[;] [6] All correspondence reflecting or referencing any interpersonal conflicts between [an identified individual] and any MCCA employees, clients, contractors and vendors[;] [7] All complaints of race-based discrimination or retaliation received by the MCCA from 2020 to the present[;] [8] All records provided to the JCRECRI by [an identified individual] or any employee of MCCA[;] [9] Copies of all policies and procedures applicable to employees of the MCCA in 2025. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Alain P. Mathieu SPR26/0539 Page 2 March 3, 2026 The Authority responded on February 9, 2026. Unsatisfied with the Authority’s response, Attorney Gill petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/0539, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. Current Appeal In her appeal petition, Attorney Gill contends: … Raw investigatory materials (interviews, reports, conclusions, and underlying evidence) are distinct from personnel files and do not qualify as “personnel information” under the Wakefield standard. Treating such records as categorically protected would undermine the Public Records Law’s presumption of disclosure and its command that exemptions be strictly and narrowly construed… … These requests are not “overly broad,” as the records sought are easily identifiable. … MCCA’s response suggests it either did not understand the word “complaint” in the findings or recommendations of the OSA audit, or that it is using the exemptions in M.G.L. c. 4, § 7 to improperly avoid the disclosure of public records. The Authority’s February 9th Response On February 9, 2026, the Authority released some records responsive to Items 3, 4, and 9, and stated it did not have records responsive to Item 8. The Authority stated that it withheld

Alain P. Mathieu SPR26/0539 Page 3 March 3, 2026 certain records pursuant to Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law, and the attorney-client privilege. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Items 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7: In its response, the Authority states: Request 1: The Authority is withholding records responsive to this Request pursuant to M.G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c) … This Request as written is overly broad and does not describe the records sought with reasonable specificity (950 CMR 32.06). Finally, certain responsive materials are withheld pursuant to the attorney- client privilege, as they consist of confidential communications between the Authority and legal counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice (see M.G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a)). Request 2: The Authority is withholding records responsive to this Request. These records are exempt from disclosure under the personnel exemption contained in M.G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Massachusetts courts have held that records related to internal disciplinary investigations of specific employees are part of the “personnel file” or “personnel information” and are thus protected from public disclosure to maintain the privacy of the employees involved. Request 3: The Authority is enclosing a copy of the settlement agreement between the Authority and [an identified individual] in this folder … Regarding other records pertaining to the decision-making process for termination, such records are generally considered part of a personnel file and are withheld under Exemption (c). … … Request 5: The Authority finds this Request overly broad, as it does not specify the types of complaints sought (e.g., formal HR grievances versus informal feedback). To the extent the request seeks individual and personal complaints filed by employees, such records are exempt under the personnel/privacy exemption (M.G.L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c)). Public disclosure of such complaints would inhibit the reporting process and infringe upon the privacy interests of both the complainant and the subject. Request 7: The Authority is currently in the process of identifying and collecting responsive records for this five-year period. Given the sensitivity of these records and the need to protect the privacy of complainants, significant redactions will be necessary pursuant to Exemption (c). The Authority will provide further updates as soon as possible.

Alain P. Mathieu SPR26/0539 Page 4 March 3, 2026 Exemption (c) Exemption (c) applies to: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). First Clause – Personnel Information While statutorily exempting personnel information from the expansive definition of public records, the Legislature did not explicitly define “personnel [file] or information.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Judicial decisions advise that the term is neither rigid, nor exact, and that the determination is case-specific. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). The custodian’s classification of materials as “personnel information” is not conclusive. Wakefield Teacher’s Association v. School Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). Instead, the nature or character of the documents, as opposed to the documents’ label, is crucial to the analysis. See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., 436 Mass. at 386. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court) has refined the analysis to be employed when considering the public record status of personnel records. The Court has held that personnel information that is “useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of exemption (c). Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798, quoting Oregonian Publ. Co.v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 329 Or. 401 (1999). The Court further defined those records that may be withheld as personnel information to include, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee.” Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798. Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal

Alain P. Mathieu SPR26/0539 Page 5 March 3, 2026 nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. With regard to Items 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 of Attorney Gill’s request, response, it is unclear how the responsive records are exempt from disclosure under Exemption (c). Particularly, it is unclear how the responsive records constitute one of the core categories of personnel information useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee. Further, the Authority has not demonstrated that the requested records contain intimate details of a highly personal nature, nor that disclosing the requested records constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. It is also unclear whether the requested records are available from other sources. Additionally, the Authority must provide additional information with respect to the balancing test which examines whether the public interest in obtaining the requested records outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy. Further, it is uncertain why the records may be withheld in their entirety. It should be noted that any non-exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a). See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289- 90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). The Authority must clarify these matters. In addition, based on the Authority’s response, it is unclear what records it possesses that it withheld from disclosure. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv) (a written response must “identify any records, categories of records or portions of records that the agency or municipality intends to withhold, and provide the specific reasons for such withholding, including the specific exemption or exemptions upon which the withholding is based . . .”). Therefore, the Authority must identify the records it has in its possession that it is withholding under Exemption (c). Common Law Attorney-Client Privilege – Item 1 A records custodian claiming the attorney-client privilege under the Public Records Law has the burden of not only proving the existence of an attorney-client relationship, but also (1) that the communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s search for

Alain P. Mathieu SPR26/0539 Page 6 March 3, 2026 legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) that the communications were made in confidence; and (3) that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. See Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 449 Mass. 444, 450 n.9 (2007); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 449 Mass. 609, 619 (2007) (stating that the party seeking the attorney-client privilege has the burden to show the privilege applies). Records custodians seeking to invoke the common law attorney-client privilege “are required to produce detailed indices to support their claims of privilege.” Suffolk, 449 Mass. at 460. Pursuant to the Public Records Law, in assessing whether a records custodian has properly withheld records based on the claim of attorney-client privilege, the Supervisor of Records “shall not inspect the record but shall require, as part of the decision making process, that the agency or municipality provide a detailed description of the record, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed.” G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). With regard to Item 1 of Attorney Gill’s request, I find the Authority has not met its burden in claiming the attorney-client privilege to withhold the responsive records. Specifically, the Authority must provide an index comprised of a detailed description of each record withheld pursuant to the attorney-client privilege, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of each record, and the grounds upon which the privilege is being claimed. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). Further, the Authority must clarify whether the communication was made during a client’s search for legal advice from an attorney in his or her capacity as such, whether the communication was made in confidence, and whether the privilege as to the communication has been waived. Reasonable Description of Records Sought A request for records must reasonably describe the records sought. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(i). In Chawla, the Superior court found that under the Public Records Law “[t]he reasonable description requirement contemplates that a requesting party will identify documents or categories of documents with sufficient particularity that government employees will be able to understand exactly what they are looking for, and then make a prompt production.” See Jaideep Chawla v. Dept of Revenue, Suffolk. Sup. No. 1784CV02087, at 2 (January 23, 2019). The court further indicated “[r]equests for documents that are articulated with very broad language that calls upon non-lawyer administrative personnel to interpret the scope of what is sought, and then make fine judgments about what documents are and are not sufficiently ‘related’ to the category of materials requested, will not satisfy this statutory standard.” (emphasis in original). Id. As such, requests that seek “all records relating to…,” “all records concerning…,” or “all records regarding…” are not sufficiently particular as to satisfy the statutory standard of a request that “reasonably described the public record sought.” See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(i). Consistent with the decision in Chawla, I find that with regard to Item 1, the language “[a]ll records, investigative reports and findings pertaining to all investigations conducted by the

Alain P. Mathieu SPR26/0539 Page 7 March 3, 2026 MCCA…” does not satisfy the statutory standard for a request that reasonably describes the public record sought. See Chawla, at 2. Attorney Gill may wish to provide clarification regarding the specific records she is seeking. Once Attorney Gill has provided the needed clarification, the Authority must provide a response within 10 business days. However, with regard to Item 5 of Attorney Gill’s request, Attorney Gill has provided descriptions of the categories of records she is seeking, including, among other things, a class and description of records. While her request may potentially result in a large volume of responsive records, she has provided sufficient particularity required to identify the documents she is seeking. Item 7 Timeliness in Providing Records G. L. c. 66, § 10(b) provides, in pertinent part, that if the magnitude or difficulty of the request unduly burdens the other responsibilities of the agency or municipality such that the agency or municipality cannot provide records within 10 business days, the agency or municipality must inform the requestor in writing within 10 business days. With respect to the timeframe to produce responsive records, the written response shall: identify a reasonable timeframe in which the agency or municipality shall produce the public records sought; provided, that for an agency, the timeframe shall not exceed 15 business days following the initial receipt of the request for public records and for a municipality the timeframe shall not exceed 25 business days following the initial receipt of the request for public records; and provided further, that the requestor may voluntarily agree to a response date beyond the timeframes set forth herein. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(vi). With regard to Item 7, where Attorney Gill submitted her request on December 17th, and the Authority has not provided responsive records, nor cited an exemption for withholding records, I find the Authority has not met its burden in responding to the request in accordance with G. L. c. 66, § 10(b). Consequently, the Authority must provide an estimated date as to when it intends to complete the search and provide the responsive records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a) (records must be provided without unreasonable delay). To the extent possible, the Authority must provide responsive records on a rolling basis. Conclusion Accordingly, the Authority is ordered to provide Attorney Gill with a response to the request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this

Alain P. Mathieu SPR26/0539 Page 8 March 3, 2026 office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Attorney Gill may further appeal the substantive nature of the Authority’s response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Sasha Gill, Esq.