White, Virginia v. Barnstable County Sheriff's Office (SPR 20260843)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records March 24, 2026 SPR26/0843 Michael B. Halpin, Esq. General Counsel Barnstable County Sheriff’s Office 6000 Sheriff’s Place Bourne, MA 02532 Dear Attorney Halpin: I have received the petition of Virginia White appealing the response of the Barnstable County Sheriff’s Office (Office) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On November 24, 2025, Ms. White requested “[the] record on the ‘identity theft’ that occurred to [an identified individual] at your facility in April of 2025.” Specifically Ms. White sought: [1] Name or names of accused[;] [2] Charges made[;] [3] Ramifications of crime[;] [4] Outcome[.] Previous Appeal This request was the subject of a previous appeal. See SPR25/3679 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (December 30, 2025) and SPR26/0207 Determination of the Supervisor of Records (February 3, 2026). In my February 3rd determination, I found that while the Office had explained how the responsive record constitutes one of the core categories of personnel information useful in making employment decisions, it was unclear whether the record was related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. I also found that the Office had not met its burden to withhold the responsive record under Exemptions (b), (o), and (p) of the Public Records Law. Subsequently, the Office provided a response to Ms. White on February 12, 2026. Unsatisfied with the Office’s response, Ms. White petitioned this office, and this appeal, SPR26/0843, was opened as a result. Status of the Requestor Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Michael B. Halpin, Esq. SPR26/0843 Page 2 March 24, 2026 in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, Ms. White’s status will play no role in a determination as to whether the records should be disclosed or redacted under the Public Records Law. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Office’s February 12th Response In its February 12, 2026 response, the Office cites Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law for withholding a responsive investigative report. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). The Office also incorporated its earlier responses which cited Exemptions (b), (o), and (p) for withholding information contained in the report. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(b), (o), (p). Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c).

Michael B. Halpin, Esq. SPR26/0843 Page 3 March 24, 2026 First Clause – Personnel While statutorily exempting personnel information from the expansive definition of public records, the Legislature did not explicitly define “personnel [file] or information.” G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Judicial decisions advise that the term is neither rigid, nor exact, and that the determination is case-specific. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2003). The custodian’s classification of materials as “personnel information” is not conclusive. Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n v. Sch. Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 798 (2000). Instead, the nature or character of the documents, as opposed to the documents’ label, is crucial to the analysis. See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., 436 Mass. at 386. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Court) has refined the analysis to be employed when considering the public record status of personnel records. The Court has held that personnel information that is “useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee” may be withheld pursuant to the first clause of exemption (c). Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798, quoting Oregonian Publ. Co.v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 329 Or. 401 (1999). The Court further defined those records that may be withheld as personnel information to include, “employment applications, employee work evaluations, disciplinary documentation, and promotion, demotion, or termination information pertaining to a particular employee.” Wakefield Teacher’s Ass’n, 431 Mass. at 798. In its February 12th response, the Office argues the following under Exemption (c) for withholding the responsive report: As previously indicated and as acknowledged by the Supervisor, the BCSO has already explained how the responsive record here constitutes “core ... personnel information” that is entirely protected from public disclosure by Massachusetts law. Wakefield Teachers Ass’n. v. School Comm., 431 Mass. 792, 797 (2000) (citation omitted) (“Wakefield”); see also c. 4, §7, cl. (26) (c) (“Exemption c”). Concerning the Supervisor’s suggestion that it “unclear whether the responsive records are related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation[,]” please note that the BCSO is not, in its operation of the Barnstable County Correctional Facility (BCCF), considered to be a “law enforcement agency” engaged in “police duties and functions.” G.L. c. 6E, §1. The Supervisor has previously recognized this statutory reality and determined that BCCF personnel investigations “are not related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation.” See SPR24/2926 (December 12, 2024 Appeal Determination, p. 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). In short, where neither the BCSO nor the subject employee of the investigation are alleged to be “in [the] performance of police duties and functions[,]” the “new carve-out ... for records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation” found in Exemption c is simply not applicable. Mack v. Dist. Att’y for the Bristol Dist., 494 Mass. 1, 10 (2024); see also G.L. c. 6E, §1, (definitions of law enforcement agency and officer). Accordingly, the responsive

Michael B. Halpin, Esq. SPR26/0843 Page 4 March 24, 2026 material here (a “single, integrated report … [constituting] personnel … information”) is plainly the type of information that an employer may find “useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee[,]” and, as such, falls into the “core categories of personnel information” that are entirely protected from public disclosure by Exemption c. Wakefield at 797 (citation omitted); Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 9 (2003). Based on the information provided in the Office’s February 12th response, I find that where the Office has explained that the subject of the report was not a law enforcement officer, nor the Office a law enforcement agency, the Office has demonstrated the responsive report is not “related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation.” Further, the Office has previously explained that the responsive investigative report falls within the core categories of personnel information described in Wakefield as useful in making employment decisions regarding an employee, and is therefore exempt under Exemption (c). See Wakefield, 431 Mass. at 798. In Colman M. Herman v. City of Boston, et. al., Suffolk Superior Court, Civil Action No. 2384CV2395, the Court in its June 20, 2024 Decision and Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Public Records Responses, found that “personnel files . . . shall be considered exempt under exemption (c).” Id. at 6. Consequently, I find that the Office has met its burden to withhold the responsive record under Exemption (c). Conclusion Accordingly, I will consider this administrative appeal closed. If Ms. White is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office shares jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth. See G. L. c. 66, §§ 10(b)(ix), 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of judicial remedies). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Virginia White