Styler, Jack v. Department of State Police (SPR 20260866)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records March 25, 2026 SPR26/0866 Allison Mondello Public Records Manager Massachusetts Department of State Police 50 Maple Street Milford, MA 01757 Dear Ms. Mondello: I have received the petition of Jack Styler, of Provincetown Independent, appealing the response of the Department of State Police (Department) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On November 19, 2025, Mr. Styler requested the following records: [1] Organization Audit in Flock The report should include data logged from the period of September 1, 2024 to the date this request is processed. Per Flock’s documentation, the Organization Audit is available within the Insights tab and is defined as searches done within the agency. [2] Network Audit in Flock This report should include data logged from the period of September 1, 2024 to the date this request is processed. Per Flock’s documentation, the Network Audit is available within the Insights table and is defined as searches of the organization’s Flock network by any agency in the Flock System. [3] Number of requests and the usage reasons for making requests related to all Flock or other license plate reading cameras on Cape Cod and/or Flock or other License plate reading cameras that monitor the bridges that connect Cape Cod to mainland Massachusetts — the Sagamore and Bourne bridges. This could be logged under the “reason” tab for each request. Mr. Styler modified his request on December 11, 2025, as follows: Please see the amended request here: I am requesting the data logged by the license plate reading cameras on the Bourne and Sagamore Bridges run by the Massachusetts state police through the company Vigilant Solutions (with the One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Allison Mondello SPR26/0866 Page 2 March 25, 2026 parent company Motorola). I am specifically requesting one month’s worth of data collected by those cameras in the month of November 2025. I am also requesting any and all records, emails, or other communications made by government agencies (state or federal) that have requested to see, use, or otherwise obtain this data from these cameras in the last year (January 1, 2025 to the date this request is received.). Prior Appeal This request was the subject of a prior appeal. See SPR26/0315 Determination of Supervisor of Records (February 13, 2026). In my February 13th determination, I found that the Department had not met its burden of specificity to withhold the records under Exemption (n) of the Public Records Law. The Department responded on March 9, 2026. Unsatisfied with the Department’s response, Mr. Styler petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/0866, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Department’s March 9th Response In its March 9, 2026 response, the Department cited Exemption (n) of the Public Records Law to withhold the requested records in their entirety.

Allison Mondello SPR26/0866 Page 3 March 25, 2026 Exemption (n) Exemption (n) permits the withholding of: records, including, but not limited to, blueprints, plans, policies, procedures and schematic drawings, which relate to internal layout and structural elements, security measures, emergency preparedness, threat or vulnerability assessments, or any other records relating to the security or safety of persons or buildings, structures, facilities, utilities, transportation, cyber security or other infrastructure located within the commonwealth, the disclosure of which, in the reasonable judgment of the record custodian, subject to review by the supervisor of public records under subsection (c) of section 10 of chapter 66, is likely to jeopardize public safety or cyber security. G. L c. 4, § 7(26)(n). Exemption (n) allows for the withholding of certain records which if released would jeopardize public safety. The first prong of Exemption (n) examines “whether, and to what degree, the record sought resembles the records listed as examples in the statute;” specifically, the “inquiry is whether, and to what degree, the record is one a terrorist would find useful to maximize damage.” PETA, 477 Mass. at 289-90. The second prong of Exemption (n) examines “the factual and contextual support for the proposition that disclosure of the record is ‘likely to jeopardize public safety.’” Id. at 289-90. The PETA decision further provides that “[because the records custodian must exercise ‘reasonable judgment’ in making that determination, the primary focus on review is whether the custodian has provided sufficient factual heft for the supervisor of public records or the reviewing court to conclude that a reasonable person would agree with the custodian’s determination given the context of the particular case.” Id. PETA also provides that “[t]hese two prongs of exemption (n) must be analyzed together, because there is an inverse correlation between them. That is, the more the record sought resembles the records enumerated in exemption (n), the lower the custodian’s burden in demonstrating ‘reasonable judgment’ and vice versa.” PETA, at 290. In its response, the Department states the following: If the Department identifies whether it has any responsive records, it would be confirming or denying the existence of Automated License Plate Recognition (“ALPR”) cameras on the Bourne and Sagamore bridges. As a result, the Department neither confirms nor denies the existence of responsive records. Public disclosure of ALPR camera locations would enable a terrorist to map surveillance coverage along major travel corridors, identify areas with limited monitoring, and plan movements designed to avoid detection during the commission of a terrorist act. Such disclosure would be harmful and contrary

Allison Mondello SPR26/0866 Page 4 March 25, 2026 to the safety and security exemption which is intended to protect the public from terrorist attacks. PETA v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 288-289 (2017) (“The preenactment history behind exemption (n) corroborates the notion that protecting the public from terrorist attacks in a post-September 11, 2001, world was the animating principle underlying its adoption.”) … The Department’s Division of Homeland Security and Preparedness (“DHS”) is responsible for the administration of the Department’s Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) system. The mission of DHS is to lead the Department’s criminal intelligence, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, emergency preparedness, and emergency response efforts, employing an intelligence-led policing approach to sustaining, enhancing and coordinating the Department’s statewide capabilities to prepare for, protect against, investigate, respond to and recover from any criminal, terrorist, natural or manmade hazards or threats. ALPR camera locations and its audit data are records relating to the security or safety of persons or buildings, structures, facilities, utilities, transportation or other infrastructure located within the Commonwealth. The ALPR records closely resembles security measures and emergency preparedness, as utilized by the Department to include but not limited to the following:  Support the Department’s homeland security mission through the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of terrorist incidents and the protection of critical infrastructure and locations that allow for travel and the free flow of commerce from subjects who intend to damage or disrupt the systems.  Supports law enforcement response to critical incidents and the protection of high profile public events or locations which may be a potential target of a terrorist attack or mass-casualty incident. Protect the safety of the motoring public and alert law enforcement in real-time that a particular license plate (e.g., a stolen vehicle or a vehicle associated with a wanted individual) is in close proximity to an ALPR to dramatically reduce the recovery time of stolen vehicles, aid in the removal of unsafe vehicles and operators from the roadway, and assist in locating dangerous and wanted individuals.  Support the Department’s public safety mission through the investigation and prosecution of suspected criminal (including terrorist) incidents. Enhance the Department’s AMBER/Silver and other law enforcement alerts programs, situation awareness, and real-time response capability by deploying ALPRs to more rapidly identify and locate vehicles related to potential child abductions, kidnappings, missing persons, or other emergency situations or serious crimes.  Support the Department’s public safety mission through the investigation and prosecution of suspected criminal (including terrorist) incidents.

Allison Mondello SPR26/0866 Page 5 March 25, 2026  Enhance the Department’s AMBER/Silver and other law enforcement alerts programs, situation awareness, and real-time response capability by deploying ALPRs to more rapidly identify and locate vehicles related to potential child abductions, kidnappings, missing persons, or other emergency situations or serious crimes. Preventing the disclosure of camera locations that can track a terrorist’s movements prior to, during, and after the commission of a terrorist act is essential to effective law enforcement in protecting the public from terrorist attacks. As discussed above, public disclosure of ALPR camera locations would enable a terrorist to map surveillance coverage along major travel corridors, identify areas with limited monitoring, and plan movements designed to avoid detection during the commission of a terrorist act. This terrorist act could target persons or buildings, structures, facilities, utilities, transportation or other infrastructure located within the Commonwealth. The ALRP system camera locations and its audit data is the type of record that a terrorist would find useful to maximize damage and jeopardize public safety for the reasons described below. The Department maintains approximately 80-100 ALPR cameras throughout the Commonwealth. ALPR cameras are frequently deployed in proximity to critical infrastructure, transportation corridors, and high-traffic public areas, which are commonly recognized as potential targets for criminal or terrorist activity. The Department’s ALPR system contributes to the protection of critical infrastructure, including highways, bridges, public gathering areas, and transportation nodes. Disclosure of operational details, including the location of cameras, would weaken those protective measures. Disclosing the locations of Department ALPRs would be detrimental to public safety and would assist a criminal or terrorist in an attempt to cause harm. Individuals involved in terrorism-related activity, organized crime, and transnational criminal networks often conduct surveillance of law enforcement capabilities in advance of planning attacks or major criminal acts. Knowledge of where ALPR cameras are located, how frequently they are used, and how the Department deploys them could assist such actors in transporting weapons, explosives, or other contraband while minimizing the likelihood of detection. A terrorist seeking to cause harm, while having quick access to precise ALPR camera locations, could preemptively vandalize or otherwise impair the operation of cameras along their proposed route. Knowledge of camera locations would enable terrorists to alter travel routes to avoid detection, identify surveillance blind spots, and transport stolen vehicles through unmonitored areas and plan criminal activity using knowledge of camera placement. The Department in its reasonable judgment determined that disclosure of ALPR camera locations would create a reasonably foreseeable risk to public safety by aiding terrorists seeking to evade detection while targeting critical infrastructure

Allison Mondello SPR26/0866 Page 6 March 25, 2026 like highways, bridges, public gathering areas, and transportation nodes or public venues. The Department’s reasonable judgment is based upon its law enforcement mission, its technical and substantive expertise in the area of criminal investigations and surveillance, its specialized knowledge of law enforcement tactics, and its unique insight and familiarity with the methods and strategies used by criminal and terroristic elements and actors intending to commit crimes and terrorist attacks. Therefore, the Department has determined in its reasonable judgement that the requested records relate to the security or safety of persons or buildings, structures, facilities, utilities, transportation or other infrastructure located within the Commonwealth that a terrorist would find useful to maximize damage and, therefore, their release would likely jeopardize public safety. In Camera Inspection In order to facilitate a determination as to the applicability of the Department’s claims to withhold the records pursuant to Exemption (n) of the Public Records Law, the Department must provide this office with an un-redacted copy of the responsive records for in camera inspection. After I complete my review of the records, I will return the records to your custody and issue an opinion on the public or exempt nature of the records. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4). The authority to require the submission of records for an in camera inspection emanates from the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4); see also G. L. c. 66, § 1. This office interprets the in camera inspection process to be analogous to that utilized by the judicial system. See Rock v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 206 (1981) (administrative agency entitled deference in the interpretation of its own regulations). Records are not voluntarily submitted, but rather are submitted pursuant to an order by this office that an in camera inspection is necessary to make a proper finding. Records are submitted for the limited purpose of review. This office is not the custodian of records examined in camera, therefore, any request made to this office for records being reviewed in camera will be denied. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(4)(c). This office has a long history of cooperation with governmental agencies with respect to in camera inspection. Custodians submit copies of the relevant records to this office upon a promise of confidentiality. This office does not release records reviewed in camera to anyone under any circumstances. Upon a determination of the public record status, records reviewed in camera are promptly returned to the custodian. To operate in any other fashion would seriously impede our ability to function and would certainly affect our credibility within the legal community. Please be aware, any cover letter submitted to accompany the relevant records may be subject to disclosure. Order Accordingly, the Department is ordered to provide this office with an un-redacted copy of the responsive records for in camera inspection without delay.

Allison Mondello SPR26/0866 Page 7 March 25, 2026 Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Jack Styler