McLeod, Spencer v. Southborough, Town of (SPR 20261004)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records April 2, 2026 SPR26/1004 Mark J. Purple Town Administrator Town of Southborough 17 Common Street Southborough, MA 01772 Dear Mr. Purple: I have received the petition of Spencer McLeod appealing the response of the Town of Southborough (Town) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66 § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On March 11, 2026, Mr. McLeod requested: . . . [C]opies of the records associated with the following two public records requests previously received and fulfilled by the Town[:] . . . Request 26-6 . . . [and] Request 26-11 . . . [.] For each of the above requests, please provide: [a] The original public records request submission, including the requester’s name and email address as provided at the time of submission[;] [b] Any attachments submitted with the request[;] [c] Any acknowledgement or response emails sent by the Town[;] [d] Any correspondence between the Town and the requester regarding clarification or fulfillment of the request[.] The Town provided an initial response on March 19, 2026. Unsatisfied with the Town’s response, Mr. McLeod petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/1004, was opened as a result. Subsequent to the opening of this appeal, the Town provided a supplemental response on March 19, 2026, which included responsive records. Mr. McLeod further appealed the Town’s supplemental response in email correspondence to this office and the Town on the same date. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Mark J. Purple SPR26/1004 Page 2 April 2, 2026 The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Town’s March 19th Responses In its initial March 19, 2026 response, the Town advised, “[a]ll requested records for . . . requests [26-6 and 26-11] are publicly available to view within” the Town’s public records portal, “the NextRequest system.” In its supplemental March 19, 2026 response, the Town provided seven additional records responsive to Request 26-6 and stated, “[a]ny emails related to [Request] #26-6 are now in the portal.” The Town additionally advised, “[f]or [Request] #26-11, the information in the portal is all that we have” and further noted, “[w]hile we do try to get as much contact information as possible from the requester, we do not deny any request that does not provide all of the information.” In its final item of correspondence on March 19, 2026, the Town confirmed that it “provided all records responsive to [the] request.” Current Appeal In his March 19, 2026 appeal to this office, Mr. McLeod characterizes the Town’s “[statement] that all responsive records are publicly available within the NextRequest system . . . [as] inaccurate.” He explains that “the publicly accessible NextRequest pages for Requests 26-6 and 26-11 do not display the requester’s name, email address, phone number, or street address” or “include the underlying submission data, complete email records, or any attachments associated with the requests.” Upon review of the case file, it is my understanding that “Request 26-6 . . . [and] Request 26-11” concern two separate previous records requests that Mr. McLeod submitted to the Town

Mark J. Purple SPR26/1004 Page 3 April 2, 2026 on January 20, 2026, and January 29, 2026, respectively. Additionally, it is my understanding that with his appeal petition, Mr. McLeod provided a copy of his request regarding “Request 26- 6 . . . [and] Request 26-11” as submitted through the Town’s NextRequest system. In his further appeal of the Town’s supplemental March 19, 2026 response, Mr. McLeod contends that the seven responsive records the Town produced following the opening of this appeal “relate only to Request 26-6” and claims, “[t]he Town has . . . produced no responsive records regarding Request 26-11.” In subsequent email correspondence on the same date, Mr. McLeod “[provides] a . . . supplement to [his further] appeal[.]” Specifically, he provides a screenshot of “a side-by-side comparison of two NextRequest submissions,” his “[above March 11, 2026] request . . . and Request 26-11, as they appear to a logged-in requester viewing their own request” through the Town’s NextRequest system. Regarding the screenshot, he explains, “my [March 11, 2026] request displays a complete requester block containing name, email, street address, and phone number. Request 26-11, submitted through the same web-based system, displays no requester information.” Mr. McLeod goes on to argue that the requestor’s “name, phone, street address, city, state, and zip code . . . was captured at the time Request 26-11 was submitted[.]” He further states that, “[h]owever, no requester information of any kind has been produced” and “[requests] that the Supervisor order the Town to produce all requester information maintained in NextRequest for Request 26-11.” Reasonable Description of Records Sought A request for records must reasonably describe the records sought. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(i). In Chawla, the Superior court found that under the Public Records Law “[t]he reasonable description requirement contemplates that a requesting party will identify documents or categories of documents with sufficient particularity that government employees will be able to understand exactly what they are looking for, and then make a prompt production.” See Jaideep Chawla v. Dept of Revenue, Suffolk. Sup. No. 1784CV02087, at 2 (January 23, 2019). The court further indicated “[r]equests for documents that are articulated with very broad language that calls upon non-lawyer administrative personnel to interpret the scope of what is sought, and then make fine judgments about what documents are and are not sufficiently ‘related’ to the category of materials requested, will not satisfy this statutory standard.” (emphasis in original). Id. Upon review, where the relevant portion of Mr. McLeod’s March 11, 2026 written request sought, “. . . the requester’s name and email address as provided at the time of submission” for Request 26-6 and Request 26-11, and Mr. McLeod seeks “all requester information maintained in NextRequest for Request 26-11” in his further appeal of the Town’s March 19, 2026 supplemental response, I find it is unclear what specific records he is seeking. Accordingly, if Mr. McLeod seeks specific records, he may wish to clarify his written request in order to reasonably describe the requested records. G. L. c. 66, § 10(a)(i) (the request must reasonably describe the public record sought).

Mark J. Purple SPR26/1004 Page 4 April 2, 2026 Conclusion Accordingly, I will consider this administrative appeal closed. If Mr. McLeod wishes to submit an additional public records request to the Town, and is unsatisfied with the response, he may appeal that response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Spencer McLeod