Maskell, Lisa v. Quincy, City of (SPR 20261017)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records March 30, 2026 SPR26/1017 John E. Bacon, Esq. Special Housing Counsel City of Quincy 34 Coddington Street, Third Floor Quincy, MA 02169 Dear Attorney Bacon: I have received the petition of Lisa Maskell appealing the response of the City of Quincy (City) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On December 12, 2025, Ms. Maskell requested the following records related to an identified property: [1] Any housing restriction agreements, affordability restrictions, right of first refusal documents, Habitat for Humanity partnership documents, program files, or recorded or unrecorded municipal approvals affecting …Bower Road or its related restrictive covenants. [2] All internal and external communications, memoranda, analyses, drafts, or correspondence between your department and the City Solicitor’s Office, the Assessor’s Office, the Quincy Housing Authority, the Quincy Housing Authority Development Corporation, Habitat for Humanity, or any other municipal or private entity concerning owner occupancy requirements, affordability restrictions, interpretation of restrictive covenants, or any review, approval, or determination regarding rental use for …Bower Road. [3] Any records, approvals, analyses, or communications your department generated or received regarding whether …Bower Road could legally be conveyed, leased, rented, or otherwise used in a manner inconsistent with owner occupancy requirements, including any review, determination, or discussion of such use. One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

John E. Bacon, Esq. SPR26/1017 Page 2 March 30, 2026 This request includes emails, letters, draft documents, internal notes, digital files, attachments, file logs, and any materials relating in whole or in part to these matters. Following correspondence with the City, on December 21, 2025, Ms. Maskell stated, “I am agreeable to refining the date range of the request to January 1, 2015 through the present,” and made an additional request as follows: …I request production of any documents, instruments, amendments, waivers, approvals or any other recorded or unrecorded materials that were relied upon to conclude that rental use is lawful or that owner-occupancy requirements do not apply to …Bower Road. Please identify such authority by book and page, instrument number, or other citation… and specify where such documents reflect a modification, amendment, waiver, or lifting of owner-occupancy or land-use restrictions applicable to that property… The City responded on December 21, 2025 and December 24, 2025. Unsatisfied with the City’s responses, Ms. Maskell petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/1017, was opened as a result. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The City’s December 21st and December 24th Responses In its December 21, 2025 response, the City provided a responsive document and stated: …Quincy Housing Authority Development Corporation (QHADC) is the owner

John E. Bacon, Esq. SPR26/1017 Page 3 March 30, 2026 of …Bower and it is not a division of or connected with the City of Quincy. QHADC is an independent non-profit corporation… The City did exercise a 2nd right to purchase and did accept an assignment from South Shore Habitat for Humanity (SHHFH) of [i]ts rights in …Bower. The only restriction referenced in those documents that were reviewed by the City to make that assignment was a price restriction in the deed. QHADC exercised the SSHFH and City rights to purchase as assignee. QHADC was represented by its private attorneys in the negotiation of a P & S Agreement and the closing of that purchase transaction. Upon receipt of your PRR, I came to understand that you were concerned that there was restriction affecting …Bower requiring it be owner occupied. I searched the Registry records that were available carefully …I found what I believe you may be looking for and referencing. I have attached it here for you… In a reply to the City on December 21, 2025, Ms. Maskell stated, “[t]he document you provided does not answer the question raised in my Public Records Request, nor the very same question reiterated in my follow-up correspondence.” In its December 24, 2025 response, the City produced responsive records to each portion of the request, but sated: The City has not produced exempt records constituting attorney work product and materials protected by the attorney-client privilege (G.L. c. 4 § 7 (26)(d)… Emails by and between Housing Counsel… and employees of the City of Quincy have not been produced. The public record document that appears to affect the issue of owner occupancy of …Bower was not within the City’s records and was retrieved from the public records at the Norfolk County Registry of Deeds as an extension of citizen courtesy produced to you on December 21, 2025 and again herewith. Current Appeal In her appeal petition, Ms. Maskell argued: The response is deficient as it is non-responsive/omits the specific records requested, constituting a total lack of compliance… The [City] claimed a blanket privilege for withheld documents without any itemization. Massachusetts law requires the City to prove with specificity why each document is exempt. I request [the] City provide a detailed private log.

John E. Bacon, Esq. SPR26/1017 Page 4 March 30, 2026 Attorney Work Product Exemption (d) Exemption (d) allows the withholding of: inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d). Exemption (d) is intended to avoid premature release of materials that could taint the deliberative process if disclosed. Its application is limited to recommendations on legal and policy matters found within an ongoing deliberative process. See Babets v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 237 n.8 (1988). Factual reports which are reasonably complete and inferences which can be drawn from factual investigations, even if labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt as deliberative or policy making materials. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(d); see also Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (purely factual matters used in the development of government policy are subject to disclosure). The Supreme Judicial Court opined on the issue of attorney work product in DaRosa v. New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446 (2015). In DaRosa, the SJC concluded that “opinion” work product that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or its representative falls within the scope of Exemption (d) of the Public Records Law. DaRosa, 471 Mass. at 448. It also concluded that “fact” work product under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial falls within the scope of Exemption (d) where it is not a reasonably completed study or report or, if it is reasonably completed, where it is interwoven with opinions or analysis leading to opinions. Id. The Court left open “the question whether opinion work product might no longer be protected once the litigation is concluded,” noting that the answer “may depend on the particular circumstances, such as the risk of similar litigation.” Id. at 459 n.16. Common Law Attorney-Client Privilege A records custodian claiming the attorney-client privilege under the Public Records Law has the burden of not only proving the existence of an attorney-client relationship, but also (1) that the communications were received from a client during the course of the client's search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) that the communications were made in confidence; and (3) that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. See Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 449 Mass, 450 n.9 (2007); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapa & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 449 Mass. 609, 619 (2007) (stating that the party seeking the attorney-client privilege has the burden to show the privilege applies). Records

John E. Bacon, Esq. SPR26/1017 Page 5 March 30, 2026 custodians seeking to invoke the common law attorney-client privilege “are required to produce detailed indices to support their claims of privilege.” Suffolk, 449 Mass. at 460. Pursuant to the Public Records Law, in assessing whether a records custodian has properly withheld records based on the claim of attorney-client privilege the Supervisor of Records “shall require, as part of the decision making process, that the agency or municipality provide a detailed description of the record, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed.” G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). Based on the City’s responses, it is unclear how all of the emails withheld under the attorney work product doctrine constitute the type of “opinion” work product prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, as required under Exemption (d). See DaRosa, at 448. The City also has not demonstrated that all of the withheld information is not factual in nature, nor that the withheld information is interwoven with opinions or analysis leading to opinions. See Id. Further, it is unclear how the records may be withheld in their entirety. It should be noted that any non-exempt, segregable portion of a public record is subject to mandatory disclosure. G.L. c. 66, § 10(a). See Reinstein v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289-90 (1979) (the statutory exemptions are narrowly construed and are not blanket in nature). In addition, the City did not provide a detailed description of the records withheld under the attorney-client privilege, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed in accordance with G. L. c. 66, § 10A(a). The City has also not sufficiently established that the withheld communications were between a client and an attorney during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such. Additionally, the City must provide further information regarding whether the communications were made in confidence and demonstrate that the privilege as to these communications has not been waived. The City must clarify these matters. Conclusion Accordingly, the City is ordered to provide Ms. Maskell with a response to her request, provided in a manner consistent with this order, the Public Records Law, and its Regulations within ten (10) business days. A copy of any such response must be provided to this office. It is preferable to send an electronic copy of the response to this office at pre@sec.state.ma.us. Ms. Maskell may appeal the substantive nature of the City’s response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1).

John E. Bacon, Esq. SPR26/1017 Page 6 March 30, 2026 Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Lisa Maskell