Chichakly, Colin v. Springfield, City of (SPR 20261024)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records April 6, 2026 SPR26/1024 Alesia H. Days, Esq. Deputy City Solicitor City of Springfield 36 Court Street, Room 210 Springfield, MA 01103 Dear Attorney Days: I have received the petition of Colin Chichakly appealing the response of the City of Springfield (City) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). On March 13, 2026, Mr. Chichakly requested records related to, “call #26POI7872…” The Department responded on March 13, 2026. Unsatisfied with the response, Mr. Chichakly petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/1024, was opened as a result. Status of the Requestor Please note that the reason for which a requestor seeks access to or a copy of a public record does not afford any greater right of access to the requested information than other persons in the general public. The Public Records Law does not distinguish between requestors. Access to a record pursuant to the Public Records Law rests on the content of the record and not the circumstances of the requestor. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(a); see also Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976). Accordingly, Mr. Chichakly’s status will play no role in a determination as to whether the records should be disclosed or redacted under the Public Records Law. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § 10A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832 • Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Alesia H. Days SPR26/1024 Page 2 April 6, 2026 It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response a written, good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The City’s March 13th Response In its March 13, 2026 response, the City cited G. L. c. 41, § 97D as it operates through Exemption (a) and Exemption (c) of the Public Records Law to withhold a record. See G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a), (c). Current Appeal In his March 21, 2026 appeal to this office, Mr. Chichakly objected to the withholding of the record under Exemption (a) and (c) and stated, “…[t]he requested records are sought to determine whether an alleged incident reported to law enforcement was substantiated, including whether the reporting party engaged with responding officers…” In a March 24, 2026 email to this office and the City, Mr. Chichakly stated, “[t]he City…sent me this heavy redacted report in response to my appeal. I am highly disappointed and dissatisfied with their response. I am seeking this record for court proceedings. I already know that [an identified individual] placed the call on March 4th 2026 at 6:22 pm in regards to an alleged violation to a 209A and when officers were dispatched they were unable to make contact with the reporting party…” Exemption (a) Exemption (a), known as the statutory exemption, permits the withholding of records that are: specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by statute G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(a). A governmental entity may use the statutory exemption as a basis for withholding requested materials where the language of the exempting statute relied upon expressly or necessarily implies that the public’s right to inspect records under the Public Records Law is restricted. See Att’y Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 154 (1979); Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 545-546 (1977).

Alesia H. Days SPR26/1024 Page 3 April 6, 2026 This exemption creates two categories of exempt records. The first category includes records that are specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. Such statutes expressly state that such a record either “shall not be a public record,” “shall be kept confidential” or “shall not be subject to the disclosure provision of the Public Records Law.” The second category under the exemption includes records deemed exempt under statute by necessary implication. Such statutes expressly limit the dissemination of particular records to a defined group of individuals or entities. A statute is not a basis for exemption if it merely lists individuals or entities to whom the records are to be provided; the statute must expressly limit access to the listed individuals or entities. In its response, the City cited G. L. c. 41, § 97D to withhold the responsive record in its entirety. G. L. c. 41, § 97D provides in pertinent part: All reports of rape and sexual assault or attempts to commit such offenses, all reports of abuse perpetrated by family or household members, as defined in section 1 of chapter 209A, and all communications between police officers and victims of such offenses or abuse shall not be public reports and shall be maintained by the police departments in a manner that shall assure their confidentiality… G. L. c. 41, § 97D. Under Exemption (a), the City argues, “[t]he record you requested is specifically exempt from public disclosure and must be withheld as it involves a report and/or communication associated with an abuse prevention order violation. The release of this information is specifically exempt from public disclosure and limited to the victim and their representatives. Furthermore, the release of any domestic violence record information would result in an unwarranted invasion of the victim’s personal privacy. Therefore, your request must be denied.” Upon review, and based on the City’s response and Mr. Chichakly’s petition, where the responsive record is restricted from disclosure in its entirety by the Legislature under G. L. c. 41, § 97D as it operates through Exemption (a) of the Public Records Law, I find that the City has met its burden in responding to this request under the Public Records Law. See G. L. c. 41, § 97D (providing that these reports and communications “shall not be public reports and shall be maintained by the police departments in a manner that shall assure their confidentiality”). Exemption (c) Exemption (c) permits the withholding of: personnel and medical files or information and any other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that this subclause shall not apply to records related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation.

Alesia H. Days SPR26/1024 Page 4 April 6, 2026 G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c). Second Clause – Privacy Analysis under the second clause of Exemption (c) is subjective in nature and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know against the relevant privacy interests at stake. Torres v. Att’y Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984); Att’y Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r of Real Prop. Dep’t, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980). Therefore, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. This clause does not protect all data relating to specifically named individuals. Rather, there are factors to consider when assessing the weight of the privacy interest at stake: (1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from other sources. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). The types of personal information which the second clause of this exemption is designed to protect includes: marital status, paternity, substance abuse, government assistance, family disputes and reputation. Id. at 292 n.13; see also Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 427 (1988) (holding that a motor vehicle licensee has a privacy interest in disclosure of his social security number). This clause requires a balancing test which provides that where the public interest in obtaining the requested information substantially outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in preventing disclosure must yield. PETA, 477 Mass. at 291. The public has a recognized interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner. Id. at 292. Where the City has met its burden to withhold the responsive record under G. L. c. 41, § 97D as it operates through Exemption (a), I decline to opine on the applicability of Exemption (c) to the responsive record. Conclusion Accordingly, I will now consider this administrative appeal closed. If. Mr. Chichakly is not satisfied with the resolution of this administrative appeal, please be advised that this office shares jurisdiction with the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A(c) (pursuing administrative appeal does not limit availability of applicable judicial remedies).

Alesia H. Days SPR26/1024 Page 5 April 6, 2026 Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Colin Chichakly