Sharkey, Kyle v. Essex County District Attorney's Office (SPR 20261392)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Public Records Division Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records April 28, 2026 SPR26/1392 Kristen W. Jiang, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Appeals Division Essex County District Attorney’s Office 10 Federal Street Salem, MA 01970 Dear Attorney Jiang: I have received the petition of Kyle Sharkey appealing the response of the Essex County District Attorney’s Office (Office) to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A; see also 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). In four separate requests on March 27, 2026 and March 29, 2026, Mr. Sharkey requested the following: The March 27, 2026 Requests [1] [D]igital copy of the complete transcript including all sidebars for [an identified] case . . . including all pretrial hearings[;] [2] [D]igital copy of the complete Discovery/Case File including exhibits in [an identified] case . . . [.] Discovery #1 to Discovery #16[;] The March 29, 2026 Requests [3] [A]ll documentary materials in the custody and control of the . . . Office with any member or relation of the family related to [an identified individual]. In relation to . . . [an identified incident], as well [sic] . . . [an identified] restraining order[;] [4] [A]ll documentary materials regarding the communications with the North Andover Police Department into any aspect of [an identified incident]. . . . The Office responded on April 3, 2026. Unsatisfied with the Office’s response, Mr. Sharkey petitioned this office and this appeal, SPR26/1392, was opened as a result. While this One Ashburton Place, Room 1719, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 • (617) 727-2832• Fax: (617) 727-5914 sec.state.ma.us/pre • pre@sec.state.ma.us

Kristen W. Jiang, Esq. SPR26/1392 Page 2 April 28, 2026 appeal was pending, the Office provided supplemental responses to Mr. Sharkey and copied to this office on April 17, 2026. The Public Records Law The Public Records Law strongly favors disclosure by creating a presumption that all governmental records are public records. G. L. c. 66, § l0A(d); 950 C.M.R. 32.03(4). “Public records” is broadly defined to include all documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency or municipality of the Commonwealth, unless falling within a statutory exemption. G. L. c. 4, § 7(26). It is the burden of the records custodian to demonstrate the application of an exemption in order to withhold a requested record. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(iv); 950 C.M.R. 32.06(3); see also Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511 (1995) (custodian has the burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption). To meet the specificity requirement a custodian must not only cite an exemption, but must also state why the exemption applies to the withheld or redacted portion of the responsive record. If there are any fees associated with a response, a written good faith estimate must be provided. G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(viii); see also 950 C.M.R. 32.07(2). Once fees are paid, a records custodian must provide the responsive records. The Office’s April 3rd and April 17th Responses In its April 3, 2026 response, a representative of the Office stated, “. . . you submitted a series of public records [requests] to this Office relative to [an identified case and docket number] . . . The investigative file relative to this case is voluminous, and we are striving to process said requests in a timely manner. We appreciate your patience in awaiting a response.” In its initial April 17, 2026 supplemental response, a representative of the Office wrote in response to Mr. Sharkey’s “extensive requests on . . . [an identified] prosecution[.]” The Office representative reiterated the portion of its previous response, which noted, “the investigative file for this case is voluminous,” and indicated that “the scope of [Mr. Sharkey’s] request encompasses everything in it.” The Office representative went on to state that “[t]he surveillance footage, in particular” responsive to Request 2, above, “is labor intensive to review” and explained that they “[did] not anticipate that this Office will be able to produce the . . . materials [responsive to Request 2] in anything less than 60 days.” The Office additionally asked that Mr. Sharkey “advise as to whether [he] would like to narrow [Request 2] in any way.” In an email replying to the Office’s initial April 17th supplemental response, Mr. Sharkey provided a “schedule” and stated, “[p]lease confirm that records can be produced on this schedule, and possibly today. . .”

Kristen W. Jiang, Esq. SPR26/1392 Page 3 April 28, 2026 In its second April 17, 2026 supplemental response, an Office representative stated, “[t]his Office is not able to produce any records today and, as I stated, we will need at least 60 days to compile a full response [to Request 2], seeing as you maintain that you are seeking a copy of the entire investigative file.” In a subsequent email replying to the Office on April 17, 2026, Mr. Sharkey stated, “[t]he 60 days is fine, while in meantime I await the . . . production” of records responsive to Requests 1, 3, and 4. Current Appeal In his April 14, 2026 appeal petition, Mr. Sharkey states that he “[has] not received a full response” to his requests. In light of Mr. Sharkey’s April 17, 2026 email, as noted above, where he agrees to an extension of time for the Office to produce records, I find that the portion of his appeal regarding Request 2 is resolved. This office encourages Mr. Sharkey and the Office to continue communicating directly in order to resolve the outstanding issues. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(vi) (requestor may voluntarily agree to response date beyond timeframes set by statute). Breadth of Request; Reasonable Description of Records Sought In Friedman v. Div. of Admin. Law Appeal and Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, the Suffolk Superior Court, in its Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, stated: [The requester] has a right to seek public records from his government, provided he does so in a reasonable manner. [The agencies], in turn, have a right not to be inundated with drain-the-ocean records requests, provided they fulfill the basic expectations of the [Public Records Law] in a fair and transparent manner. The Court in Friedman noted, “the extraordinary volume of records called for in this case has compelled the Defendants to produce responsive materials in a ‘rolling’ fashion, rather than in accordance with deadlines contemplated by the [Public Records Law].” Id. at 1. The Court stated that: [T]he parties shall be expected to agree upon, to the greatest extent possible, the following: (a) appropriate definitions, time frames, and parameters regarding substance and scope for the identification of requested documents; (b) appropriate search terms to be used for the retrieval of responsive documents; (c) a reasonable time frame for the production of requested documents, if the statute’s presumptive deadlines are not realistic; (d) appropriate rules to govern the withholding of documents falling within the scope of a statutory privilege or privacy doctrine; and

Kristen W. Jiang, Esq. SPR26/1392 Page 4 April 28, 2026 (e) an appropriate methodology for computing the reasonable fees that may be charged for responsive document production. Id. at 2. In addition, please be aware that the request must reasonably describe the specific records sought. In a recent case, the Superior Court found that under the Public Records Law “[t]he reasonable description requirement contemplates that a requesting party will identify documents or categories of documents with sufficient particularity that government employees will be able to understand exactly what they are looking for, and then make a prompt production.” See Jaideep Chawla v. Dept. of Revenue, Suffolk Sup. No. 1784CV02087, at 2 (January 23, 2019). With regard to Requests 3 and 4, I find that the language “all documentary materials . . . with any member or relation of the family [sic] related to . . .” and “all documentary materials regarding the communications . . .” does not satisfy the statutory standard for a request that reasonably describes the public record sought. See Chawla, at 2. Mr. Sharkey may wish to clarify Requests 3 and 4 in order to reasonably describe the requested records. G. L. c 66, § 10(a)(i) (the request must reasonably describe the public record sought). Once Mr. Sharkey has provided the needed clarification, the Office must provide a response within 10 business days. Regarding Request 1, based on the Office’s responses, this office encourages Mr. Sharkey and the Office to communicate directly in order to facilitate providing records more efficiently and affordably. Mr. Sharkey may wish to narrow his request. The Office must use its superior knowledge of the records to suggest any further potential reasonable modifications to the request. See G. L. c. 66, § 10(b)(vii) (an agency shall suggest a reasonable modification of the scope of the request or offer to assist the requestor to modify the scope of the request if doing so would enable the agency to produce the records sought more efficiently and affordably). Conclusion If outstanding issues remain after Mr. Sharkey and the Office communicate further as described above, Mr. Sharkey may appeal the substantive nature of the Office’s response within ninety (90) days. See 950 C.M.R. 32.08(1). Sincerely, Manza Arthur Supervisor of Records cc: Kyle Sharkey